Judge: Thomas D. Long, Case: 24STCV21217, Date: 2025-03-25 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV21217    Hearing Date: March 25, 2025    Dept: 48

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

On August 21, 2024, Plaintiff Isabella Vincenza filed this action against Defendants City Storage Systems LLC, CSS Payroll Co. L.P., Travis Kalanick, Jessica Morton, and David Tunna.

On November 15, 2024, Defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration.  Defendants’ request for judicial notice is granted.

DISCUSSION

When seeking to compel arbitration of a party’s claims, the movant must allege the existence of an agreement to arbitrate.  (Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 219.)  The burden then shifts to the opponent to prove the falsity of the agreement.  (Ibid.)  After the Court determines that an agreement to arbitrate exists, it then considers objections to its enforceability.  (Ibid.)

The Court must grant a petition to compel arbitration unless the movant has waived the right to compel arbitration or if there are grounds to revoke the arbitration agreement.  (Ibid.; Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2.)  Under California law and the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), an arbitration agreement may be invalid based upon grounds applicable to any contract, including unconscionability, fraud, duress, and public policy.  (Sanchez v. Western Pizza Enterprises, Inc. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 154, 165-166.)

“On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party to the agreement refuses to arbitrate that controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that: (a) The right to compel arbitration has been waived by the petitioner; or (b) Grounds exist for rescission of the agreement.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2.)

The parties agree that there is an arbitration agreement that governs the claims in this case.  (See DiBenedetto Decl. ¶ 5; Downes Decl. ¶ 3.)  However, Plaintiff argues that the arbitration agreement is unenforceable because Defendants breached Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.97, subdivision (a)(1) and JAMS breached Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.97, subdivision (a)(2).

In an employment arbitration, the drafting party materially breaches the arbitration agreement and is in default when it fails to timely pay certain fees and costs.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.97, subd. (a).)

On July 2, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Demand for Arbitration with JAMS.  (DiBenedetto Decl. ¶ 6; Downes Decl. ¶ 4.)  On August 2, 2024, JAMS emailed the parties, “Respondent is to pay the non-refundable filing fee of $2,000.  We can then proceed with arbitrator selection.”  (DiBenedetto Decl. ¶ 17 & Ex. M; Downes Decl. ¶ 5.)  On August 5, 2024, JAMS issued a “NOTICE OF INTENT TO INITIATE ARBITRATION (Respondent’s invoice).pdf,” for which the second page is an invoice that is also dated August 5, 2024.  (DiBenedetto Decl. ¶¶ 10-13 & Exs. J-K; Downes Decl. ¶ 6.)

As a matter of law, an employer’s failure to pay certain fees and costs within 30 days after the due date is a material breach of the arbitration agreement.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.97, subd. (a).)  Here, however, Defendants paid the arbitration fee on September 3, 2024—29 days after receipt of the August 5, 2024 invoice.  (See Motion at p. 1, 3; Opposition at p. 15.)  Defendants therefore did not breach their obligations and did not waive their right to arbitration.

Plaintiff also argues that JAMS breached Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.97, subdivision (a)(2) by not immediately providing an invoice for arbitration fees.  (Opposition at pp. 10-11.)  JAMS’s conduct cannot waive Defendants’ rights.

Plaintiff further argues that the parties’ contractual duties are conditioned upon JAMS’s services, and all conditions precedent have not been satisfied.  (Opposition at pp. 13-14.)  This is nonsensical.  On September 10, 2024, JAMS sent the parties a list of potential arbitrators and requested that the parties rank their preferences by September 20, 2024.  (DiBenedetto Decl. ¶ 19.)  Plaintiff’s JAMS case is still pending with JAMS, but JAMS has not appointed an arbitrator.  (DiBenedetto Decl. ¶ 20; Downes Decl. ¶ 8.)  Plaintiff identifies no actual condition precedent that prevents the already-pending case from continuing with JAMS.

CONCLUSION

Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration is GRANTED.  The entire action is STAYED pending the conclusion of the arbitration.

A Status Conference re: Arbitration is scheduled for March 26, 2026 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 48 at Stanley Mosk Courthouse.  Five court days before, the parties are to file a joint report stating the name of their retained arbitrator and the status of arbitration.

Moving party to give notice.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMCDEPT48@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit.  If all parties in the case submit on the tentative ruling, no appearances before the Court are required unless a companion hearing (for example, a Case Management Conference) is also on calendar.

         Dated this 25th day of March 2025