Judge Thomas D. Long, Case Number: 22STCV38039, Date: 2025-04-22 Tentative Ruling

On February 15, 2023, Plaintiff Ciro R. Pineda filed a first amended complaint (“FAC”) against Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District, alleging negligence and negligent hiring, retention, and supervision.

Defendant’s evidentiary objections are sustained. Objection Nos. 1-4 are irrelevant and inadmissible character evidence being used to prove Crumb’s propensity to act. (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (a).) Objection Nos. 5-6 lack foundation and are speculative about what others knew or should have known.

Additionally, as the party producing the evidence, Plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the deposition testimony falls within an exception to the hearsay rule. (Byars v. SCME Mortgage Bankers, Inc. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1134, 1150.) Plaintiff made no showing that R.B. is unavailable as a witness. (Evid. Code, § 1292, subd. (a).)

Defendant’s request for judicial notice of the FAC is denied as unnecessary because this document is already part of this case’s record.

Plaintiff started Le Conte Junior High School in the seventh grade for the 1973-1974 school year, and he attended from 1973 to 1976. (Undisputed material Facts “UMF” 2.) Robert Crumb was Plaintiff’s drama and stage crew teacher. (UMF 2.) For the first two years, Plaintiff had “[j]ust a teacher-student relationship” with Crumb. (UMF 3; Pineda Depo. at p. 36.)

During the summer after Plaintiff graduated from Le Conte, Crumb invited him and at least three other students on a trip to Minnesota. (UMF 6.) Plaintiff traveled along with Crumb to Minnesota by car, and they stayed in motels along the way. (UMF 7.) Sexual conduct between Plaintiff and Crumb occurred in Minnesota on the visit to Crumb’s family. (UMF 8.) Plaintiff disclosed the alleged abuse to his mother, but he did not provide details of the abuse. (UMF 9.) His mother never reported the abuse to the police or the school, and Plaintiff also never reported the abuse to the school. (UMF 9.)

During discovery in this case, Plaintiff did not identify any documents or evidence of the School District’s actual or constructive knowledge of abuse by Crumb, nor any documents in support of his claims of negligence or negligent hiring, retention, or supervision. (UMF 10.)

At the time of Crumb’s hire by Defendant, Crumb had no criminal record or history of misconduct, and he passed a background check. (UMF 11.)

For each claim in the complaint, the defendant moving for adjudication must satisfy the initial burden of proof by showing that one or more elements of a cause of action cannot be established or that there is a complete defense to a cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520 (Scalf).) Then the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of material fact exists as to that cause of action or a defense. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Scalf, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p. 1520.) To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce “substantial responsive evidence.” (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 162-163.)

Defendant moves for summary judgment on the grounds that it cannot be liable for common law negligence and it had no notice of Crumb’s abuse.

A. There is No Triable Issue of Material Fact Regarding Defendant’s Lack of Knowledge of the Abuse.

A public entity is not liable for an injury arising out of an act or omission by the public entity or its employees, unless provided by statute. (Gov. Code, § 815, subd. (a).) There is “no relevant case law approving a claim for direct liability based on a public entity’s allegedly negligent hiring and supervision practices,” and “a direct claim against a governmental entity asserting negligent hiring and supervision, when not grounded in the breach of a statutorily imposed duty owed by the entity to the injured party, may not be maintained.” (de Villers v. County of San Diego (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 238, 252, 255-256.)

However, “claims against school districts premised on their own direct negligence in hiring and supervising teachers may be pursued.” (Virginia G. v. ABC Unified School Dist. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1848, 1854-1855.) “[A] public school district may be vicariously liable under section 815.2 for the negligence of administrators or supervisors in hiring, supervising and retaining a school employee who sexually harasses and abuses a student.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 879 (William S. Hart).)

“A defendant does not owe a legal duty to protect against third party conduct, unless there exists a special relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff. [Citation.] In that circumstance, “[i]n addition to the special relationship . . ., there must also be evidence showing facts from which the trier of fact could reasonably infer that the [defendant] had prior actual knowledge, and thus must have known, of the offender’s assaultive propensities. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] In short, the third party’s misconduct must be foreseeable to the defendant.” (Doe v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Children & Family Services (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 675, 682-683.)

“[A] district’s liability must be based on evidence of negligent hiring, supervision or retention, not on assumptions or speculation. That an individual school employee has committed sexual misconduct with a student or students does not of itself establish, or raise any presumption, that the employing district should bear liability for the resulting injuries.” (William S. Hart, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 878.)

Defendant argues that no employee knew or reasonably could have suspected that Crumb was engaged in child sexual abuse of Plaintiff. (Motion at pp. 10-13.) When Crumb was hired by Defendant, Crumb had no criminal record or history of misconduct, and he passed a background check. (UMF 11.) Crumb’s sexual abuse of Plaintiff occurred on a trip to Minnesota after Plaintiff’s graduation from the school. (UMF 6-8.) Plaintiff and his mother never reported the abuse to the school. (UMF 9.)

Defendant has met its initial burden of showing that it had no prior knowledge of Crumb’s abuse of Plaintiff and that Crumb’s abuse was unforeseeable.

Plaintiff argues that “the evidence supports reasonable inferences that LAUSD was aware of Crumb’s sexually abusive and dangerous propensities towards minor students before Crumb sexually abused Plaintiff.” (Opposition at p. 5.) Plaintiff only refers to non-party R.B.’s inadmissible testimony. (Id. at pp. 5, 7.) Plaintiff also argues that “teachers at Le Conte witnessed Crumb stroking Plaintiff’s knees and thighs in the school auditorium,” and the teachers did nothing in response. (Id. at pp. 7-8.) “Crumb’s inappropriate behavior towards students was so open and obvious that it became a popular topic of conversation at Samuel Gompers.” (Id. at p. 8.)

Plaintiff cites his deposition testimony. (Opposition at p. 7; Additional Material Facts “AMF” 13.) Plaintiff was sometimes alone with Crumb during rehearsals, and they would sit next to each other and talk. (Plaintiff Depo. at p. 194.) This included “always just grabbing of the knees, touching of the thighs, stuff like that.” (Ibid.) When asked if “there were any other adults present during these weekend rehearsals,” Plaintiff responded, “[o]ther teachers, coming in and out, you know, not being there all the time, but just coming in and out of the auditorium as we were rehearsing. That’s about it.” (Id. at p. 196.) This does not demonstrate that other teachers actually witnessed abuse and did nothing about it. “An issue of fact can only be created by a conflict of evidence. It is not created by ‘speculation, conjecture, imagination or guess work.’” (Sinai Memorial Chapel v. Dudler (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 190, 196; see also Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 864 [“Speculation, however, is not evidence.”].) With respect to inappropriate behavior “so open and obvious that it became a popular topic of conversation at Samuel Gompers,” Plaintiff cites R.B.’s inadmissible testimony about student rumors at a school that Plaintiff did not attend. (Opposition at p. 8; AMF 7-8.)

Plaintiff has not shown the existence of a triable issue of fact regarding the foreseeability of Crumb’s abuse and Defendant’s prior knowledge of Crumb’s abuse.

Defendant further argues that it cannot be liable for Crumb’s conduct off campus or after school hours. (Motion at pp. 13-16.)

No school district is liable for the conduct or safety of any student when the student is off school property “unless such district, board, or person has undertaken to provide transportation for such pupil to and from the school premises, has undertaken a school-sponsored activity off the premises of such school, has otherwise specifically assumed such responsibility or liability or has failed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances.” (Ed. Code, § 44808; see Motion at p. 11.) In other words, section 44808 provides that school districts are not responsible for the safety of students outside school property absent a specific undertaking by the school district and direct supervision by a district employee. (LeRoy v. Yarboi (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 737, 743.)

It is undisputed that the sexual abuse occurred off campus, during a trip to Minnesota. (UMF 6-8.) Plaintiff’s opposition argument is based on Defendant’s “lack of supervision and remedial action taken on campus,” which later led to the abuse off campus. (Opposition at p. 11, formatting omitted.) For the reasons discussed above, there is no evidence to support this and no triable issue of fact.

Defendant provided additional evidence with its reply, responsive to Plaintiff’s opposition evidence. In light of the Court’s evidentiary rulings, Defendant’s reply evidence now appears irrelevant. At the hearing, the parties should be prepared to address whether Defendant’s reply evidence makes any difference and whether Plaintiff should be permitted to file a sur-reply.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMCDEPT48@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit. If all parties in the case submit on the tentative ruling, no appearances before the Court are required unless a companion hearing (for example, a Case Management Conference) is also on calendar.

Hon. Thomas D. Long

Judge of the Superior Court