Judge Thomas D. Long, Case Number: 22STCV24227, Date: 2023-09-14 Tentative Ruling

On July 27, 2022, Plaintiff K.A. filed this action against Defendant Doe 1 arising from childhood sexual assault. Plaintiff alleges that in 1984, she was abducted, assaulted, molested, and raped by Pastor A in Indiana, and Defendant was the California corporation that governed the local church. (E.g., Complaint ¶¶ 3, 21-22.) She now brings claims for negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress against Defendant under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1.

On September 6, 2023, Defendant filed a demurrer. Defendant’s request for judicial notice is granted.

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context, accepting the alleged facts as true. (Nolte v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1406.)

Section 340.1 governs actions for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault, including actions “against any person or entity who owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, if a wrongful or negligent act by that person or entity was a legal cause of the childhood sexual assault that resulted in the injury to the plaintiff” and actions “against any person or entity if an intentional act by that person or entity was a legal cause of the childhood sexual assault that resulted in the injury to the plaintiff.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 340.1, subd. (a); see Code Civ. Proc., § 340.1, subd. (q) [reviving previously barred claims].) “Childhood sexual assault” includes any act committed against the plaintiff that occurred when the plaintiff was under the age of 18 years and that would have been proscribed by specific sections of the Penal Code “or any prior laws of this state of similar effect at the time the act was committed.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 340.1, subd. (d).)

Defendant argues that all causes of action are barred by the statute of limitations because section 340.1 does not apply.

Defendant first relies on Code of Civil Procedure section 361, which states: “When a cause of action has arisen in another State, or in a foreign country, and by the laws thereof an action thereon cannot there be maintained against a person by reason of the lapse of time, an action thereon shall not be maintained against him in this State, except in favor of one who has been a citizen of this State, and who has held the cause of action from the time it accrued.” (Demurrer at p. 3.) However, section 340.1’s revival provision applies “[n]otwithstanding any other law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 340.1, subd. (q).) “[C]ourts have held regarding a variety of subjects that a provision that includes such a phrase controls over other provisions of law regarding the same subject.” (Young v. Midland Funding LLC (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 63, 94.) Section 361 does not apply.

Next, Defendant argues that if section 361 does not apply, the governmental interest analysis from McCann v. Foster Wheeler LLC (2010) 48 Cal.4th 68 (McCann) requires application of Indiana’s, not California’s, statute of limitations. (Demurrer at p. 3.)

“[I]n those instances in which section 361 does not mandate application of another jurisdiction’s statute of limitations or statute of repose the question whether the relevant California statute of limitations (or statute of repose) or, instead, another jurisdiction’s statute of limitations (or statute of repose) should be applied in a particular case must be determined through application of the governmental interest analysis that governs choice-of-law issues generally.” (McCann, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 87.) “‘In brief outline, the governmental interest approach generally involves three steps. First, the court determines whether the relevant law of each of the potentially affected jurisdictions with regard to the particular issue in question is the same or different. Second, if there is a difference, the court examines each jurisdiction’s interest in the application of its own law under the circumstances of the particular case to determine whether a true conflict exists. Third, if the court finds that there is a true conflict, it carefully evaluates and compares the nature and strength of the interest of each jurisdiction in the application of its own law ‘to determine which state’s interest would be more impaired if its policy were subordinated to the policy of the other state’ [citation] and then ultimately applies ‘the law of the state whose interest would be more impaired if its law were not applied.”’ [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 87-88.)

Defendant compares this case to the persuasive authority of Rodriguez v. Mahony (C.D. Cal., Mar. 26, 2012, No. CV 10-02902-JST JEMX) 2012 WL 1057428 (Rodriguez). (Demurrer at pp. 9-10.) There, the California defendants (a priest and Archdiocese) moved for judgment on the pleadings for section 340.1 claims brought by a Mexican plaintiff who was sexually abused by another priest in Mexico. (Rodriguez, supra, 2012 WL 1057428 at pp. *1-2.) The district court found that section 361 did not apply, so it applied the governmental interest analysis from McCann. (Id. at pp. *6-11.) For the first prong, the court found that there were analogous torts under Puebla law, and there was no dispute that the statute of limitations for similar causes of action there differed from the statute of limitations applicable to the Plaintiff’s claims under California law. (Id. at pp. *7-9.)

That is also true here: Plaintiff alleges that she was 17 years old when she was assaulted in 1984. (Complaint ¶ 1.) Indiana currently has a two-year statute of limitations for injury to person (such as Plaintiff’s claims for IIED and NIED) and a seven-year statute of limitations for injury to a person that results from the sexual abuse of a child. (Ind. Code Ann. § 34-11-2-4(b).) Therefore, Indiana law would bar Plaintiff’s claims, in conflict with California law.

Because there is a difference in law, next the Court must examine each jurisdiction’s interest in the application of its own law under the circumstances of the particular case to determine whether a true conflict exists. As the Rodriguez court recognized (Rodriguez, supra, 2012 WL 1057428, at p. *9), California has an interest in applying its revival statute: “[T]he Legislature’s goal in enacting subdivision (b)(2) was to expand the ability of victims of childhood abuse to sue those responsible for the injuries they sustained as a result of that abuse. . . . The overall goal of section 340.1 is to allow victims of childhood sexual abuse a longer time period in which to bring suit against their abusers. [Citation.] The legislative history makes this abundantly clear. The statute has been amended numerous times since its enactment in 1986, to enlarge the period for filing claims to hold molesters accountable for their behavior so that they are not ‘off the hook’ as soon as their victims reach age 21, [citation] [and] to extend the expanded limitations period to actions not just against molesters, but against any person or entity who owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, where a wrongful or negligent act by that person or entity was a legal cause of the childhood sexual abuse.” (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 545, internal quotation marks omitted.) On the other hand, Indiana also has an interest in applying its own statutes of limitations for harms that occurred in Indiana. (E.g., A.M. v. Roman Catholic Church (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) 669 N.E.2d 1034, 1037 [“Statutes of limitation are favored because they afford security against stale claims and promote the peace and welfare of society. [Citation.] They are enacted upon the presumption that one having a well-founded claim will not delay in enforcing it.”].)

Plaintiff argues that the Rodriguez plaintiff conceded that a true conflict existed, so that court had no occasion to engage with the California cases of Ashland, Corondoni, or Nelson. (Opposition at p. 4.) The Rodriguez court noted that “there is no dispute that the statute of limitations for a cause of action for illicit acts under Puebla law differs from that applicable to Plaintiff’s Common Law Claims under California law.” (Rodriguez, supra, 2012 WL 1057428, at p. *8.) Plaintiff here does not expressly concede that there is a true conflict in the laws, but she must. There is no doubt that Indiana’s shorter two-year or seven-year limitations periods have long passed, and they conflict with California’s longer, revived limitations period in section 340.1.

Moreover, Ashland and Nelson applied California’s shorter statutes of limitations to claims brought by out-of-state plaintiffs against California defendants, noting the policy intent to protect the state’s residents from stale claims. (Ashland Chemical Co. v. Provence (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 790, 794; Nelson v. International Paint Co. (9th Cir. 1983) 716 F.2d 640, 644-645.) In Corondoni, application of the foreign state’s law would not have protected the defendant, and thus application of the California time period did not offend the other state’s public policy. (American Bank of Commerce v. Corondoni (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 368, 373.) That differs from this case, where the California Defendant faces a longer statute of limitations period in California for claims based on conduct and harm in Indiana—underlying conduct that is long past the applicable limitations periods.

Finally, for the third prong, the Court must consider the comparative impairment analysis. In Rodriguez, the plaintiff was a resident of Puebla, the abuser was a resident of Puebla, and the abuse and injury occurred in Puebla. (Rodriguez, supra, 2012 WL 1057428, at p. *10.) Although the California defendants’ conduct occurred entirely in California, “the tort for which Plaintiff seeks to hold the California Defendants liable was completed and accrued in Puebla,” so “Puebla’s interests would be most significantly impaired by a failure to apply its statute of limitations to Plaintiff’s claims.” (Ibid.) “In comparison, California’s interest in applying section 340.1 is relatively weak under the specific facts of this case, which involve claims brought by a Plaintiff with no connection to California based on childhood abuse that did not occur in California. Moreover, while, as outlined above, California has an interest in deterring the California Defendants’ wrongful conduct, that interest will ‘only be “negligibly” advanced if claims by nonresidents of California proceed in this forum.’” (Id. at p. *11.)

Once again, the same is true here. “Plaintiff is, and at all relevant times has been, a resident of Indiana.” (Complaint ¶ 1.) Pastor A sexually abused Plaintiff in Indiana. (E.g., Complaint ¶¶ 21-31.) Plaintiff attempts to hold Defendant liable for Pastor A’s conduct in Indiana through its California-based operation, control, and governance of local church branches, including the Indiana church of Plaintiff and Pastor A. (See Complaint ¶¶ 12-20.) Like in Rodriguez, “California’s interest in applying section 340.1 is relatively weak under the specific facts of this case, which involve claims brought by a Plaintiff with no connection to California based on childhood abuse that did not occur in California.” (Rodriguez, supra, 2012 WL 1057428, at p. *11.)

After thorough consideration of the governmental interest analysis, the Court finds that this action presents the same problem that borrowing statutes (like section 361) were intended to address, and why the governmental interest analysis is required when a borrowing statute does not apply: “A more problematic situation was presented, however, when the period provided in the applicable statute of limitations of the forum state was longer than that in the applicable statute of limitations in the state where the cause of action arose. In that setting, a plaintiff who failed to timely file an action in the state in which the action arose would be provided the opportunity to search out another jurisdiction in which the applicable period under the relevant statute of limitations for the cause of action at issue was longer and in which the action could be maintained—a classic example of questionable forum shopping.” (McCann, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 84.)

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Indiana’s statutes of limitations must apply, and Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant are time-barred.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMCDEPT48@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit. If all parties in the case submit on the tentative ruling, no appearances before the Court are required unless a companion hearing (for example, a Case Management Conference) is also on calendar.

Hon. Thomas D. Long

Judge of the Superior Court