Judge Thomas Falls, Case 22PSCV00800 2023-04-04 Tentative Ruling

The Court may change tentative rulings at any time. Therefore, attorneys are advised to check this website to determine if any changes or updates have been made to the tentative ruling.

Counsel may submit on the tentative rulings by calling the clerk in Dept. O at 909-802-1126 before 8:30 the morning of the hearing. Submission on the tentative does not bind the court to adopt the tentative ruling at the hearing should the opposing party appear and convince the court of further modification during oral argument.

The Tentative Ruling is not an invitation, nor an opportunity, to file any further documents relative to the hearing in question. No such filing will be considered by the Court in the absence of permission first obtained following ex-parte application therefore.

(1) GENERAL MOTORS LLC’S DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

(2) GENERAL MOTORS LLC’S NOTICE OF MOTION; MOTION TO STRIKE PUNITIVE DAMAGES FROM PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

(1) GENERAL MOTORS LLC’S DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.

(2) GENERAL MOTORS LLC’S NOTICE OF MOTION; MOTION TO STRIKE PUNITIVE DAMAGES FROM PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT is GRANTED.

On August 1, 2022 Plaintiffs KRISTAL AVILA AND MARIA S. MEDINA (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed suit against Defendant General Motors, LLC (“Defendant”) relating to the purchase of a 2014 Chevrolet Cruz.

On November 21, 2022, the court sustained Defendant’s first demurrer with leave to amend.

On December 21, 2022, Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint (“FAC”).

A demurrer may be asserted on any one or more of the following grounds: (a) The court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the pleading; (b) The person who filed the pleading does not have legal capacity to sue; (c) There is another action pending between the same parties on the same cause of action; (d) There is a defect or misjoinder of parties; (e) The pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action; (f) The pleading is uncertain (“uncertain” includes ambiguous and unintelligible); (g) In an action founded upon a contract, it cannot be ascertained from the pleading whether the contract is written, is oral, or is implied by conduct; (h) No certificate was filed as required by CCP §411.35 or (i) by §411.36. CCP §430.10. Accordingly, a demurrer tests the sufficiency of a pleading, and the grounds for a demurrer must appear on the face of the pleading or from judicially noticeable matters. CCP §430.30(a); Blank v. Kirwan, (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.

The face of the pleading includes attachments and incorporations by reference (Frantz v. Blackwell, (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 91, 94); it does not include inadmissible hearsay. Day v. Sharp, (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 904, 914.

Defendant again demurs to the fifth cause of action for Violation of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”).[1]

The CLRA protects individuals engaging in consumer transactions. The CLRA prohibits “unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices undertaken by any person in a transaction intended to result or which results in the sale or lease of goods or services to any consumer.” (Civ. Code, § 1770, subd. (a).) The CLRA sets forth twenty-seven (27) different “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” that may constitute a violation of the statute. (Ibid.) In assessing whether the representations made in the course of the consumer transaction violate the CLRA, courts use the reasonable consumer standard—i.e., whether a reasonable consumer would be misled by the representation. (Consumer Advocates v. Echostar Satellite Corp. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1360.) To the extent an alleged violation is based on the defendant’s omission of a material fact, “to be actionable the omission must be contrary to a representation actually made by the defendant, or an omission of a fact the defendant was obliged to disclose.” (Daugherty v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 824, 835.) A cause of action under the CLRA “must be stated with reasonable particularity, which is a more lenient pleading standard than is applied to common law fraud claims.” (Gutierrez v. Carmax Auto Superstore California (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1234, 1261.)

As the court previously determined that Plaintiffs failed to plead the alleged “fraud” with particularity, the court will determine whether the FAC now provides the requisite facts.

Defendant violated the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”) when, inter alia, it engaged in unfair and deceptive acts, and by knowingly warranting and allowing to be sold to Plaintiffs the Vehicle without disclosing that the Subject Vehicle was defective and susceptible to sudden and premature failure. Specifically, GM knew that the cooling system had one or more defects that can result in various problems, including, but not limited to, excessive low engine coolant level; improper leakage/evaporation of abnormally high amounts of coolant fluid; premature failure of the water pump; premature failure of the bearing shaft seal; premature failure of the reservoir plug; premature failure of the water outlet; fluid leakage into the engine; and/or emission of malodorous fumes in the passenger compartment (“Cooling System Defect”). By failing to disclose and concealing the defective nature of the cooling system from Plaintiffs, Defendant violated California Civil Code § 1770(a), as it represented that the Vehicle and its cooling system had characteristics and benefits that they do not have, and ii) represented that the Vehicle and its cooling system were of a particular standard, quality, or grade when they were of another. See Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1770(a)(5) and (7)

Here, as stated before, Plaintiffs have failed to specify the particular “characteristics and benefits” which Defendant represented the Subject Vehicle did affirmatively have, but, in reality, did not have. Further, Plaintiffs have failed to expressly state the specific “standard, quality, or grade” which Defendant represented the Subject Vehicle did have, which, in reality, it did not have. (Ibid.) Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to plead facts detailing the specific misrepresentations made by Defendant.

Therefore—following a liberal reading of the FAC—the court again concludes that Plaintiffs’ Fifth Cause of Action is not stated with the requisite particularity, and, as a result, the cause of action is susceptible to Defendant’s Demurrer. As for leave to amend, as the court already allowed leave to amend on the cause of action, but Plaintiff failed to cure it, the court SUSTAINS the demurrer as to the 5^th cause of action of CLRA violations without leave to amend.

As for punitive damages, Plaintiff’s first through fourth and sixth causes of action are based upon Defendant’s alleged breaches of express and implied warranties under the SBA and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. However, punitive damages are not available under the SBA because the statute limits recovery to a refund of the purchase price paid and payable (or replacement of the subject vehicle). (Civ. Code, § 1794; 15 U.S.C. § 2301.) To the extent that in opposition Plaintiffs argue punitive damages in SBA causes of action are recoverable, they have not provided binding authority.[2] Accordingly, as Plaintiffs could only have sought seek punitive damages their fraudulent inducement-concealment cause of action, which the court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to plead, then punitive damages may not be recovered.

Consequently, the punitive damages claim is stricken because Plaintiffs have not pled a viable cause of action that can support punitive damages claim.

Based on the foregoing, the demurrer is sustained without leave to amend and the motion to strike punitive damages is granted.

[1] As the court in its previous ruling determined that sustaining the demurrer as to the statute of limitations would be improper because the face of the complaint fails to state with certainty the exact date upon which Plaintiffs’ discovered Defendant’s wrongful and deceptive acts punishable under the CLRA and the FAC still does not plead that date with clarity, the court will not revisit the issue. (See Union Carbide Corp. v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal.3d 15, 25 [When nothing appearing on the face of the complaint suggests that the action is barred by the statute of limitations, there are no grounds for a demurrer]; see also Valvo v. University of Southern California (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 887, 895 [Further, a demurrer on the ground of the bar of the statute of limitations does not lie where the complaint merely shows that the action may have been barred. Instead, it must appear affirmatively that, upon the facts stated, the right of action is necessarily barred.].)

[2] Even assuming arguendo that SBA allows for recovery of punitive damages, the allegations must describe a state of mind and a motive to harm such that the mere allegation that the defendant committed an intentional tort will not support an award of punitive damages. (See Motion p. 4, citing Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166) (emphasis added). (The court notes that Plaintiffs did not address Defendant’s citation to Grieves.) Here, not only are there insufficient facts to support fraud, but there are no allegations that speak to Defendant’s intent to cause harm to consumers.