Judge Thomas D. Long, Case Number: BS173043, Date: 2025-03-27 Tentative Ruling

On January 3, 2025, following appeal, the Court entered judgment and ordered that a peremptory writ of mandate be issued directing Respondent The University of Southern California to set aside its finding that Petitioner violated the April 14, 2017 Avoidance of Contact Directive.

“[A] court may award attorneys’ fees to a successful party against one or more opposing parties in any action which has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest if: (a) a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has been conferred on the general public or a large class of persons, (b) the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement, or of enforcement by one public entity against another public entity, are such as to make the award appropriate, and (c) such fees should not in the interest of justice be paid out of the recovery, if any.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1021.5.) An order granting or denying attorney fees under section 1021.5 is reviewed for abuse of discretion, and the award will be upheld unless there is no substantial evidence to support the trial court’s findings or when there has been a miscarriage of justice. (Keep Our Mountains Quiet v. County of Santa Clara (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 714, 737.)

Petitioner argues that his “victory enforces the statutory rights pursuant to Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (b) to a fair hearing and to be free from abuses of discretion perpetrated by a university” and “enforces the important right of students to fair discipline procedures, specifically the right of students to be provided with the evidence, the right of the accused to be presumed innocent, the right to be held responsible for misconduct only in situations where the university is able to (and does) uphold its burden of proof, and the right to an administrative proceeding that complies with the university’s policies and procedures.” (Motion at p. 13.)

In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeal summarized the basis for the petition: “In June 2018, appellant filed a first amended petition setting forth more detail, describing how he and Jane Roe had met and engaged in sexual intercourse in April 2017, how appellant was arrested and charged with raping an intoxicated person, how these charges were dismissed at a preliminary hearing, and how USC conducted its own investigation and ultimately found appellant responsible for nonconsensual sexual activity, resulting in his expulsion in May 2018.” (Doe v. University of Southern California (Cal. Ct. App., Apr. 29, 2024, No. B314774) 2024 WL 1854190, at *2 (Doe).) Respondent had issued a letter to Petitioner on April 14, 2017 directing him to avoid contact with Roe (“Avoidance of Contact letter”). (See id. at *6.) The Avoidance of Contact letter was not included in the evidence for the live hearing. (Id. at *3-4.) The hearing officer found that Petitioner violated USC’s policies by violating the Avoidance of Contact letter. (Id. at *4.) The Court of Appeal concluded that Respondent failed to follow its policy by permitting the hearing officer to consider evidence outside the record, and had the hearing officer considered only evidence properly in the record, substantial evidence would not have supported a finding that appellant violated the Avoidance of Contact order. (Id. at *1.)

The Court agrees with Respondent that this action did not enforce an important right affecting the public interest and confer a significant benefit on the general public or a large class of persons.

The ultimate findings were not significant to the general public or demonstrably applicable to any other student. (See Davis v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1302, 1329.) The parties agreed that the Avoidance of Contact order was not part of the evidentiary record, and Respondent violated its own policy by sending it to the hearing officer. (Doe, supra, 2024 WL 1854190, at *6.) This is not a constitutional, statutory, or due process violation; rather, the decision was based on a violation of internal policy and the weight of the remaining, admissible evidence. (See Opposition at pp. 10-11.)

Petitioner’s relief was purely personal, based only on the limited facts of his case and the improper inclusion of one piece of evidence (without which there was insufficient evidence to find a violation by Petitioner). (See Opposition at p. 12.) “[G]rants of relief premised on the lack of evidence supporting a challenged decision . . . generally do not satisfy the significant-benefit requirement, [as compared to] those premised on broader violations of constitutional or statutory rights.” (Doe v. Atkinson (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 667, 676-677.) The people who will benefit from Petitioner’s success is very limited: at best, in future disciplinary hearings, Respondent may be more diligent about ensuring that all evidence is in the record and only that evidence (and no outside evidence) is considered by the hearing officer. (See id. at p. 677.) Given the relatively small number of students potentially affected and the necessarily fact-based nature of disciplinary hearings, this action did not confer a significant benefit on the general public.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMCDEPT48@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit. If all parties in the case submit on the tentative ruling, no appearances before the Court are required unless a companion hearing (for example, a Case Management Conference) is also on calendar.

Hon. Thomas D. Long

Judge of the Superior Court