Judge: Thomas Falls, Case: 22PSCV00460, Date: 2022-08-26 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22PSCV00460    Hearing Date: August 26, 2022    Dept: R

JANE ROE 1 A.R., et al. vs COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, A PUBLIC ENTITY (22PSCV00460)

Defendant County of Los Angeles’s DEMURRER To Plaintiffs’ Complaint For Personal Injury

            Responding Party: Plaintiffs, Jane Roe 1 A.R, et al.

Tentative Ruling

Defendant County of Los Angeles’s DEMURRER To Plaintiffs’ Complaint For Personal Injury is TBD.

Background

This case arises from allegations of childhood sexual assault.  Plaintiffs JANE ROE 1 A.R., JANE ROE 2 L.J., JANE ROE 3 C.R., JANE ROE 4 T.A., JANE ROE 5 A.L., JANE ROE 6 R.R., JANE ROE 7 A.T., JANE ROE 8 L.S., JOHN ROE 1 J.W., JOHN ROE 2 A.P., JOHN ROE 3 D.D., and JOHN ROE 4 D.R. (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) allege the following against Defendant County of Los Angeles (“County”): Plaintiffs were housed in the MacLaren Hall.[1] Dozens of employees who ran, oversaw, and supervised MacLaren Hall had criminal histories over the forty-year operation of MacLaren Hall. (Complaint ¶27.) In 2003, after forty years of operation, MacLaren Hall was closed due to the decades of sexual assault and “overcrowded, dirty, scary, horrific conditions.” (Complaint ¶¶26, 28.) Plaintiffs were all sexually assaulted, and in one instance Plaintiff Jane Roe 4 T.A. became pregnant by the abuser while living at MacLaren Hall. (Complaint ¶¶35-64.)

On May 16, 2022, Plaintiffs filed the instant action against the County and Does 1 through 50 for:

1.      Negligence Based On Government Code Sections 815.2 And 820,

2.      Negligent Supervision Of A Minor Government Code Sections 815.2 And 820,

3.      Violation Of Bane Act (Civil Code §52.1) And

4.      Negligence

On July 8, 2022, the County filed the instant Demurrer.

On August 15, 2022, Plaintiffs filed their Opposition to the County’s Demurrer.

On September 19, 2022, the County filed its Reply.

Plaintiff’s Counsel: James W. Lewis of Slater Slater Schuman LLP.

Defense Counsel: Thomas A. Guterres and Megan K. Lieber of Collins + Collins LLP.

Legal Standard

A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the pleadings and will be sustained only where the pleading is defective on its face.  (City of Atascadero v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 445, 459.)  “We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.  We accept the factual allegations of the complaint as true and also consider matters which may be judicially noticed.  [Citation.]”  (Mitchell v. California Department of Public Health (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1000, 1007; Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 604 [“the facts alleged in the pleading are deemed to be true, however improbable they may be”].)  Allegations are to be liberally construed.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 452.)  In construing the allegations, the court is to give effect to specific factual allegations that may modify or limit inconsistent general or conclusory allegations.  (Financial Corporation of America v. Wilburn (1987) 189 Cal.App.3rd 764, 769.)   

A demurrer may be brought if insufficient facts are stated to support the cause of action asserted.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).)  “A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.”  (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)  A demurrer for uncertainty will be sustained only where the complaint is so bad that the defendant cannot reasonably respond.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f).) 

Where the complaint contains substantial factual allegations sufficiently apprising defendant of the issues it is being asked to meet, a demurrer for uncertainty will be overruled or plaintiff will be given leave to amend.  (Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2.)  Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment.  (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.)  The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully.  (Ibid.)  

Discussion

The County brings forth the instant demurrer on the following grounds:

1.      There is a misjoinder of parties (Code of Civ. Proc., § 430.10(d)),

2.      The Third Cause of Action for Violation of Bane Act does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action (Code of Civ. Proc., § 430.10(e)), and

3.      The Complaint is uncertain as to the allegations against County (Code of Civ. Proc. § 430.10(f).)

1.      Whether There is a Misjoinder of Parties?

California Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) section 430.10 subdivision (d) provides that a demurrer may be brought on grounds of misjoinder of parties. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10(d).) CCP section 379 provides that all persons may be joined in one action as defendants if there is any right asserted against them “arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all these persons will arise in the action; or [a] claim, right, or interest adverse to them in the property or controversy which is the subject of the action.” (Id., § 379(a)) (emphasis added). “[A] defendant may not make allegations of defect or misjoinder of parties in the demurrer if the pleadings do not disclose the existence of the matter relied on; such objection must be taken by plea or answer.” (Harboring Villas Homeowners Association v. Superior Court (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 426, 429.) 

The County argues that misjoinder applies because the complaint “contains no allegation, and indeed there could not be, that more than one plaintiff was injured as a result of the same transaction or occurrence, i.e., that more than one plaintiff was injured as a result of the same perpetrator. Each Plaintiff alleges separate abuse by a separate perpetrator at a separate time, constituting separate occurrences.” (Demurrer p. 7, relying upon Coleman v. Twin Coast Newspaper, Inc., (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d 650, 653.) Thus, it concludes, “there is no unity of interest, as each Plaintiffs’ right to relief, if in fact they possess such a right, does not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence.” (Demurrer pp. 7-8.)

Here, however, misjoinder does not apply.

First, the County’s reliance on Coleman is misplaced. As stated by the County’s own recitation of facts, in Coleman, three chiropractors who practiced in different locations alleged that representatives of the county had entered their offices on separate occasions under the guise of official business and disrupted their practices. (Coleman, supra, 175 Cal.App.2d at p. 652.) Accordingly, the Coleman court found misjoinder because “[t]he only fact which appears in the complaint is that three chiropractors, practicing in the same city, underwent scrutiny during the course of the same day.” (Id. at p. 654.) Here, however, the situation differs markedly from that present in Coleman as Plaintiffs were all in the same location (i.e., at MacLaren Hall), Plaintiffs were all minors (between the ages of 5 to 17 years old), and all Plaintiffs are suing for conduct that was similar in kind and manner.

Second, even though the alleged sexual assault at MacLaren Hall took course over many years, that does not indicate a misjoinder of parties. In Anaya v. Superior Ct. (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 228, petitioners filed two actions to recover damages for the exposure of male employees, and through them their wives and children, over the course of 20 to 30 years to the hazardous effect of a certain chemical at a fertilizer and agricultural chemicals manufacturing facility. In discussing the period over which the conduct occurred, the court stated that “[t]he fact that each employee was not exposed on every occasion any other employee was exposed does not destroy the community of interest linking these petitioners.” (Id. at 233.) Similarly, here, while two of the victims were sexually abused in 1988 and 1990, most of the abuse alleged occurred between 1994 and 2001. (See also Opp. p. 8, citing Moe v. Anderson (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 826, 835-836 [In a case where plaintiffs were sexually assaulted by the same physician on different occasions (one plaintiff in May 2009 and the other plaintiff between July and September 2009), the Court of Appeal upheld permissive joinder of the patients’ negligence claims against the medical group for which the physician worked because the medical group engaged in a “series of transactions, i.e., the negligent hiring and supervision of Anderson, which exposed plaintiffs to [the doctor’s] predatory conduct.”].)

Therefore, as common issues of fact and law abound because all the rights to relief arise from the same series of transactions or occurrences (i.e., childhood sexual assault that occurred at MacLaren Hall), the demurrer is OVERRULED on the grounds of misjoinder.

2.      Whether the Complaint is Uncertain?

A demurrer based on uncertainty only applies where the complaint is so bad that a defendant cannot reasonably respond—i.e., cannot reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what counts or claims are directed against him or her.  (Khoury v. Maly’s of Calif., Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) All that is required of a plaintiff, as a matter of pleading, even as against a special demurrer, is that his complaint set forth the essential facts of the case with reasonable precision and with sufficient particularity to acquaint the defendant with the nature, source and extent of his cause of action.  (Harman v. City and County of San Francisco (1972) 7 Cal.3d 150, 157.)   

The County argues that the complaint “is uncertain as to any identifying information for each of the 12 Plaintiffs that would allow County to investigate these claims, uncertain as to the approximate dates when the alleged abuse occurred for each of the 12 Plaintiffs, uncertain as to the identity of the alleged abuser of each of the 12 Plaintiffs, and uncertain as to whether all 12 plaintiffs were abused by the same or different perpetrators.” (Demurrer p. 10.)

Here, the County’s essential need for exact identities, exact dates, and exact perpetrators is unnecessary at the pleading stage and disingenuous to the nature of this case.

First, “a demurrer for uncertainty will not lie where the ambiguous facts alleged are presumptively within the knowledge of the demurring party.” (Merlino v. West Coast Macaroni Mfg. Co. (1949) 90 Cal.App.2d 106, 202.) Here, as the County employed the perpetrators and as the County had control over MacLaren Hall, it is the County who likely possesses the knowledge it seeks. Furthermore, as the basic facts have been pled, the more specific facts can be obtained under modern discovery procedures. (Khoury, supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 616.)

Second, the County’s argument that fictitious names cannot be used undermines the very purpose in the judicial use of ‘Doe Plaintiffs.’ “The judicial use of “Doe plaintiffs” to protect legitimate privacy rights has gained wide currency, particularly given the rapidity and ubiquity of disclosures over the World Wide Web.” (Starbucks Corp. v. Superior Court (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1436, 1452, fn. 7; see also

The United States Supreme Court has also implicitly endorsed the use of pseudonyms to protect a plaintiff's privacy. (See Roe v. Wade (1973) 410 U.S. 113, 124, overruled on other grounds by Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization (2022) 142 S. Ct. 2228.)

Therefore, as the pleading has set forth the essential facts—the number of plaintiffs, the age of plaintiffs at the time of the alleged assaults, the year of the alleged assaults, the details of the alleged assaults, and the location of the alleged assaults—the demurrer is OVERRULED on the grounds of uncertainty. 

3.      Whether Plaintiffs Have Pled Sufficient Facts for a Bane Violation Cause of Action

To allege a cause of action under Civil Code § 52.1, the plaintiff must allege that “the defendant interfered with or attempted to interfere with the plaintiff’s legal right by threatening or committing violent acts.” (Doe v. State (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 832, 842.) “The essence of a¿Bane¿Act¿claim is that the defendant, by the specified improper means (i.e., ‘threats, intimidation or coercion’), tried to or did prevent the plaintiff from doing something he or she had the right to do under the law or to force the plaintiff to do something that he or she was not¿required to do under the law. [Citation.]” (Austin B. v. Escondido Union School Dist. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 860, 883.) “A plaintiff need not allege the defendant acted with discriminatory animus or intent; a defendant is liable if he or she interfered with the plaintiff’s constitutional rights by the requisite threats, intimidation, or coercion.” (Id. at 882) (emphasis added).

The elements of a cause of action under Civil Code Section 52.1 are stated in CACI No. 3066:

1. [That by threats, intimidation or coercion, [name of defendant] caused [name of plaintiff] to reasonably believe that if [he/she/nonbinary pronoun] exercised [his/her/nonbinary pronoun] right [insert right, e.g., “to vote”], [name of defendant] would commit violence against [[him/her/nonbinary pronoun]/ [or] [his/her/nonbinary pronoun] property] and that [name of defendant] had the apparent ability to carry out the threats;]

[or]

[That [name of defendant] acted violently against [[name of plaintiff]/ [and] [name of plaintiff]’s property] [to prevent [him/her/nonbinary pronoun] from exercising [his/her/nonbinary pronoun] right [e.g., to vote]/to retaliate against [name of plaintiff] for having exercised [his/her/nonbinary pronoun] right [e.g., to vote]];]

[2. That [name of defendant] intended to deprive [name of plaintiff] of [his/her/nonbinary pronoun] enjoyment of the interests protected by the right [e.g., to vote];]

3. That [name of plaintiff] was harmed; and

4. That [name of defendant]'s conduct was a substantial factor in causing [name of plaintiff]'s harm.

Plaintiffs base their Bane Act cause of action on the following pertinent allegations:

Defendants County of Los Angeles and DOES 1 through 150, intentionally interfered with their civil rights by threats, intimidation, coercion and violence against them to prevent them from exercising their right to peaceably live at MacLaren Hall without being sexually assaulted, intimidated, threatened, physically assaulted, and psychologically harmed.

. . .

Plaintiffs were subjected to the deprivations alleged herein as a result of the failure of Defendants County of Los Angeles and DOES 1 through 60 to properly train and supervise their employees and/or agents and giving them the authority to detain, restrain, confine and keep children inside a locked, guard-gated facility, without the ability to leave.

(Complaint ¶¶95, 98) (emphasis added).

The County argues that “Plaintiffs vaguely and generally conclude County violated their constitutional rights through threats of violence but stop short of alleging the necessary ‘specific intent’ to violate said rights and further fail to allege how the alleged threats were independent from the underlying violation.” (Demurrer p. 9, relying upon Julian v. Mission Cmty. Hosp. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 360, Allen v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 67-68, and Shoyoye v. County of Los Angeles (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 947, 959.)

In Opposition, Plaintiffs aver that the County “is wrong.” (Opp. p. 11.) Plaintiffs cite to Cornell v. City & County of San Francisco (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 766 for the proposition that nothing in the text of the Bane Act requires that the threat, intimidation or coercion element be separate from the underlying constitutional or statutory violation. (Opp. p. 12.) Thus, by the “use of physical force, threats of physical force, threats of isolation, intimidation and sexual assaults and abuse to intimidate, threaten, harm, detain, [and] assault” to “keep [Plaintiffs] from disobeying directives, keep them ‘in line,’ and keep [Plaintiffs] from leaving the locked and guard gated facility, the complaint has adequately alleged that the County—through its employees[2]—cause in interference with Plaintiffs’ right to peaceful living.[3]

The court will address the Bane Violation cause of action in further detail during the hearing and requests the Parties to be prepared to further discuss this cause of action.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the complaint does not fail for misjoinder and is not uncertain.