Judge: Thomas D. Long, Case: 23STCV30339, Date: 2024-08-20 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV30339 Hearing Date: August 20, 2024 Dept: 48
SUPERIOR
COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT
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EVA BERNECE MELENDEZ VELASCO, Plaintiff, vs. LOSS PREVENTION SERVICES, LLC, et al., Defendants. |
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[TENTATIVE] DENYING LPS’S MOTION TO STRIKE;
DENYING TOYOTA’S MOTION TO STRIKE; DENYING NRS’S MOTION TO STRIKE Dept. 48 8:30 a.m. August 20, 2024 |
On
December 13, 2023, Plaintiff Eva Bernece Melendez Velasco filed this action
against Defendants Loss Prevention Services LLC (“LPS”) and Nations Recovery
Services Inc. (“NRS”). Plaintiff later named
Toyota Motor Credit Corporation (“Toyota”)as Doe 1.
On
January 17, 2024, LPS filed a motion to strike.
On
March 11, 2024, NRS filed a motion to strike.
On
May 2, 2024, Toyota filed a motion to strike.
The
court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion: (1) strike out any
irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike
out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the
laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subds. (a)-(b).)
REQUEST
FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
Plaintiff’s
request for judicial notice of complaints and orders filed in other cases is
denied as irrelevant.
Plaintiff’s
request for judicial notice of LPS’s repossession agency license is denied as
irrelevant.
LPS’S
AND TOYOTA’S MOTIONS TO STRIKE
The
motions filed by LPS and Toyota are substantially similar. LPS and Toyota seek to strike Paragraphs 2,
3, 26, 39, and 42, as well as the Prayer for punitive damages.
Paragraph
2 alleges, “This is also an action for injunctive relief, civil fines and
damages against defendant Loss Prevention Services, LLC (‘LPS’), a national
repossession agency based in Michigan, for its unlicensed repossession
activities in California.” Paragraph 3
elaborates on the unlicensed repossession work and alleges that LPS was on
notice that its activities were unlawful.
Paragraph 42 further elaborates on LPS’s knowledge of their unlawful
activities through prior lawsuits. LPS
argues that “[a]ll allegations mentioning grand theft are improper and
unfounded,” and Toyota argues that “[a]ll of these allegations are improper as
this case is a civil matter and a criminal case related to this matter does not
exist.” (LPS Motion at p. 11; Toyota
Motion at p. 7.) These arguments are
based on the merits of the allegations, not the sufficiency of the pleadings. The motion is denied for paragraphs 2, 3, and
42.
Paragraph
26 alleges, “Defendants violated Civil Code § 1788.10(a) by using, or
threatening to use, any criminal means, including grand theft in violation of
Penal Code § 487, to cause harm . . . .”
LPS and Toyota seek to strike “including grand theft in violation of
Penal Code § 487.” Civil Code section
1788.10, subdivision (a) states that no debt collector shall attempt to collect
a consumer debt by means of “[t]he use, or threat of use, of physical force or
violence or any criminal means to cause harm to the person, or the reputation,
or the property of any person.”
Plaintiff’s allegation that LPS and Toyota violated Penal Code section
487 is the “criminal means” supporting the alleged violation of Civil Code
section 1788.10. The motion is denied
for this portion of Paragraph 26.
Paragraph
39 alleges that Plaintiff is entitled to recover punitive damages and that
“Defendants’ corporate officers, directors, or managing agents are personally
guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice with respect to plaintiff.” The Prayer for Relief requests “[t]he maximum
punitive damages allowed by law.” A plaintiff
can recover punitive damages in tort cases where “the defendant has been guilty
of oppression, fraud, or malice.” (Civ.
Code § 3294, subd. (a).) “The mere
allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an
award of punitive damages.
[Citation.] Not only must there
be circumstances of oppression, fraud or malice, but facts must be alleged in
the pleading to support such a claim.
[Citation.]” (Grieves v.
Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166, fn. omitted.) Plaintiff alleges that LPS and Toyota knowingly
engaged in grand theft when they worked with each other and NRS to unlawfully
repossess her vehicle. If proven, this could
support a finding of malice or oppression.
The motion is denied for Paragraph 39 and the prayer for punitive
damages.
LPS’s
and Toyota’s motions to strike are DENIED.
NRS’S MOTION TO STRIKE
NRS
seeks to strike Paragraphs 26, 30, and 39.
Paragraph
26 alleges, “Defendants violated Civil Code § 1788.10(a) by using, or
threatening to use, any criminal means, including grand theft in violation of
Penal Code § 487, to cause harm to the person, or the reputation, or the
property of any person.” After raising
this ground in the Notice of Motion, NRS did not provide any specific argument. “[P]arties are required to include argument
and citation to authority in their briefs, and the absence of these necessary
elements allows this court to treat [an] issue as waived.” (Interinsurance Exchange v. Collins (1994)
30 Cal.App.4th 1445, 1448.) Moreover,
Plaintiff’s allegation that NRS violated Penal Code section 487 is the
“criminal means” supporting the alleged violation of Civil Code section
1788.10. The motion is denied for Paragraph 26.
Paragraph
30 alleges, “Defendants’ violations of the Rosenthal Act were willful and
knowing.” After raising this ground in
the Notice of Motion, NRS did not provide any specific argument. The motion is denied for this portion of
Paragraph 30.
Paragraph
39 alleges that Plaintiff is entitled to recover punitive damages and that
“Defendants’ corporate officers, directors, or managing agents are personally
guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice with respect to plaintiff.” A plaintiff can recover punitive damages in
tort cases where “the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or
malice.” (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (a).) “The mere allegation an intentional tort was
committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages. [Citation.]
Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud or malice, but
facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim. [Citation.]”
(Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166, fn.
omitted.) Plaintiff alleges that NRS
knowingly engaged in grand theft when it unlawfully repossessed her
vehicle. If proven, this could support a
finding of malice or oppression. The
motion is denied for Paragraph 39.
NRS’s
motion to strike is DENIED.
Moving
party to give notice.
Parties
who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMCDEPT48@lacourt.org
indicating intention to submit. If all parties
in the case submit on the tentative ruling, no appearances before the Court are
required unless a companion hearing (for example, a Case Management Conference)
is also on calendar.
Dated this 20th day of August 2024
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Hon. Thomas D. Long Judge of the Superior
Court |