Judge Thomas D. Long, Case 22STCV31501 2023-03-30 Tentative Ruling

On September 26, 2022, Plaintiff Diana Lands Nathanson filed this action against Defendant Alexander Gervasi aka Sacha Gervasi, alleging (1) sexual battery; (2) battery; (3) assault; (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”); (5) false imprisonment; (6) gender violence; and (7) harassment/hostile work environment.

On December 1, 2022, Defendant filed a demurrer to the fourth and fifth causes of action and a motion to strike.

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context, accepting the alleged facts as true. (Nolte v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1406.)

“‘[T]o state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress a plaintiff must show: (1) outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) the defendant’s intention of causing or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress; (3) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (4) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.’ [Citation.] ‘Conduct, to be ‘outrageous’ must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized society.’ [Citation.]” (Huntingdon Life Sciences, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1259.)

Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to adequately describe the nature, extent, and duration of her alleged emotional injuries. (Demurrer at p. 5.) Plaintiff alleges sexual battery by Defendant occurring on July 9, 2021 and January 3, 2022. (Complaint ¶¶ 19, 28; see id. ¶¶ 50-51.) She continued to work on projects for Defendant, and “[d]uring the time Lands continued to perform services for Gervasi and de Rothschild, however, she suffered constant distress and anxiety, she was unable to sleep normally, and the situation was affecting her health.” (Complaint ¶ 29.) This sufficiently alleges Plaintiff’s emotional distress.

False imprisonment “consists of the ‘“nonconsensual, intentional confinement of a person, without lawful privilege, for an appreciable length of time, however short.”’” (Fermino v. Fedco, Inc. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 701, 715 (Fermino).)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant “intentionally deprived Plaintiff of freedom of movement by closing the door and physically blocking her from leaving the office of his Hollywood Hills home in January 2022 and by trying to trap her at her car in the motor court in the front yard of his Hollywood Hills home.” (Complaint ¶ 56.) Specifically, during the alleged sexual battery, Plaintiff tried to leave but Defendant closed the door and pushed his body against Plaintiff. (Complaint ¶ 28.) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant “[tried] to trap her at her car in the motor court in the front yard of his Hollywood Hills home.” (Complaint ¶ 56.) During that alleged sexual battery, Defendant “pushed her against the car and forced his body against hers.” (Complaint ¶ 19.) Plaintiff “told him to stop and he would not listen. Lands was finally able to push him off enough to get into the car and close the door. (Complaint ¶ 19.)

Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to plead that she was confined for any appreciable amount of time. (Demurrer at p. 6.) Defendant notes that Plaintiff does not allege that he locked the door of the room, and the allegations do not establish “confinement” for an “appreciable length of time.” (Ibid.) Although Fermino stated that the “length of time can be as brief as 15 minutes,” it did so with citation to another case where those were the facts. (Fermino, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 715.) It did not state that fifteen minutes was a legal minimum; rather, the confinement can be “however short” so long as the length of time is “appreciable.” (Ibid.) Whether Defendant’s alleged confinements of Plaintiff were “for an appreciable length of time” is a factual determination that cannot be resolved on demurrer.

The demurrer is OVERRULED. Defendant is ordered to file an answer within five days.

The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subds. (a)-(b).)

Defendant moves to strike “broad and inappropriate allegations about Gervasi’s general character” at paragraph 1, line 1 (first sentence) and lines 6-8 (“In private . . . harassing conduct”), and paragraph 14, lines 23-27 (“Throughout the years . . . inappropriate behavior.”)

The identified lines in paragraph 1 are irrelevant to Plaintiff’s claims, which arise from two separate incidents and not an ongoing pattern or practice. The motion to strike is GRANTED as to paragraph 1, lines 1 and 6-8, without leave to amend.

The identified lines in paragraph 14 are relevant to why Plaintiff “thought she could continue [to] maintain sufficient distance to complete each of the projects for which Gervasi and de Rothschild had hired her.” (Complaint ¶ 14.) The motion to strike is DENIED as to these lines.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMCDEPT48@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit. Parties intending to appear are encouraged to appear remotely and should be prepared to comply with Dept. 48’s new requirement that those attending court in person wear a surgical or N95 or KN95 mask.

Hon. Thomas D. Long

Judge of the Superior Court