Judge Thomas D. Long, Case Number: 23STCV30767, Date: 2025-02-11 Tentative Ruling

On December 18, 2023, Plaintiffs 79th & York Entertainment Inc. and David Armour filed this action against Defendants Katrina Jackson, Oliver Hatchett, and Enigma Entertainment Group LLC, alleging (1) breach of contract (written); (2) breach of contract (implied); (3) tortious interference with contract; and (4) violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”).

On May 2, 2024, Defendants filed a combined demurrer and motion to strike. “Motions to strike and demurrers should be filed as separate documents.” (Weil & Brown, Cal. Prac. Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group June 2024 Update) ¶ 7:162.1; see id., ¶ 7:162 [“Where there are grounds both for demurring and moving to strike, the two documents must be filed together and noticed for the same hearing”].)

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context, accepting the alleged facts as true. (Nolte v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1406.)

A. Plaintiffs Sufficiently Allege Breach of Contract (First and Second Causes of Action).

Defendants argue that “Plaintiffs cannot and have not alleged that Enigma or Ms. Jackson signed an agreement with anyone during the production agreement’s relevant time period.” (Motion at p. 4.)

Plaintiffs allege that on or about July 30, 2020, they “entered into an exclusive co-production and talent agreement (the ‘Agreement’) with Enigma and Jackson for the exclusive services of Ms. Jackson respecting the development and production of a television series centered upon Ms. Jackson opening and operating her Enigma Tattoo parlor.” (Complaint ¶ 10.) The term of the exclusive relationship was to expire on July 30, 2021. (Complaint ¶ 13.) Additionally, “[i]f, within six (6) months of the expiration of the Term, Jackson or Producer enters into any third-party agreement with or on behalf of any Third Party to which the Project was pitched during the Term, the terms and conditions of this Agreement shall apply as if the Term had not expired.” (Complaint ¶ 14.)

On March 17, 2021, the parties held a pitch meeting with VH1 executives, but the executives passed on the series. (Complaint ¶¶ 15, 19.) In August 2021, Defendant Hatchett informed Plaintiff Armour that VH1 was interested in having Defendant Jackson do recurring guest appearances on another program. (Complaint ¶ 24.) Defendants concealed “that Jackson’s participation was not to be limited to making guest appearances, but rather to becoming the central figure of her own show following her opening and operating an Enigma Tattoo parlor and that such engagement is exclusive to [VH1’s owner].” (Complaint ¶ 27.)

The August 2021 interest in Defendant Jackson’s recurring guest appearances on another program was within six months of the July 30, 2021 expiration of the exclusive development agreement. It is not apparent from the face of the Complaint whether this constitutes entry into a third-party agreement that extends the original agreement “as if the Term had not expired.” (See Complaint ¶ 14.) Regardless, Plaintiffs do allege that they learned that Jackson “had, during the Term, accepted an exclusive engagement with MTVN [VH1’s owner] for what amounted, in all respects, to be the identical concept as the Series.” (Complaint ¶ 29; see Complaint ¶ 38.) Taking these allegations as true, as the Court must upon demurrer, this sufficiently alleges a breach of contract during the relevant contract term.

The demurrer to the first and second causes of action is overruled on this ground.

B. Plaintiffs Do Not Allege Tortious Interference With Contract (Third Cause of Action).

“The elements which a plaintiff must plead to state the cause of action for intentional interference with contractual relations are (1) a valid contract between plaintiff and a third party; (2) defendant’s knowledge of this contract; (3) defendant’s intentional acts designed to induce a breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; (4) actual breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; and (5) resulting damage.” (Pacific Gas & Electric Co., supra, 50 Cal. 3d at p. 1126, fn. 2.)

Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Hatchett interfered with their exclusive rights under the contract with Jackson. (Complaint ¶¶ 30, 49-53.) Hatchett was going to be a producer for the exclusive series. (Complaint ¶ 11.) He later communicated to Plaintiffs that VH1 was not going to proceed with the series as pitched, but VH1 was interested in having Jackson do recurring guest appearances on another program. (Complaint ¶ 24.) During the contract term, Jackson accepted an exclusive engagement for an identical series concept. (Complaint ¶¶ 29-30.)

Defendants argue that as a matter of law, Hatchett as Jackson’s agent cannot interfere with Jackson’s contract. (Motion at pp. 5-6.) “[T]he representative of a contracting party may not be held liable for the tort of interfering with its principal’s contract.” (Mintz v. Blue Cross of California (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1594, 1607.) Under the “manager’s privilege,” a manager or agent may protect the interests of his principal by inducing the breach of a contract with a third party that the manager or agent reasonably believes to be harmful to his principal’s best interests. (Aalgaard v. Merchants Nat. Bank, Inc. (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 674, 684.) However, here there are no facts alleging that Hatchett was Jackson’s manager or agent. Instead, Hatchett was going to be a producer. (Complaint ¶ 11.) The allegations about agency are conclusory and lack facts. (Complaint ¶ 8.) From the face of the Complaint, it is not clear that the manager’s privilege invalidates this cause of action. The demurrer to the third cause of action is overruled on this ground.

Defendants also argue that there are no allegations about an act of intentional interference. (Motion at pp. 6-7.) Plaintiffs only allege that Hatchett “informed Mr. Meyer via email that VH1 was interested in having Jackson and her Tattoo shop participate in Black Ink: Compton,” he “informed Mr. Armour that while VH1 was not going to proceed with the Series or a Series premised upon Ms. Jackson opening, owning, and operating her Enigma Tattoo Parlor, VH1 was interested in having her do recurring guest appearances on another program, Black Ink: Compton,” and he concealed the true nature of Jackson’s participation. (Complaint ¶¶ 23-27.) There are no facts about an intentional act taken by Hatchett that were designed to induce a breach or disruption of the contractual relationship. The demurrer to the third cause of action is sustained on this ground.

C. Plaintiffs Allege a Basis for a Violation of the UCL (Fourth Cause of Action).

California’s UCL includes any unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue, or misleading advertising. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200.) The UCL embraces “anything that can properly be called a business practice and that at the same time is forbidden by law.” (Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 180.) “By proscribing any unlawful business practice, section 17200 borrows violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices that the unfair competition law makes independently actionable.” (Ibid.; see Klein v. Earth Elements, Inc. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 965, 969 [“Virtually any law can serve as the predicate for a section 17200 action.”].)

Defendants argue that because the underlying claims fail, there is no basis for Plaintiffs’ UCL claim. (Motion at p. 7.) The Court overrules the demurrer to the first two causes of action. Accordingly, there are still underlying claims.

The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subds. (a)-(b).)

Defendants seek to strike the prayer for punitive damages because there are no facts that constitute fraud, malice, or oppression. (Motion at pp. 8-9.) A plaintiff can recover punitive damages in tort cases where “the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.” (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (a).) “The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages. [Citation.] Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim. [Citation.]” (Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166, fn. omitted.)

For the reasons discussed with the demurrer to the third cause of action, the Court also finds that there are no facts to show fraud, malice, or oppression. The motion to strike is granted on this ground.

The demurrer to the third cause of action is SUSTAINED with 30 days’ leave to amend. The demurrer is otherwise OVERRULED.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMCDEPT48@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit. If all parties in the case submit on the tentative ruling, no appearances before the Court are required unless a companion hearing (for example, a Case Management Conference) is also on calendar.

Hon. Thomas D. Long

Judge of the Superior Court