Judge Thomas D. Long, Case Number: 24STCV13701, Date: 2025-05-13 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff MRO Elliot Management Inc. served Defendant Inna P. Puchkova on July 22, 2024. The Court entered default on October 3, 2024, and default judgment on October 11, 2024.

On April 10, 2025, Defendant filed a motion to vacate default and default judgment, along with a proposed answer to the complaint.

The Court may relieve a party from a judgment resulting from mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b).) The application for relief must be made within a reasonable time, not to exceed six months, after the judgment. (Ibid.) “Section 473 is often applied liberally where the party in default moves promptly to seek relief, and the party opposing the motion will not suffer prejudice if relief is granted. [Citations.] In such situations ‘very slight evidence will be required to justify a court in setting aside the default.’ [Citation.]” (Elston v. City of Turlock (1985) 38 Cal.3d 227, 233.)

This motion was filed within six months after entry of default judgment, but more than six months after the entry of default. “This six-month time limitation is jurisdictional; the court has no power to grant relief under section 473 once the time has lapsed.” (Austin v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 918, 928.) Therefore, the entry of default may not be vacated under Code of Civil Procedure section 473.

“‘Where, as in the present case, a motion to vacate a default judgment is made more than six months after the default was entered, the motion is not directed to the court’s statutory power to grant relief for mistake or excusable neglect under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, but rather is directed to the court’s inherent equity power to grant relief from a default or default judgment procured by extrinsic fraud or mistake.’ [Citations.]” (Gibble v. Car-Lene Research, Inc. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 295, 314.) Extrinsic fraud occurs when a defendant is deprived of his opportunity to present his claim or defense to the court, or when he was kept ignorant or fraudulently prevented from fully participating in the proceeding. (Id. at p. 315.) This does not include circumstances when the party “‘has been given notice of the action and has had an opportunity to present his case and to protect himself from any mistake or fraud of his adversary, but has unreasonably neglected to do so.’” (Ibid.) To set aside a judgment or order based on extrinsic mistake, the defaulted party must (1) show that it has a meritorious case, (2) articulate a satisfactory excuse for not presenting a defense to the original action, and (3) demonstrate that it was diligent in seeking to set aside the default once it had been discovered. (Aldrich v. San Fernando Valley Lumber Co. (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 725, 738.)

Defendant declares that as a tenant at the Melrose Property, she dealt with Massoud Omrany of Plaintiff’s management company. (Puchkova Decl. ¶ 4.) Plaintiff and Massoud Omrany executed a new lease for the Pico Property and a lease extension of the Melrose Property. (Puchkova Decl. ¶¶ 5-6.) During this time, Massoud Omrany “represented that he was the owner of both locations and that the transition from the Melrose property to the Pico property would present no issue, and that [she] would only pa[y] rent at the Melrose location only through the date [she] moved [her] business into the Melrose location.” (Puchkova Decl. ¶ 7.) When Plaintiff received the complaint, she “mistakenly assumed that it was in error in light of [her] continuing to pay rent as [she] was obligated to do with reference to the Melrose property . . . [and she] was completely unaware that there was an issue between Massoud Omrany and his brother and that there was a change in ownership of the Plaintiff MRO Elliot Management, landlord for the Melrose property.” (Puchkova Decl. ¶ 10.) Massoud Omrany “gave [Plaintiff] the impression that [she] could ignore the lawsuit as her had told [her] that so long as [she] paid rent to him with reference to the Pico property, [she] was not in any danger of being delinquent to anyone with reference to the Melrose property.” (Puchkova Decl. ¶ 11; see Puchkova Decl. ¶ 15.)

The Court finds that this is a satisfactory excuse for not presenting a defense to the original action, and Defendant acted diligently after discovering the default and default judgment.

However, Defendant does not attempt to show that she has a meritorious case. (See Opposition at pp. 10-11.) Defendant also did not file a reply and has not addressed Plaintiff’s request for a bond if the motion is granted. (See id. at pp. 11-12.)

Accordingly, the motion to vacate entry of default and default judgment is CONTINUED to July 22, 2025 at 8:30 a.m.

Defendant may file a reply arguing her meritorious case and responding to Plaintiff’s request for a bond no later than June 24, 2025. Plaintiff may file a sur-reply no later than July 8, 2025.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMCDEPT48@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit. If all parties in the case submit on the tentative ruling, no appearances before the Court are required unless a companion hearing (for example, a Case Management Conference) is also on calendar.

Hon. Thomas D. Long

Judge of the Superior Court