Judge Thomas D. Long, Case Number: 24STCV19203, Date: 2025-03-18 Tentative Ruling

On November 18, 2024, Plaintiff Michelle Farias filed a first amended complaint (“FAC”) against Defendant American Honda Motor Co. Inc. arising from Plaintiff’s purchase of an allegedly defective vehicle.

On December 11, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion to compel further responses to discovery.

Plaintiff seeks to compel further responses to Request for Production of Documents (Set One) Nos. 1-3, 7, 9, 14-20, 29, 30, 39, 40, 43, 44, 47, 48, 53, 54, 55, 56, 69-74, 83-86, 89, 92, 93, 104, 107, 108, 110, 114, 115, 120, 121, 126, 127, 135, 136, 139, 140, and 142-145.

A party may move to compel a further response to a discovery demand if the demanding party deems that the statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete; the representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive; or an objection in the response is without merit or too general. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.300, subd. (a) [interrogatories], 2031.310, subd. (a) [documents], 2033.290, subd. (a) [admissions].)

For a motion to compel further, the moving party must meet and confer with the opposing party and file a Separate Statement or follow the Court’s alternative method of outlining the disputes. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b); California Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(b).) This Department requires the parties to follow the procedures outlined in Exhibit A of Department 48’s Courtroom Information (available on the Court’s website, www.lacourt.org) and file a joint statement.

Plaintiff’s counsel’s declaration and 76-page separate statement make clear that they did not attempt to follow these procedures. On September 18, 2024, Plaintiff sent a 4-page letter to Defendant. (Theophil Decl. ¶ 26 & Ex. 8.) On November 5, 2024, Plaintiff sent a 37-page letter to Defendant. (Theophil Decl. ¶ 27 & Ex. 9.) According to Plaintiff, Defendant did not respond to either letter. (Theophil Decl. ¶¶ 26-27.) However, Defendant’s counsel provides copies of their responsive emails inviting a phone call—including Plaintiff’s counsel’s multiple replies. (Maugeri Decl. ¶¶ 8-11 & Exs. D-E.) Plaintiff filed her motion to compel on December 11, 2024, within hours of some of Defendant’s emails reiterating that they “remain ready, willing, and able to confer regarding such production and responses.” (Maugeri Decl., Ex. E at pp. 1-3.) Defendant pointed out the discrepancies in another email shortly after Plaintiff filed the motion, noting, “The declaration in support of that motion blatantly misrepresents the purported ‘meet and confer efforts’ that preceded the motion,” and “request[ing] that you immediately withdraw the motion to compel and let us know your availability to engage in actual, good faith meet-and-confer efforts to resolve the issues raised by your motion.” (Maugeri Decl., Ex. E at p. 1.)

The Court will continue the hearing on this motion so the parties can meet and confer and follow the proper procedures, including the submission of a Joint Statement.

The Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses to Plaintiff’s Request for Production of Documents, Set One is CONTINUED to June 26, 2025 at 8:30 a.m.

The parties are ordered to meet and confer in good faith. The Court strongly encourages the parties to consult newly enacted Code of Civil Procedure section 871.26 for guidance on the scope of relevant discovery.

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context, accepting the alleged facts as true. (Nolte v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1406.)

A. The Fifth Cause of Action Does Not Allege Fraud with Specificity and Does Not Sufficiently Allege a Relationship Between the Parties.

Defendant argues that the fifth cause of action for Fraudulent Inducement – Concealment does not allege sufficient facts. (Demurrer at pp. 11-18.)

Fraud based on concealment requires that “(1) the defendant must have concealed or suppressed a material fact, (2) the defendant must have been under a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff, (3) the defendant must have intentionally concealed or suppressed the fact with the intent to defraud the plaintiff, (4) the plaintiff must have been unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he did if he had known of the concealed or suppressed fact, and (5) as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact, the plaintiff must have sustained damage.” (Bigler-Engler v. Breg, Inc. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 276, 310-311.)

An essential element of intentional concealment includes the duty to disclose, which must be based upon a transaction, or a special relationship, between plaintiff and defendant. (Id. at p. 314.) “There are ‘four circumstances in which nondisclosure or concealment may constitute actionable fraud: (1) when the defendant is in a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff; (2) when the defendant had exclusive knowledge of material facts not known to the plaintiff; (3) when the defendant actively conceals a material fact from the plaintiff; and (4) when the defendant makes partial representations but also suppresses some material facts.’” (Id. at p. 311.) “[O]ther than the first instance, in which there must be a fiduciary relationship between the parties, ‘the other three circumstances in which nondisclosure may be actionable presuppose[ ] the existence of some other relationship between the plaintiff and defendant in which a duty to disclose can arise. . . . “[W]here material facts are known to one party and not to the other, failure to disclose them is not actionable fraud unless there is some relationship between the parties which gives rise to a duty to disclose such known facts.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Hoffman v. 162 North Wolfe LLC (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1178, 1187 (Hoffman).) “Even under the strict rules of common law pleading, one of the canons was that less particularity is required when the facts lie more in the knowledge of the opposite party.” (Alfaro v. Community Housing Improvement System & Planning Assn., Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1384.)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant knew about the Sensing Defect since 2017. (See, e.g., FAC ¶¶ 65, 68-70, 79.) Because of the defect, “Plaintiff was harmed by purchasing a vehicle that Plaintiff would not have leased and/or purchased had Plaintiff known the true facts about the Sensing Defect. Furthermore, Plaintiff unknowingly exposed themselves to the risk of liability, accident and/or injury as a result of Defendant's fraudulent concealment of the Sensing Defect.” (FAC ¶ 84.) Plaintiff did not know about these defects and problems, and Defendant, who had superior knowledge of the defect, did not disclose the defects when Plaintiff purchased the vehicle. (E.g., FAC ¶¶ 79-83.) The allegations are specific enough to allege the information that was concealed and the danger posed. (See Jones v. ConocoPhillips Co. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1187, 1199-1200.)

However, Plaintiff does not allege facts showing the existence of a relationship between the parties that gives rise to a duty to disclose facts. (See Hoffman, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 1187.) Plaintiff alleges only that “Defendant was under a duty to Plaintiff to disclose the defective nature of the Vehicle and its sensing system, its safety consequences and/or the associated repair costs because . . . Plaintiff is informed, believes, and thereon alleges that Honda acquired its knowledge of the Sensing Defect and its potential consequences prior to Plaintiff acquiring the Vehicle, through sources not available to consumers such as Plaintiff . . .” (FAC ¶ 80.) There are also no facts showing why Defendant’s knowledge was exclusive or that Defendant intended to defraud. Indeed, Plaintiff quotes complaints from other customers that were posted by the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration, suggesting that the knowledge was in fact public. (FAC ¶ 70.)

Defendant argues that the fifth cause of action is barred by the economic loss rule. (Demurrer at pp. 18-19.) Under the economic loss rule, “[w]here a purchaser’s expectations in a sale are frustrated because the product he bought is not working properly, his remedy is said to be in contract alone, for he has suffered only ‘economic’ losses.” (Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. v. Dana Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 979, 988 (Robinson), quotation marks omitted.) However, tort damages may be permitted when the breach of contract is accompanied by a tort such as fraud. (Id. at pp. 989-990.) To plead around the economic loss rule, a party must plead the existence of a duty that arises independent of any contractual duty and independent injury, other than economic loss, that arises from the breach of that duty. (Id. at pp. 988-991.)

“[U]nder California law, the economic loss rule does not bar [a claim] for fraudulent inducement by concealment. Fraudulent inducement claims fall within an exception to the economic loss rule recognized by our Supreme Court” in Robinson, and such claims allege fraudulent conduct that is independent of the alleged warranty breaches. (Dhital v. Nissan North America, Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 828, 843.) The Supreme Court recently confirmed that “the economic loss rule does not apply to limit recovery for intentional tort claims like fraud.” (Rattagan v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2024) 17 Cal.5th 1, 38.) “A plaintiff may assert a tort claim for fraudulent concealment based on conduct occurring in the course of a contractual relationship, if the elements of the cause of action can be established independently of the parties’ contractual rights and obligations and the tortious conduct exposes the plaintiff to a risk of harm beyond the reasonable contemplation of the parties when they entered into the agreement.” (Ibid.)

Accordingly, a properly pleaded claim for fraudulent inducement is not barred by the economic loss rule. Here, however, Plaintiff does not establish all elements of fraudulent concealment independently of the parties’ contractual rights and obligations.

The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subds. (a)-(b).)

Defendant moves to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages. (Motion at p. 2.) A plaintiff can recover punitive damages in tort cases where “the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) “The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages. [Citation.] Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim. [Citation.]” (Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166, fn. omitted.)

The Court concurrently sustains the demurrer to the fraud cause of action, and there are no other specific facts showing oppression or malice.

Additionally, a corporate employer can be liable for punitive damages only when an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (b).) The allegation that “[a]ll acts of corporate employees as alleged herein were authorized or ratified by an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporate employer” is conclusory and lacks facts. (FAC ¶ 67.)

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMCDEPT48@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit. If all parties in the case submit on the tentative ruling, no appearances before the Court are required unless a companion hearing (for example, a Case Management Conference) is also on calendar.

Hon. Thomas D. Long

Judge of the Superior Court