Judge Thomas D. Long, Case Number: 23STCV17095, Date: 2024-12-12 Tentative Ruling

On January 16, 2024, Plaintiff Yvette Morales filed a first amended complaint (“FAC”) against Defendant Women’s and Children’s Crisis Shelter, Inc.

On February 21, 2024, Defendant filed a motion to strike allegations related to punitive damages

The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subds. (a)-(b).)

A plaintiff can recover punitive damages in tort cases where “the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) “The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages. [Citation.] Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim. [Citation.]” (Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166, fn. omitted.)

Defendant specifically seeks to strike Paragraphs 22, 29, 33, 37, 41, 45, 51, 57, 63, and 68, which allege, “WCCS’s Board of Directors intentionally discriminated against Plaintiff because she was pregnant, and then lied about their reasons for Plaintiff’s termination to hide WCCS’s Board of Directors’ real reasons for its actions. These intentional acts by WCCS’s Board of Directors constitute oppression, fraud and malice against Plaintiff, and, therefore, entitle the Plaintiff to an award of punitive and exemplary damages.” Defendant also seeks to strike the prayer for punitive and exemplary damages.

Defendant contends that “Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint and the request for punitive damages includes language that contains mere legal conclusions, which are not supported by specific factual allegations that warrants an award of punitive damages.” (Motion at p. 7.)

Ironically, it is Defendant’s motion that “contains mere legal conclusions.” The majority of the motion only sets forth a summary of the FAC’s claims, basic legal standards for motions to strike and the Court’s authority to strike allegations, and a recitation of the allegations that Defendant seeks to strike. (Motion at pp. 2-10.)

According to Defendant, “Plaintiff has not alleged any facts in the First Amended Complaint that support the claim for punitive damages in that Plaintiff has not pled circumstances of oppression, fraud or malice on the part of Defendant. Nor do the facts as pled in the First Amended Complaint show that Defendant had an evil motive, nor does Plaintiff establish intent in the First Amended Complaint.” (Motion at p. 6.) “The Plaintiff in this case should be precluded from asserting a claim for punitive damages based on the conclusory allegations set forth in the First Amended Complaint, especially in light of the fact that the law does not favor punitive damages in cases such as this instant case.” (Id. at p. 7.) “In this case, the facts alleged in the First Amended Complaint do not appear on their face to be facts that demonstrate oppression, fraud, or malice on the part of Defendant that would allow the punitive damages allegations to survive a Motion to Strike. The facts as alleged, simply do not establish oppression, fraud, or malice.” (Ibid.) “Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint and the request for punitive damages includes language that contains mere legal conclusions, which are not supported by specific factual allegations that warrants an award of punitive damages. Therefore, the allegations and prayers for punitive damages in the First Amended Complaint, as set forth below, are improper and should be stricken from Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint.” (Id. at pp. 7-8.) Defendant concludes, “As set forth throughout this Memorandum of Points and Authorities, it is clear that the Court has the legal authority to grant this Motion to Strike portions in Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint as specified in this Motion, including striking the prayers for punitive damages.” (Id. at p. 10.)

Defendant’s cited legal authority establishes only that a plaintiff must allege facts about intentional malice, oppression, or fraud, and that punitive damages should be granted cautiously. Defendant makes no attempt to engage with the substance of Plaintiff’s allegations and demonstrate why the allegations are insufficient. Defendant’s failure to provide any relevant argument is nearly the same as filing no motion at all. (See Interinsurance Exchange v. Collins (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1445, 1448 [“[P]arties are required to include argument and citation to authority in their briefs, and the absence of these necessary elements allows this court to treat [an] issue as waived.”]; Dabney v. Dabney (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 379, 384 [“We need not consider an argument for which no authority is furnished.”].)

Although the paragraphs that Defendant seeks to strike are conclusory, the FAC contains other allegations that provide context and factual support for those conclusions. Plaintiff alleges that shortly after she announced her pregnancy at work, she was issued a Performance Improvement Plan and was placed under investigation for a concern brought up by a staff member. (FAC ¶ 10.) At a meeting the next month, Plaintiff was not told who complained or what the complaint was. (FAC ¶ 11.) Plaintiff met with her acting supervisor regarding her maternity leave and her Performance Improvement Plan, and she was told that “her performance was headed in the right direction, and not to worry because [Plaintiff] was doing great.” (FAC ¶ 16.) The acting supervisor also asked Plaintiff “whether she planned to have more children because she said it was very difficult to find coverage for [Plaintiff], and asked whether she had to counsel [Plaintiff] about having more children.” (FAC ¶ 16.) When Plaintiff attempted to return to work after her maternity leave, she was told that she had to resign her position as Executive Director because the Board of Directors held a vote to terminate her because of no confidence. (FAC ¶ 20.) Plaintiff alleges that this reason “was an intentional falsification to hide the intentional discrimination by WCCS’s Board of Directors based on Plaintiff’s pregnancy, and retaliation for Plaintiff’s taking pregnancy leave.” (FAC ¶ 21; see FAC ¶ 23-24.)

“[W]rongful termination, without more, will not sustain a finding of malice or oppression.” (Scott v. Phoenix Schools, Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 702, 717.) However, “[e]vidence that the decisionmaker [for discrimination] attempted to hide the improper basis with a false explanation” can support an award of punitive damages. (Cloud v. Casey (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 895, 912.) The FAC contains sufficient facts to allege that Defendant acted pretextually when terminating Plaintiff’s employment.

The motion to strike is DENIED. Defendant is ordered to file an answer within 10 days.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMCDEPT48@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit. If all parties in the case submit on the tentative ruling, no appearances before the Court are required unless a companion hearing (for example, a Case Management Conference) is also on calendar.

Hon. Thomas D. Long

Judge of the Superior Court