Judge Thomas D. Long, Case 22STCV34291 2023-04-20 Tentative Ruling

On October 25, 2022, Plaintiffs John HJ Doe and John HB Doe filed this action against Defendants County of Los Angeles and Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services, alleging (1) violation of Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act (“CANRA”); (2) breach of mandatory duties; (3) breach of special duty arising under special relationship; (4) negligence; (5) negligent supervision; and (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”).

On December 16, 2022, County of Los Angeles (“Defendant”) filed a demurrer and motion to strike.

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context, accepting the alleged facts as true. (Nolte v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1406.) A special demurrer for uncertainty under Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (f) is disfavored and will only be sustained where the pleading is so bad that defendant or plaintiff cannot reasonably respond—i.e., cannot reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what counts or claims are directed against him or her. (Khoury v. Maly’s of Calif., Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)

Defendant argues that because Defendant is the recipient of reports of child abuse, it cannot breach a mandatory duty to report under CANRA. (Demurrer at p. 5.)

The Complaint alleges that Defendant, through its employees and agents, is a mandated reporter of child abuse. (Complaint ¶ 68.) “Mandated reporters” include social workers. (Pen. Code, § 11165.7, subd. (a)(15).) Plaintiffs reported their abuse to social workers and employees of the County’s Department of Children and Family Services. (Complaint ¶ 34.)

The Complaint also alleges that Defendant failed to cross-report to law enforcement and the District Attorney’s office and failed to properly train their employees regarding the duties of mandated reporters. (Complaint ¶ 69.) This is required under CANRA both currently and at the time of the alleged abuse. (Pen. Code, § 11166, subd. (j)(1) [current version]; Pen. Code, § 11166, subd. (i) [effective to Dec. 31, 2000].) Defendant does not address this portion of the first cause of action’s allegations.

In reply, Defendant argues that the “Complaint is devoid of any specific allegations that could overcome the immunity afforded to Child Service Workers under California Government Code § 820.21.” (Reply at p. 2.) This was not a ground originally raised in the motion.

Defendant argues that the first cause of action is duplicative of the second, third, fourth, and fifth causes of action. (Demurrer at pp. 5-6.)

The second cause of action for breach of mandatory duties alleges breaches of other mandatory duties in addition to those under CANRA. (Complaint ¶ 75.) The third and fourth causes of action allege breaches of duties sounding in negligence, not violations of statutory duties. (See Complaint ¶¶ 79-89.) These causes of action do not make the first cause of action duplicative.

The fifth cause of action alleges negligent supervision of Plaintiffs while in the foster care system and failure to report their abuse. (See Complaint ¶¶ 91-99, 103-109.) Although both the first and fifth causes of action allege failure to report abuse, the first cause of action alleges more violations of CANRA, and Plaintiffs can plead alternative theories.

C. There is a Statutory Basis for Defendant’s Liability on the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Causes of Action.

Defendant argues that the third (breach of duty arising under special relationship), fourth (negligence), and fifth (negligent supervision) causes of action have no statutory basis. (Demurrer at p. 6.)

A public entity is not liable for an injury arising from an act or omission of the entity, a public employee, or any other person except as provided by statute. (Gov. Code, § 815.) A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee within the scope of his employment if the act or omission would have given rise to a cause of action against that employee. (Gov. Code, § 815.2, subd. (a).)

Defendant acknowledges that it can be directly liable for breach of a mandatory duty, such as liability for injuries to children in foster care that occur as a result of a violation of the mandatory duties of the public entity. (Demurrer at p. 6; Gov. Code, § 815.6.) The third, fourth, and fifth causes of action arise in part from Defendant’s and its employees’ failure to report child abuse, in violation of their mandatory duties. (See Complaint ¶¶ 81, 85-87, 97.)

The demurrer to the third, fourth, and fifth causes of action is overruled on this ground.

Defendant argues that negligent supervision of a minor is not a separate cause of action. (Demurrer at p. 6.) A public employee may be liable for negligence in the supervision of a minor in foster care. (See Scott v. County of Los Angeles (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 125, 142.) And Defendant may be liable for these acts or omissions by its employees. (Gov. Code, § 815.2, subd. (a).)

Defendant also argues that this cause of action is duplicative of the second cause of action for breach of mandatory duties and does not add further facts or theories. (See Demurrer at p. 7.)

The fifth cause of action alleges that Defendant was negligent in its supervision of Plaintiffs by not investigating the perpetrator, not warning Plaintiffs, and not protecting Plaintiffs from the known abuse. (Complaint ¶¶ 91-92.) Plaintiffs allege this constitutes negligence per se due to the failure to report abuse. (See Complaint ¶¶ 100-109.) The second cause of action for breach of mandatory duties similarly alleges that Defendant violated specific mandatory duties. (Complaint ¶ 75.) The second cause of action essentially alleges the same negligence elements as the fifth cause of action.

The demurrer to the fifth cause of action is sustained with leave to amend to consolidate the allegations in the second and fifth causes of action.

E. The Sixth Cause of Action Does Not Sufficiently Allege the Basis for Defendant’s Liability.

Defendant argues that the sixth cause of action for IIED is based in common law with no statutory basis for Defendant’s liability. (Demurrer at p. 7.)

Defendant can be vicariously liable for its employees’ actions that gave rise to IIED. (Gov. Code, § 815.2, subd. (a); see Lawson v. Superior Court (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1372, 1389.) However, the Complaint does not clearly allege an employee’s acts. The Complaint alleges that Defendant placed the perpetrator in a position of care and control over Plaintiffs, which led to the abuse. (Complaint ¶ 114.) It does not identify any individual employee or clearly plead acts that give rise to a cause of action against an employee.

The demurrer to the fifth and sixth causes of action is SUSTAINED with 20 days’ leave to amend. The demurrer is otherwise OVERRULED.

The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subds. (a)-(b).)

Defendant moves to strike the prayer for punitive damages. (Motion at p. 4.) A public entity is not liable for punitive damages or other damages imposed primarily for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant. (Gov. Code, § 818.)

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMCDEPT48@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit. Parties intending to appear are encouraged to appear remotely and should be prepared to comply with Dept. 48’s new requirement that those attending court in person wear a surgical or N95 or KN95 mask.

Hon. Thomas D. Long

Judge of the Superior Court