Judge Thomas D. Long, Case Number: 23STCV02000, Date: 2023-06-22 Tentative Ruling

On January 30, 2023, Plaintiff Joseph Viens filed this action against Defendant C & C Boats, Inc. (erroneously sued as C & C Boats - Newport Landing) for violation of the Jones Act.

At the original June 22, 2023 hearing, the Court continued the matter at Plaintiff’s request to allow discovery and supplemental briefing on venue issues only regarding (1) the actual location of the Plaintiff's injury; (2) where the Plaintiff performed his work for the Defendant; (3) where do witnesses to the case reside and what would and would not be convenient for the witnesses; (4) and where the Defendant is doing business, has done business, and whether and where it continues to do business.

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 395, subdivision (a), the general venue rule is that “‘the superior court in the county where the defendants or some of them reside at the commencement of the action is the proper court for the trial of the action.’ [Citation.]” (Fontaine v. Superior Court (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 830, 837 (Fontaine).) “[T]he trial court [is] limited, on the motion for change of venue, to the cause pleaded in the complaint and it must appear clearly from the complaint alone that plaintiff is entitled to have the cause tried in a county other than that in which the defendant resides. In determining this question all uncertainties will be resolved against the complaint and the allegations will be strictly construed against the pleader.” (Meadows v. Emett & Chandler (1950) 99 Cal.App.2d 496, 497-498 (Meadows).) A corporation may be sued “in the county where the contract is made or is to be performed, or where the obligation or liability arises, or the breach occurs; or in the county where the principal place of business of such corporation is situated.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 395.5.)

A court may change the place of trial when the court designated in the complaint is not the proper court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 397, subd. (a).) “‘It is the moving defendant’s burden to demonstrate that the plaintiff’s venue selection is not proper under any of the statutory grounds.’ [Citation.] In opposing the motion to change venue, ‘[t]he plaintiff may bolster his or her choice of venue with counteraffidavits consistent with the complaint’s theory of the type of action but amplifying the allegations relied upon for venue.’ [Citation.]” (Fontaine, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 836.)

Plaintiff alleges that he worked as a seaman stationed on vessels that were owned and operated by Defendant in the Santa Barbara Channel, and his injuries “were sustained in the course of his offshore marine work for C & C Boats in the Santa Barbara Channel.” (Complaint ¶ 5; see Complaint ¶ 6.) Plaintiff was also exposed to crude oil from the Refugio Beach oil spill. (Complaint ¶ 7.) The Santa Barbara Channel is in Ventura County, and Refugio Beach is in Santa Barbara County. (Dent Decl. ¶ 5.)

Although the Complaint alleges that Defendant did business in Los Angeles County (Complaint ¶ 2), Defendant’s owner declares that during the relevant time, Defendant’s principal place of business was in Huntington Beach, in Orange County (Croft Decl. ¶ 4). Defendant has transferred its principal place of business to Camarillo in Ventura County and is winding down its business operations. (Croft Decl. ¶ 9.) Defendant provided offshore service support to platforms located in the Santa Barbara Channel in Ventura County. (Croft Decl. ¶ 8.) Defendant never operated out of the Newport Landing harbor, and Plaintiff did not work on any vessels operating out of the Long Beach harbor. (Croft Decl. ¶¶ 5, 7.)

In opposition, Plaintiff declares that his handwritten work assignment logs indicate that on January 3 and 4, 2002, he worked at Pier D of the Long Beach Harbor before and after navigating to the offshore platforms Elly, Ellen, and Eureka off of the coast of Los Angeles County. (Viens Decl. ¶ 6.) He also worked at the Ventura County and Los Angeles County line on July 1, 2002. (Viens Decl. ¶ 6.) Therefore, Plaintiff contends that Los Angeles County is a proper venue because liability arose there. (See Opposition at p. 6.)

However, the Complaint does not make it clear that Los Angeles County is the correct venue. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant “was doing business in the County of Los Angeles, State of California” (Complaint ¶ 2), which is refuted by Defendant’s declaration (Croft Decl. ¶¶ 4-5, 7). Plaintiff also relies on his allegations that his injuries arose during his work “upon navigable waters within the State of California.” (Opposition at pp. 6-7; Complaint ¶¶ 18, 25.) This does not specify Los Angeles County within the State of California. Instead, Plaintiff alleges that he was exposed to toxins “while stationed on vessels owned and operated by Defendant . . . in the Santa Barbara Channel.” (Complaint ¶ 6.) It is not clear from the Complaint that Los Angeles County is a proper venue, and “all uncertainties will be resolved against the complaint and the allegations will be strictly construed against the pleader.” (Meadows, supra, 99 Cal.App.2d at pp. 497-498.)

The Court therefore finds that Ventura County—the location of Defendant’s current principal place of business and where the injury is alleged to have occurred—is the proper venue for this action.

Accordingly, the motion to transfer venue is GRANTED. This matter is ordered transferred to Ventura County with Plaintiff to pay any transfer fees. Defendant’s request for sanctions is DENIED.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMCDEPT48@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit. If all parties in the case submit on the tentative ruling, no appearances before the Court are required unless a companion hearing (for example, a Case Management Conference) is also on calendar.

Hon. Thomas D. Long

Judge of the Superior Court