Judge: Thomas D. Long, Case: 23STCV28745, Date: 2024-12-03 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV28745 Hearing Date: December 3, 2024 Dept: 48
SUPERIOR
COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT
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GLADIS N VELASQUEZ HERRERA, Plaintiff, vs. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, et al., Defendants. |
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[TENTATIVE] ORDER GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND EXPENSES Dept. 48 8:30 a.m. December 3, 2024 |
Plaintiff
Gladis N. Velasquez Herrera and Defendants Ford Motor Company and Autonation Ford
Torrance have reached a settlement in this Song-Beverly action. On August 2, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion for
attorney fees, along with a memorandum of costs.
As
the prevailing party, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees
and expenses. (Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (d).) California courts apply the “lodestar” approach
to determine what fees are reasonable. (See,
e.g., Holguin v. DISH Network LLC (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1332.) This inquiry “begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e.,
the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th
1084, 1095.) From there, the “lodestar figure
may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in
order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.” (Ibid.) Relevant factors include “(1) the novelty and
difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them,
(3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment
by the attorneys, [and] (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122,
1132.) The party seeking fees has the burden
of documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates. (City of Colton v. Singletary (2012) 206
Cal.App.4th 751, 784.)
Plaintiff
requests a total of $35,796.60, consisting of $27,030.00 in attorney fees, $657.60
in costs and expenses, and $8,109.00 as a 0.3 multiplier enhancement on the attorney
fees.
Plaintiff
provides a copy of counsel’s billing records.
(Khoubian Decl., Ex. A.) Plaintiff’s
counsel requests an hourly rate of $425.
(Khoubian Decl. ¶ 19.) Based on counsel’s
experience, the type of case, and the market rate, the Court concludes that $425
is a reasonable hourly rate for this matter.
Defendants
note that 8.4 hours were billed for the business decision of determining whether
to represent Plaintiff. (Opposition at p.
7.) Defendant argues that “[o]nly fees ‘reasonably
incurred by the buyer’ are recoverable,” and Plaintiff “did not incur any fees before
he was represented by Alpha thus these fees are not recoverable against Ford.” (Ibid.) A Plaintiff may reasonable attorney fees based
on actual time expended and “reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with
the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (d).) Some of the identified time was “in connection
with the commencement” of this action and is recoverable. However, the Court agrees that some of the time
is excessive. The Court deducts 5.4 hours.
Defendant
argues that almost every document used by Plaintiff’s counsel is a form document
used in prior cases, so the 2.4 hours spent on the form complaint and 6.6 hours
on template discovery requests are excessive.
(Opposition at p. 7.) As the Court
observes in the multitude of Song-Beverly cases on the docket, experienced counsel
have pre-written form pleadings, discovery requests, discovery responses, and motion
papers they use in these cases. Defendant
proves this by providing copies of Plaintiff’s discovery requests here and those
propounded in another action with the same counsel. (Proudfoot Decl. ¶ 7 & Exs. C-D.) The Court agrees that the 9.0 hours spent on form
pleadings is excessive. The Court deducts
6 hours.
Defendants
argue that the time incurred for this fee motion is unreasonable because “Ford’s
initial offer included $9,500 in attorney’s fees compared to the $5,610 Alpha had
billed actually representing [Plaintiff],” and Plaintiff’s counsel “never responded
to the fee offer or made any demands to resolve fees prior to filing this motion.” (Opposition at p. 7.) Plaintiff is entitled to attorney fees and expenses
whether by agreement or by motion. However,
the Court agrees that the 14.1 hours spent on this motion is excessive. The Court deducts 7 hours.
In
sum, the Court deducts $7,820.00 (18.4 hours) from the $27,030.00 requested, for
a total of $19,210.00.
“[A] trial court should award a multiplier for
exceptional representation only when the quality of representation far exceeds the
quality of representation that would have been provided by an attorney of comparable
skill and experience billing at the hourly rate used in the lodestar calculation.” (Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1139.) This matter was not noticeably different from
other lemon law cases and did not involve complex or novel legal issues warranting
a multiplier. There are no indications that
Plaintiff’s counsel provided uniquely exceptional representation or engaged in any
actions different from a typical strategy to achieve settlement. The Court declines to add a multiplier.
The
motion for attorney fees and expenses is GRANTED IN PART. The Court awards Plaintiff $19,210.00 in attorney
fees and $657.60 in costs and expenses.
Moving
party to give notice.
Parties
who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMCDEPT48@lacourt.org
indicating intention to submit. If all parties
in the case submit on the tentative ruling, no appearances before the Court are
required unless a companion hearing (for example, a Case Management Conference)
is also on calendar.
Dated this 3rd day of December 2024
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Hon. Thomas D. Long Judge of the Superior
Court |