Judge Thomas D. Long, Case Number: 23STCV23934, Date: 2024-05-16 Tentative Ruling

On October 2, 2023, Plaintiff Raymond Hooker filed this action against Defendant General Motors LLC arising from Plaintiff’s purchase of an allegedly defective vehicle.

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context, accepting the alleged facts as true. (Nolte v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1406.)

A. Plaintiff Sufficiently Alleges Fraud (First and Second Causes of Action).

Defendant argues that Plaintiff does not allege any specific misrepresentations or material facts that were concealed. (See Demurrer at pp. 7-10.)

The first cause of action alleges fraudulent concealment and misrepresentation. “The essential elements of a count for intentional misrepresentation are (1) a misrepresentation, (2) knowledge of falsity, (3) intent to induce reliance, (4) actual and justifiable reliance, and (5) resulting damage. [Citations.] The essential elements of a count for negligent misrepresentation are the same except that it does not require knowledge of falsity but instead requires a misrepresentation of fact by a person who has no reasonable grounds for believing it to be true. [Citations.]” (Chapman v. Skype Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 217, 230-231.) “Causes of action for intentional and negligent misrepresentation sound in fraud and, therefore, each element must be pleaded with specificity.” (Daniels v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1150, 1166.)

For intentional and negligent misrepresentation, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant misrepresented material facts about the about the vehicle’s charge-range and ability to replace the battery through its advertisements, publications, and warranties, in addition to its authorized dealership’s salesperson who was authorized to speak on behalf of Defendant. (Complaint ¶¶ 8, 37-39, 44.) Plaintiff relied on these representations and purchased the vehicle. (Complaint ¶¶ 12, 40, 46-47.) This sufficiently alleges the misrepresentations by Defendant.

The second cause of action alleges negligent misrepresentation. Fraud based on concealment requires that “(1) the defendant must have concealed or suppressed a material fact, (2) the defendant must have been under a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff, (3) the defendant must have intentionally concealed or suppressed the fact with the intent to defraud the plaintiff, (4) the plaintiff must have been unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he did if he had known of the concealed or suppressed fact, and (5) as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact, the plaintiff must have sustained damage.” (Bigler-Engler v. Breg, Inc. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 276, 310-311.) An essential element of intentional concealment includes the duty to disclose, which must be based upon a transaction, or a special relationship, between plaintiff and defendant. (Id. at p. 314.) “There are ‘four circumstances in which nondisclosure or concealment may constitute actionable fraud: (1) when the defendant is in a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff; (2) when the defendant had exclusive knowledge of material facts not known to the plaintiff; (3) when the defendant actively conceals a material fact from the plaintiff; and (4) when the defendant makes partial representations but also suppresses some material facts.’” (Id. at p. 311.) Less specificity is required to plead fraud by concealment. (Ibid.) “Even under the strict rules of common law pleading, one of the canons was that less particularity is required when the facts lie more in the knowledge of the opposite party.” (Alfaro v. Community Housing Improvement System & Planning Assn., Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1384.)

For fraudulent concealment, Plaintiff alleges Defendant knew since at least 2017 that the battery could start a fire. (E.g., Complaint ¶¶ 11, 13-24, 31, 33.) Plaintiff did not know about this defect, and Defendant, who had superior knowledge of the defect, did not disclose the defects when Plaintiff purchased the vehicle. (Complaint ¶¶ 11-12, 34.) The allegations are specific enough to allege the information that was concealed and the danger posed. (See Jones v. ConocoPhillips Co. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1187, 1199-1200.)

B. Plaintiff Sufficiently Alleges Unfair Business Practices (Third Cause of Action).

Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to establish the alleged unlawfulness of any conduct and does not sufficiently allege damages or the relief sought. (Demurrer at pp. 11-12.)

California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) includes any unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue, or misleading advertising. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200.) The UCL embraces “anything that can properly be called a business practice and that at the same time is forbidden by law.” (Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 180.) “By proscribing any unlawful business practice, section 17200 borrows violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices that the unfair competition law makes independently actionable.” (Ibid.; see Klein v. Earth Elements, Inc. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 965, 969 [“Virtually any law can serve as the predicate for a section 17200 action.”].)

As discussed above, Plaintiff’s fraud claims survive demurrer, so his UCL claim may be based on fraudulent business acts. Plaintiff also alleges that he was harmed by the misrepresentations and concealment because he otherwise would not have purchased the vehicle. (E.g., Complaint ¶¶ 55-56.) Plaintiff requests equitable and injunctive relief, which is permitted under the UCL. (Complaint at p. 16.)

The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subds. (a)-(b).)

Defendant moves to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages for the fourth, fifth, and sixth causes of action on the grounds that Plaintiff cannot receive both a civil penalty under the Song-Beverly Act and punitive damages. (Motion at p. 3.) A plaintiff is not entitled to recover both punitive damages and civil penalties under Song-Beverly. (Troensegaard v. Silvercrest Industries, Inc. (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 218, 228.) However, these causes of action do not seek punitive damages. The only mention of punitive damages is in the Prayer for Relief, which does not specify for which causes of action punitive damages are sought.

Defendant also moves to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages for the first, second, and third causes of action. (Motion at pp. 4-5.) A plaintiff can recover punitive damages in tort cases where “the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.” (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (a).) Because Plaintiff’s fraud causes of action survive demurrer, they may be bases for punitive damages.

Defendant is ordered to file an answer within 10 days. (California Rules of Court, rule 3.1320(j)(1).)

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMCDEPT48@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit. If all parties in the case submit on the tentative ruling, no appearances before the Court are required unless a companion hearing (for example, a Case Management Conference) is also on calendar.

Hon. Thomas D. Long

Judge of the Superior Court