Judge Thomas D. Long, Case Number: 22STCV38039, Date: 2024-03-05 Tentative Ruling

On December 6, 2022, Plaintiff Ciro R. Pineda filed this action against Doe 1, arising from childhood sexual assault.

On February 15, 2023, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint against Los Angeles Unified School District and Does 2 through 25, inclusive, alleging Negligence and Negligent Hiring, Retention, and Supervision.

On December 7, 2023, Defendant filed the instant motion for judgment on the pleadings.

Defendant’s request for judicial notice of exhibits 1-4, consisting of trial court orders and parties’ filings in Jane Doe #1 et al. v. Acalanes Union High School District et al., Contra Costa County Superior Court, Case No. C22-02613 is DENIED. Similarly, Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice of exhibits 1-11, 13, consisting of trial court orders in other cases are also DENIED. These orders are unpublished and nonprecedential. (See Santa Ana Hospital Medical Center v. Belshe (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 819, 831 [“a written trial court ruling has no precedential value”].) However, Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice of Exhibit 12, Assembly floor analysis AB 218 is GRANTED.

A motion for judgment on the pleadings is the functional equivalent to a general demurrer. (Lance Camper Mfg. Corp. v. Republic Indemnity Co. of Am. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 194, 198.) Like demurrers, motions for judgment on the pleadings challenge the legal sufficiency of the allegations, not their veracity. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) The Court “must accept as true all material facts properly pleaded, but does not consider conclusions of law or fact, opinions, speculation, or allegations contrary to law or facts that are judicially noticed.” (Stevenson Real Estate Services, Inc. v. CB Richard Ellis Real Estate Services, Inc. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1219-1220.)

Defendant argues that the retroactive application of AB 218 violates Article XVI, Section 6 of the California Constitution. (Demurrer at pp. 10-17.)

Under the Government Claims Act, no person may sue a public entity or public employee for money or damages unless a timely written claim has been presented to and denied by the public entity. (County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1263, 1267.) Absent an applicable exception, failure to timely present a claim for money or damages to a public entity bars a plaintiff from filing suit against that entity bars a plaintiff from filing a lawsuit against that entity. (State of California v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1239.)

Currently, claims brought under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 for damages resulting from childhood sexual abuse are exempt from the claims presentation requirement. (See Gov. Code, § 905, subd. (m).) Before the passage of AB 218, Government Code section 905, subdivision (m) limited the exception to the claim presentation requirement to childhood sexual abuse claims arising out of conduct occurring on or after January 1, 2009. When AB 218 became law in October 2019, it amended section 340.1 to revive expired claims and enlarged the time to file suit. AB 218 also (1) amended Government Code section 905, subdivision (m) by deleting the language limiting the claim presentation exception to claims arising out of conduct occurring on or after January 1, 2009, and (2) added Government Code section 905, subdivision (p), which made this change retroactive.

Defendant challenges AB 218 as unconstitutional in that it violates California Constitution, Article XVI, section 6, which prohibits gifts of public funds (also referred to by the parties as the “Gift Clause”). The Gift Clause states, in relevant part, that the Legislature shall have no “power to make any gift or authorize the making of any gift, of any public money or thing of value to any individual, municipal or other corporation whatever.” (Cal. Const., art. XVI, § 7.) “[T[he term ‘gift’ includes ‘all appropriations of public money for which there is no authority or enforceable claim, even if there is a moral or equitable obligation.’” (Jordan v. California Dept. of Motor Vehicles (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 431, 450 [citing Conlin v. Board of Supervisors (1893) 99 Cal.17, 21-22 (Conlin)].)

Defendant argues that AB 218 is a gift of public funds that violates the Gift Clause by excusing compliance with the Government Claims Act. (Demurrer at pp. 7, 10-17.) Importantly, Defendant does not dispute that the Legislature’s authority to enlarge or amend a statute of limitations to revive claims; instead, it argues that timely claim presentation is a substantive element of any cause of action against a public entity and is not merely a procedural requirement. (Demurrer at p. 14.) Therefore, Defendant contends, AB 218 is unconstitutional because it creates liability for past acts where no right to recovery previously existed. Defendant relies on the following California Supreme Court cases regarding constitutional prohibition against gifts which it asserts have been cited favorably in modern decisions: Bourn v. Hart (1892) 93 Cal. 321, Conlin v. Board of Supervisors (1893) 99 Cal. 17, Powell v. Phelan (1903) 138 Cal. 271, and Heron v. Riley, 209 Cal. 507 (1930). (Demurrer at pp. 10-12.) In Heron, the Supreme Court stated that the imposition of liability for a past act of negligence “would, in effect, be the making of a gift.” (Heron, supra, 209 Cal. at 517.)

Defendant argues that the Court should grant the motion for judgment on the pleadings because Plaintiff was allegedly abused and assaulted in approximately 1976, but did not submit a claim within a year of the abuse. (Demurrer at p. 13.)

In opposition, Plaintiff largely argues that the Legislature is permitted to waive an established immunity and create liability as long as there is a “public purpose.” (Opposition at pp. 3-9.) Plaintiff cites County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.2d 730, 745-746 (Carleson), in which the California Supreme Court stated: “It is generally held that in determining whether an appropriation of public funds is to be considered a gift, the primary question is whether the funds are to be used for a ‘public’ or ‘private’ purpose; the benefit to the state from an expenditure for a public purpose is in the nature of consideration and the funds expended are therefore not a gift even though private persons are benefited therefrom.” (Opposition at p. 4.) The court further stated that “[t]he determination of what constitutes a public purpose is primarily a matter for the Legislature to determine and its discretion will not be disturbed by the courts so long as that determination has a reasonable basis.” (Carleson, supra, 5 Cal.2d at p. 746.) Plaintiff then extensively cites to the legislative history of AB 218 to describe its clear and established public purpose provide tort relief to victims of child sexual abuse and hold perpetrators and institutions accountable. (Opposition at pp. 4-9.) Plaintiff argues that the public purpose serves as the consideration for the expenditure of public funds and is therefore consistent with the Gift Clause. (Opposition at pp. 9.)

In reply, Defendant cites Bourn and Conlin and argues that retroactively imposing liability on public entities for unenforceable claims, as a matter of law, serves no public purpose. (Reply at pp. 5-6.) Defendant also cites Orange County Foundation v. Irvine Co. (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 195, 200 (Orange County Foundation) for the proposition that the appropriation of public funds for the payment of unenforceable claims serves no public purpose. (Reply at pp. 7-8.) That case held that the settlement of a good faith dispute between the state and a private party is an appropriate use of public funds and is not a gift “because the relinquishment of a colorable legal claim in return for settlement funds paid by the State is good consideration and accomplishes a valid public purpose.” (Orange County Foundation, supra, 139 Cal.App.3d 195 at p. 200.) However, if the claim is invalid or unfounded, a promise to compromise “is not valuable consideration.” (Id. at p. 201.)

Here, the Court is unpersuaded that the Legislature lacks the power to revive lapsed claims and exempt said claims from the claim presentation requirement of the Government Tort Claims Act. This case is distinguishable from those cited by Defendant, in which the legislature appropriated funds to pay specific individuals (see Bourn v. Hart (1892) 93 Cal. 321; Conlin v. Board of Supervisors (1893) 99 Cal.17) or passed legislation that a specific class of persons would be paid a specified amount out of the counties’ general funds (see Powell v. Phelan (1903) 138 Cal. 271). AB 218 does neither of these things, but rather revives previously time-barred claims that still must be proven in a court of competent jurisdiction in the manner provided by law, consistent with due process requirements.

The cases Defendant relies on also predate the Government Claims Act, enacted in 1963. Before the Government Claims Act was enacted, “tort liability for public entity defendants was barred by a common law rule of governmental immunity. Over time, however, the common law rule became ‘riddled with exceptions,’ both legislative and judge made, and in 1961 this court abolished the rule altogether [in Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist. (1961) 55 Cal.2d 211].” (Quigley v. Garden Valley Fire Protection Dist. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 798, 803.)

More than a decade after the Government Claims Act was passed, the California Supreme Court pronounced that “Government Code section 815 restores sovereign immunity in California except as provided in the Tort Claims Act or other statute.” (Williams v. Horvath (1976) 16 Cal.3d 834.) Even if the Legislature confined potential governmental liability to “rigidly delineated circumstances,” the Court is not persuaded that the Legislature is barred from changing those circumstances; it is also not persuaded that the Legislature necessarily “creates” liability” when it eliminates a statutory immunity (in the form of the prefiling claims requirement) that previously applied to a negligent act that occurred in the past. Taken to its conclusion, Defendant’s argument would mean that anytime the Legislature narrowed liability for public agencies it could never reverse course and expand that liability without making an unconstitutional gift of public funds. Yet the Legislature and the courts have expanded liability in the past without a constitutional violation being found.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMCDEPT48@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit. Parties intending to appear are encouraged to appear remotely and should be prepared to comply with Dept. 48’s new requirement that those attending court in person wear a surgical or N95 or KN95 mask.

Hon. Thomas D. Long

Judge of the Superior Court