Judge: Thomas D. Long, Case: 22STCV21710, Date: 2023-05-11 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV21710    Hearing Date: July 11, 2023    Dept: 48

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

On October 14, 2022, Plaintiff Johnny Rivas, as an “aggrieved employee,” filed a first amended complaint (“FAC”) against Defendants Emerald Los Angeles LLC and Oceanside Laundry LLC dba Emerald Los Angeles LLC, asserting a single cause of action for civil penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”) due to Defendants’ violations of the Labor Code.

On December 14, 2022, Defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration and dismiss the case.

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE AND OBJECTIONS

Defendants’ request for judicial notice of Exhibits 1-4 is denied as irrelevant because these filings are already part of the case record.

Defendants’ request for judicial notice of Exhibits 6-11 is denied as irrelevant.  These are unpublished and nonbinding orders in other cases that Defendants appear to rely on as binding, or at least persuasive, authority.  They are also irrelevant to the issues in this case.

Defendants’ request for judicial notice of Exhibit 12 is denied as irrelevant.  It is not cited in the motion, and a declaration filed to compel arbitration in another case is not relevant here.

For these reasons, Plaintiff’s objections to Exhibits 5-12 are sustained.

DISCUSSION

When seeking to compel arbitration of a plaintiff’s claims, the defendant must allege the existence of an agreement to arbitrate.  (Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 219.)  The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to prove the falsity of the agreement.  (Ibid.)  After the Court determines that an agreement to arbitrate exists, it then considers objections to its enforceability.  (Ibid.)  The Court must grant a petition to compel arbitration unless the defendant has waived the right to compel arbitration or if there are grounds to revoke the arbitration agreement.  (Ibid.; Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2.)

Defendants contend that on October 26, 2021, Plaintiff signed an arbitration agreement in connection with his new hire paperwork.  (Motion at p. 2; Beach Decl. ¶ 6.)  Defendants provide a copy of the Arbitration Agreement.  (Beach Decl., Ex. B [“Arbitration Agreement”].)

The Arbitration Agreement expressly “does not apply to private attorney general representative actions brought on behalf of the state under the California Labor Code, but any claim on your own behalf as an aggrieved employee for recovery of unpaid wages (as opposed to representative claims for civil penalties) shall be arbitral and covered by this Agreement.”  (Arbitration Agreement, ¶ 2.)

Defendants seek to compel Plaintiff to submit his individual PAGA claim to arbitration and to dismiss the claims of other aggrieved employees.  (Motion at p. 1.)  According to Defendants, “The language of Plaintiff’s pleadings make[s] clear that he has his own individual claim as an aggrieved employee for alleged Labor Code violations for which he seeks penalties pursuant to PAGA.”  (Motion at p. 4.)  Defendants argue that Plaintiff must have an individual PAGA claim in addition to his non-arbitral representative PAGA claim because “[u]nder Viking River and California law, he cannot maintain a representative PAGA action without having at least one, individual PAGA claim.”  (See Motion at pp. 10-13.)

“PAGA actions are ‘representative’ in that they are brought by employees acting as representatives—that is, as agents or proxies—of the State.  But PAGA claims are also called ‘representative’ when they are predicated on code violations sustained by other employees.  In the first sense, ‘“every PAGA action is . . .  representative”’ and ‘[t]here is no individual component to a PAGA action,’ [citation], because every PAGA claim is asserted in a representative capacity.  But when the word ‘representative’ is used in the second way, it makes sense to distinguish ‘individual’ PAGA claims, which are premised on Labor Code violations actually sustained by the plaintiff, from ‘representative’ (or perhaps quasi-representative) PAGA claims arising out of events involving other employees.”  (Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 142 S.Ct. 1906, 1916 (Viking River).)

The FAC states that “Plaintiff bring[s] this action against Defendants seeking only to recover penalties on behalf of all Aggrieved Employees that worked for Defendants, and on behalf of the State of California.  Plaintiff does not seek to recover anything other than penalties as permitted by California Labor Code Section 2699 at this time.  To the extent that statutory violations are mentioned for wage violations, Plaintiff does not seek underlying general and/or special damages for those violations, but simply penalties as permitted by California Labor Code Section 2699, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief for himself and all aggrieved employees as permitted by the PAGA.”  (FAC ¶ 4.)  The FAC prays for declaratory relief, civil penalties, attorney fees and costs, and “such other and further relief as the Court may deem equitable and appropriate.”  (FAC at p. 11.)  No unpaid wages are sought.

Plaintiff’s claim is therefore only a “private attorney general representative action[] brought on behalf of the state under the California Labor Code” seeking civil penalties, which is excluded from the Arbitration Agreement.  (Arbitration Agreement, ¶ 2.)  To the extent that Plaintiff has “individual” claims premised on Labor Code violations actually sustained by him, they are still “representative” claims brought as an agent or proxy of the state.  (See Viking River, supra, 142 S.Ct. at p. 1916.)  Plaintiff does not assert “any claim on [his] own behalf as an aggrieved employee for recovery of unpaid wages (as opposed to representative claims for civil penalties),” which would be subject to arbitration.  (Arbitration Agreement, ¶ 2.) 

Because Plaintiff’s PAGA claim is expressly excluded from the Arbitration Agreement, the motion is denied.

CONCLUSION

The motion to compel arbitration and dismiss the case is DENIED.

Moving party to give notice.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMCDEPT48@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit.  Parties intending to appear are encouraged to appear remotely and should be prepared to comply with Dept. 48’s new requirement that those attending court in person wear a surgical or N95 or KN95 mask.

      Dated this 11th day of July 2023