Judge: Thomas D. Long, Case: 23STCV08965, Date: 2024-02-15 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV08965 Hearing Date: February 15, 2024 Dept: 48
SUPERIOR
COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT
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CHIYUKI KAWAI, Plaintiff, vs. NETSU-KEN USA INC., et al., Defendants. |
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[TENTATIVE] ORDER SUSTAINING DEMURRER; DISMISSING
ACTION Dept. 48 8:30 a.m. February 15, 2024 |
On
April 24, 2023, Plaintiff Chiyuki Kawai filed this action against Defendants Netsu-Ken
USA Inc., Mitsuyoshi Akita, and Mariko Akita, alleging breach of contract and fraud.
On
July 10, 2023, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint (“FAC”), and on August
25, 2023, Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint (“SAC”).
On
November 27, 2023, Defendants Netsu-Ken USA Inc. and Mitsuyoshi Akita (“Defendants”)
filed a demurrer to the SAC.
DEMURRER
A
demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740,
747.) When considering demurrers, courts
read the allegations liberally and in context, accepting the alleged facts as true. (Nolte v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (2015)
236 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1406.)
A. Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice
Is Unnecessary.
Defendants’
request for judicial notice is denied as irrelevant because the complaint and FAC
are already part of this case’s record.
B. The SAC is a Sham Pleading.
Defendants
argue that the amendments in the SAC render it a sham pleading, and the admissions
in the FAC show that the causes of action are time-barred. (Demurrer at pp. 10-15.)
“Under the sham pleading doctrine, a plaintiff cannot avoid allegations
that are determinative to a cause of action simply by filing an amended complaint
which omits the problematic facts or pleads facts inconsistent with those alleged
in the original complaint.” (Tindell v.
Murphy (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1239, 1248.)
The FAC alleges that from May 2015 through August 2016, Plaintiff loaned
various amounts of money to Defendants for a construction project, and Defendants
would pay Plaintiff back with interest after the houses were sold (“2015 Contract”). (FAC ¶¶ 8-13, 31.) In June 2018, Plaintiff found out that Defendants
sold the land without paying Plaintiff back, and Plaintiff demanded full repayment. (FAC ¶¶ 17-18, 25.) After negotiations, Plaintiff and Defendants entered
into a new oral contract, under which Defendants promised to pay back the loan within
one year (“2018 Contract”). (FAC ¶¶ 19-20,
26.) Defendants made some payments, but they
failed to pay back the full amount. (FAC
¶¶ 21-23, 28.) In February 2023, Defendants
stopped all payments and denied the 2018 Contract. (FAC ¶¶ 23, 28.)
The SAC similarly alleges the 2015 Contract and discovery of the breach
in June 2018. (See SAC ¶¶ 15-19.) In June 2018, “Plaintiff allowed Defendants additional
time to repay their debt.” (SAC ¶ 19.) Defendants then made installment payments. (SAC ¶¶ 20-43.) In October 2022, Plaintiff requested full payment
by March 2023, but no further payments were made. (SAC ¶¶ 43-44.)
The SAC omits important facts about the 2018 Contract and its terms,
including the one-year repayment period.
Instead, Plaintiff tries to allege an implied contract—not an express oral
contract—arising from Defendants’ installment payments. (See SAC ¶¶ 19-43.)
Plaintiff argues that it is permissible to amended pleadings to assert
alternative legal theories. (Opposition at
pp. 5-7.) “Plaintiff's shift in representation
has led to a more thorough examination of the legal landscape to the facts, which
mandates the put forth alternative causes of action in the SAC,” and the “change
in counsel and subsequent formulation of alternative theories are founded on the
same set of operative facts laid down in the original complaint but now enriched
with granular detail that has surfaced upon closer scrutiny and further factual
investigation.” (Id. at p. 6.) However, the discrepancies between the FAC and
SAC are not alternative legal theories. Instead,
the SAC omits facts about the express agreements and the dates of the alleged breaches.
Because of these factual inconsistencies, the Court will consider the
FAC as well as the SAC in connection with this demurrer.
C. The Causes of Action are Time-Barred.
“‘In
order for the bar of the statute of limitations to be raised by demurrer, the defect
must clearly and affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint; it is not enough
that the complaint shows that the action may be barred.’” (Geneva Towers Ltd. Partnership v. City of
San Francisco (2003) 29 Cal.4th 769, 781.)
An
action based on a written contract must be brought within four years, and an action
based on an oral contract must be brought within two years. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 337, 339.) The statute of limitations for fraud is three
years. (Code Civ. Proc., § 338.)
Defendants
promised to repay the 2015 Contract when the houses were sold. (FAC ¶ 9; see SAC ¶¶ 15-16.) In June 2018, Plaintiff learned that Defendants
sold the land without repaying the loan.
(FAC ¶ 17; SAC ¶ 19.) Defendants’
failure to repay Plaintiff upon the sale was a breach of the 2015 contract. (FAC ¶¶ 9, 18; SAC ¶ 19.) Accordingly, an action based on the 2015 Contract
must have been filed by June 2020 if an oral contract (two years) or by June 2022
if a written contract (four years).
The
parties entered into a new oral contract in September 2018. (FAC ¶ 19 [“After negotiations, in or around September
2018, Plaintiff and Defendants entered into a new oral contract.”]; see SAC ¶ 19
[“Plaintiff allowed Defendants additional time to repay their debt.”].) Under this 2018 Contract, Defendants promised
to pay back the loan within one year. (FAC
¶ 20.) Defendants made some payments, but
they did not pay the entire loan by February 2023. (FAC ¶¶ 22-23; SAC ¶¶ 20-45.) Defendants’ failure to repay the loan by September
2019 was a breach of the 2018 Contract. (FAC
¶ 20.) Accordingly, an action based on the
oral 2018 Contract must have been filed by June 2020—two years after the breach.
Plaintiff
also alleges that the 2015 Contract and 2018 Contract were induced by fraud. (FAC ¶¶ 30-33; SAC ¶¶ 60, 62.) Plaintiff knew or should have known that these
promises were false when Defendants failed to perform. (See FAC ¶¶ 9, 18, 20; SAC ¶ 19.) Accordingly, an action based on these misrepresentations
must have been filed within three years: by June 2021 (2015 Contract) or September
2022 (2018 Contract).
Plaintiff
did not file this action until April 24, 2023, long after all applicable statutes
of limitation had expired.
Plaintiff
argues that the breach of contract occurred no earlier than October 7, 2022, when
Defendants did not honor their repayment obligation. (Opposition at p. 9.) Plaintiff also became aware of the promissory
fraud at the same time. (Ibid.) However, the allegations about subsequent extended
deadlines and installment payments cannot revive the causes of action based on the
2015 and 2018 Contracts that already accrued by Defendants’ breaches and cannot
start the running of a new period of time.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 360.)
The
causes of action are facially time-barred.
The demurrer is sustained.
D. Conclusion
The
demurrer is SUSTAINED. Plaintiff has not
shown how he can remedy the deficiencies, so no leave to amend is granted.
Accordingly,
the Court orders Netsu-Ken USA Inc. and Mitsuyoshi Akita DISMISSED from the SAC.
DISMISSAL OF ENTIRE ACTION
A
complaint must be served on all named defendants and proofs of service must be
filed with the court within 60 days after the filing of the complaint. (California Rules of Court, rule 3.110(b).)
“It
is undoubtedly true that a defendant need only be served with summons once and that
service of an amended complaint by mail under Code of Civil Procedure section 1012
is sufficient where the defendant has made an appearance in the action.” (Engebretson & Co. v. Harrison (1981)
125 Cal.App.3d 436, 441.) But the plaintiff
must first serve the with the summons and complaint in a manner that confers jurisdiction
over the defendant (see Code Civ. Proc., § 410.50), or the defendant must make a
general appearance before the plaintiff can serve the defendant by mail to the defense
counsel. A defendant makes a general appearance
by participating in an action “in some manner which recognizes the authority of
the court to proceed.” (Mt. Holyoke Homes,
LP v. California Costal Com. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 830, 844.)
On
May 9, 2023, Plaintiff filed proofs of service showing personal service of the summons
and complaint on Netsu-Ken USA Inc. and Mitsuyoshi Akita. No proof of service was filed for Mariko Akita. The FAC and SAC each have an attached proof of
service showing electronic service on David Craig Bernstein, Esq., “Counsel for
Defendants.” Counsel filed this demurrer
on behalf of only Netsu-Ken USA Inc. and Mitsuyoshi Akita. There is no evidence of service of the original
summons and complaint on Mariko Akita, and Mariko Akita has not made any general
appearance in this action.
Typically,
the Court would set an Order to Show Cause Re: Dismissal for Failure to Serve Defendant
Mariko Akita. Here, however, the Court finds
that unnecessary because the entire action is subject to dismissal, including the
allegations against the unserved defendant.
The SAC alleges that Mariko Akita is an officer and alter ego of Netsu-Ken
USA Inc., and she was an active participant in the breach of contract and fraud. (SAC ¶¶ 7, 9-11, 58, 67.) Because the allegations against Mariko Akita are
the same as those against Netsu-Ken USA Inc. and Mitsuyoshi Akita, for which the
demurrer is sustained, these allegations also fail to state a claim against Mariko
Akita. Thus, they are subject to being stricken
for not being drawn in conformity with the law.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (b).)
Accordingly,
the Court orders Mariko Akita DISMISSED from the SAC.
The
entire action is DISMISSED.
Moving
party to give notice.
Parties
who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMCDEPT48@lacourt.org
indicating intention to submit. Parties intending
to appear are encouraged to appear remotely and should be prepared to comply with
Dept. 48’s new requirement that those attending court in person wear a surgical
or N95 or KN95 mask.
Dated this 15th day of February 2024
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Hon. Thomas D. Long Judge of the Superior
Court |