Judge Thomas D. Long, Case Number: 22STCV36009, Date: 2023-10-12 Tentative Ruling

On November 10, 2022, Plaintiff Luis Abundes filed this action against Defendant Antonio Perez and others.

On February 2, 2023, Defendant filed a demurrer to the first cause of action for quiet title, the only cause of action brought against him.

At the original June 6, 2023 hearing on the motion, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to amend, continued the hearing on the demurrer, and allowed supplemental briefing.

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context, accepting the alleged facts as true. (Nolte v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1406.) “Because a demurrer challenges defects on the face of the complaint, it can only refer to matters outside the pleading that are subject to judicial notice.” (Arce ex rel. Arce v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 471, 556.)

Defendant asks the Court to take judicial notice of various documents recorded in the office of the Los Angeles County Recorder or filed in a bankruptcy action.

The Court may take judicial notice of the legal effect of documents’ language when the effect is clear, but it may not take judicial notice of the truth of statements of fact recited within the documents. (Fontenot v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 256, 265.) The request is granted only to that extent.

Defendant’s objections to the Declaration of Negar Tehrani and its exhibits are sustained. To the extent that the exhibits are an improper form of Plaintiff requesting judicial notice of documents filed in an unlawful detainer action, the Court denies the request as irrelevant.

C. The Complaint and Judicially Noticeable Facts Do Not Show That Plaintiff Lacks Standing.

The Complaint alleges that on April 7, 1992, Yolanda Abundes forged Plaintiff’s signature on a deed to transfer his joint tenancy interest in the property to his parents and Yolanda Abundes. (Complaint ¶ 35; FAC ¶ 35.)

Defendant argues that Plaintiff lack standing to quiet title because he conveyed his interest in the property before the allegedly forged deeds were recorded. (Demurrer at pp. 13-15.) Defendant identifies an August 27, 1987 deed through which Plaintiff conveyed his interest in the property to his parents. (Demurrer at p. 14; RJN, Ex. 3.) The legal effect of that document is the property transfer on the date of the deed. It does not, however, prove that Plaintiff did not own the property during any intervening period prior to the 1992 forged deed.

The Court allowed Plaintiff to file a FAC to address the 1987 deed. (See Suppl. Demurrer at p. 3.) The FAC alleges that Grant Deed dated August 28, 1987 that appears on the title of the property is a forgery. (FAC ¶¶ 17, 34, 43.) Plaintiff alleges that after his ex-wife transferred her community property interest to Plaintiff in an Interspousal Transfer Deed recorded on April 8, 1987, Plaintiff did not execute any other deeds in 1987. (FAC ¶ 17.) This fact is sufficient, and it is not clear from the face of the complaints that Plaintiff lacks standing.

D. Plaintiff’s Statement In Bankruptcy Is Not Inconsistent With This Action.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s judicial admissions bar him from claiming an interest in the property. (Demurrer at pp. 15-16.) In Plaintiff’s bankruptcy proceeding, Plaintiff filed a January 20, 2023 schedule stating that he has zero real estate assets. (Demurrer at pp. 16-17; RJN, Ex. 16.) On demurrer, the Court cannot conclude that this bars Plaintiff’s claim to quiet title in property that he alleges is wrongfully owned by Defendant.

Defendant argues that the claim for quiet title is barred by the statute of limitations. (Demurrer at pp. 18-19.) To sustain a demurrer on the statute of limitations, the running of the statute must appear clearly and affirmatively on the face of the complaint. (Geneva Towers Ltd. Partnership v. City of San Francisco (2003) 29 Cal.4th 769, 781.) “‘[I]t is not enough that the complaint might be time-barred. [Citation.]’” (Ibid.)

“The Legislature has not established a specific statute of limitations for actions to quiet title. . . . Generally, the most likely time limits for a quiet title action are the five-year limitations period for adverse possession, the four-year limitations period for the cancellation of an instrument,or the three-year limitations period for claims based on fraud and mistake.” (Salazar v. Thomas (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 467, 476-477, footnotes omitted.) “‘“[A]s a general rule, the statute of limitations [for a quiet title action] does not run against one in possession of land.”’ [Citation.] Part of the rationale for this special rule for quiet title actions is an unwillingness to convert a statute of limitations into a statute that works a forfeiture of property rights on the person holding the most obvious and important property right—namely, possession.” (Id. at p. 477.)

Defendant notes that the allegedly forged deeds were recorded in 1992, and because Plaintiff continued to live at the property, he “presumably should have also received the recorded 1992 deeds in the mail.” (Demurrer at pp. 18-19.) But as Defendant also notes, the recorded deeds were mailed and addressed to Jesus, Elena, and Yolanda—not addressed to Plaintiff. (Demurrer at p. 19.) Additionally, Plaintiff continued to live at the property until after Defendant purchased the property without giving him notice before the sale. (Complaint ¶ 29; FAC ¶ 29.) The Complaint’s allegations do not show that the statute of limitations has run.

Defendant argues that the quiet title claim is barred by res judicata because of Defendant’s unlawful detainer action against Plaintiff. (Demurrer at pp. 20-21.) A court may sustain a general demurrer if all facts necessary to show that an action is barred by res judicata are within the complaint or subject to judicial notice. (Frommhagen v. Board of Supervisors (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 1292, 1299.) Res judicata precludes the re-litigation of a cause of action that previously was adjudicated in another proceeding between the same parties, or parties in privity with them. (Federation of Hillside & Canyon Assns. v. City of Los Angeles (2004) 126 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1202.) “Res judicata applies if (1) the decision in the prior proceeding is final and on the merits; (2) the present proceeding is on the same cause of action as the prior proceeding; and (3) the parties in the present proceeding or parties in privity with them were parties to the prior proceeding.” (Ibid.)

“Ordinarily, issues respecting the title to the property cannot be adjudicated in an unlawful detainer action.” (Martin-Bragg v. Moore (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 367, 385.) “Defects in the plaintiff’s title ‘are neither properly raised in [a] summary proceeding for possession, nor are they concluded by the judgment.’” (Ibid.) Although both parties claimed ownership of the property in the unlawful detainer action (see Demurrer at p. 20), the judgment was only for possession. (RJN, Ex. 14.)

The demurrer is OVERRULED. Defendant is ordered to file an answer within 10 days. (California Rules of Court, rule 3.1320(j)(1).)

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMCDEPT48@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit. If all parties in the case submit on the tentative ruling, no appearances before the Court are required unless a companion hearing (for example, a Case Management Conference) is also on calendar.

Hon. Thomas D. Long

Judge of the Superior Court