Judge: Thomas D. Long, Case: 22STCV19334, Date: 2023-05-25 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV19334 Hearing Date: May 25, 2023 Dept: 48
SUPERIOR
COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT
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TIMOTHY PHILIPS, Plaintiff, vs. SEIZMIC, INC., Defendant. |
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[TENTATIVE] ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO CONTINUE
AS SURVIVAL ACTION; OVERRULING DEMURRER TO SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT; GRANTING
MOTION TO STRIKE Dept. 48 8:30 a.m. May 25, 2023 |
On
December 29, 2022, Plaintiff Timothy Philips filed a second amended complaint (“SAC”)
against Defendant Seizmic, Inc.
On
January 30, 2023, Defendant filed a demurrer to the fifth and sixth causes of action. Defendant also filed a motion to strike.
On
March 2, 2023, Plaintiff’s counsel filed this motion to continue the case as a survival
action through Michelle Philips, the successor in interest for Plaintiff, who is
now deceased. No oppositions were filed.
MOTION TO CONTINUE CASE AS
SURVIVAL ACTION
“A
cause of action that survives the death of the person entitled to commence an action
or proceeding passes to the decedent’s successor in interest . . . and an action
may be commenced by the decedent’s personal representatives or, if none, by the
decedent’s successor in interest.” (Code
Civ. Proc., § 377.30.) After the death of
a plaintiff, the court, on motion, shall allow a pending action that does not abate
to be continued by the decedent’s personal representative or successor-in-interest. (Code Civ. Proc., § 377.31.)
The
person who seeks to commence or continue a pending action as the decedent’s successor
in interest shall execute and file an affidavit or declaration that includes (1)
the decedent’s name; (2) the date and place of decedent’s death; (3) “No proceeding
is now pending in California for administration of the decedent’s estate”; (4) a
copy of the final order showing the distribution of the decedent’s cause of action
to the successor-in-interest, if the decedent’s estate was administered; (5) either
the declarant is the decedent’s successor in interest or the declarant is authorized
to act on behalf of the decedent’s successor in interest, with facts in support
thereof; (6) “No other person has a superior right to commence the action or proceeding
or to be substituted for the decedent in the pending action or proceeding”; and
(7) that the statements are true, under penalty of perjury. (Code Civ. Proc., § 377.32, subd. (a).) The affidavit or declaration must attach a certified
copy of the decedent’s death certificate.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 377.32, subd. (c).)
Michelle
Philips declares that Plaintiff passed away on February 23, 2023 at their home in
West Covina, California. (Philips Decl. ¶
3.) She declares that there is no proceeding
pending in California for the administration of Plaintiff’s estate. (Id. at ¶ 5.) As Plaintiff’s widow, she declares that she is
the successor in interest under Code of Civil Procedure section 377.11. (Id. at ¶ 4.) “No other person has a superior right to commence
the action or proceeding or to be substituted for the decedent in the pending action
or proceeding.” (Id. at ¶ 6.) She declares that her statements are true under
penalty of perjury. The copy of the death
certificate attached to her original declaration does not appear to be a complete,
certified copy, as required by statute. (See
Philips Decl., Ex. 1.) Accordingly, the Court
continued the motion. Michelle Philips filed
a supplemental declaration on May 12, 2023 with a certified copy of Plaintiff’s
death certificate.
The
motion to continue this action as a survival action by substituting Michelle Philips
as successor in interest is GRANTED.
DEMURRER
Defendant
demurs to the fifth through tenth causes of action. A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint
states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda
(2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering
demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context, accepting the alleged
facts as true. (Nolte v. Cedars-Sinai
Medical Center (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1406.)
A. The SAC Sufficiently Pleads a Violation
of Labor Code § 1102.5 (Fifth Cause of Action).
An
employer may not prevent or retaliate against an employee who discloses (or an employee
that the employer believes may disclose) information about a violation of state or federal statute, or a
violation of or noncompliance with a local, state, or federal rule or regulation
(Lab. Code, § 1102.5.)
When
sustaining a demurrer to the FAC, the Court noted that Plaintiff did not identify
any violation of state or federal statute, or a violation of or noncompliance with
a local, state, or federal rule or regulation.
The SAC now alleges that Defendant’s failure to inform employees about a
coworker’s positive COVID-19 test violated Labor Code section 6400, subdivision
(a), which requires that “(e)very employer shall furnish employment and a place
of employment that is safe and healthful for the employees therein.” (SAC ¶¶ 22-25.) Plaintiff complained to his supervisors about
this safety violation, and they terminated his employment. (SAC ¶¶ 24-26.)
Because
the FAC now alleges that Plaintiff complained about a violation of a specific state
statute, the demurrer is overruled.
B. The SAC Sufficiently Pleads a Violation
of Labor Code § 6310 (Sixth Cause of Action).
An
employer may not discharge or discriminate against any employee who makes an oral
or written complaint of unsafe working conditions. (Lab. Code, § 6310, subds. (a)-(b).)
Plaintiff
previously alleged that he complained “about the lack of communication and their
safety violations” (FAC ¶ 24), and Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff “as
a result of his complaints of the lack of notification of a [COVID-19] exposure”
(FAC ¶ 101).
The
SAC now alleges that Defendant “discriminated against him as a result of her complaints
of the lack of notification of a COVID-19 exposure—disclosure of what PLAINTIFF
believed were violations of the law or noncompliance with the law.” (SAC ¶ 96.)
Plaintiff “had reasonable cause to believe that his complaints disclosed
a violation of state or federal statute, or violation of noncompliance with local,
state, or federal rule or regulation, specifically Labor Code section 6400(a) .
. . .” (SAC ¶ 97.) These allegations now identify Plaintiff’s complaints
about specific unsafe working conditions.
The
demurrer is overruled.
C. Conclusion
The
demurrer to the fifth and sixth causes of action is OVERRULED. Defendant is ordered to file an answer within
10 days. (California Rules of Court, rule
3.1320(j)(1).)
MOTION TO STRIKE
The
court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion: (1) strike out any irrelevant,
false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any
part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California,
a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code
Civ. Proc., § 436, subds. (a)-(b).)
Defendant
moves to strike allegations related to punitive damages (SAC ¶¶ 46, 60, 70, 79,
91, 103, 111, and Prayer for Relief ¶ 7).
A plaintiff can recover punitive damages in tort cases where “the defendant
has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.” (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (a).) “The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed
is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages. [Citation.]
Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud or malice, but
facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim. [Citation.]” (Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d
159, 166, fn. omitted.)
Plaintiff’s
allegation that Defendant intentionally retaliated against him bv terminating his
employment and attempting to hide the illegal reason with a false explanation (see
SAC ¶ 28) could support a finding of malice.
However,
a corporate employer can be liable for punitive damages only when an officer, director,
or managing agent of the corporation authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct
or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (b).) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s President (Mr.
Woroniecki)
and CEO (Mr. Fateen) were present when Plaintiff complained to his supervisors about
safety violations. (SAC ¶ 24.) Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Medina terminated his
employment. (SAC ¶ 26.) There are no allegations about Mr. Medina as an
officer, director, or managing agent, and no allegations that Mr. Woroniecki
or Mr. Fateen authorized or ratified the termination. The allegation that Defendant “authorized, condoned
and/or ratified the unlawful conduct” is conclusory. (SAC ¶ 104.)
The
motion to strike is GRANTED.
Plaintiff
has already had the opportunity to amend and failed to remedy the deficiencies. Accordingly, no further leave to amend is granted. If Plaintiff later obtains evidence supporting punitive damages, he may seek
leave to amend through a properly noticed motion.
Moving
party to give notice.
Parties
who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMCDEPT48@lacourt.org
indicating intention to submit. Parties intending
to appear are encouraged to appear remotely and should be prepared to comply with
Dept. 48’s new requirement that those attending court in person wear a surgical
or N95 or KN95 mask.
Dated this 25th day of May 2023
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Hon. Thomas D. Long Judge of the Superior
Court |