Judge: Thomas Falls, Case: 22PSCV00972, Date: 2023-04-10 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 22PSCV00972    Hearing Date: April 10, 2023    Dept: O

Hearing date:                          Monday, April 10, 2023

RE:                                          RAUL ALMANZA vs NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC. (22PSCV00972)

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(1)   DEFENDANT NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC.’S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND STAY PROCEEDINGS

(2)   PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL THE DEPOSITION OF DEFENDANT GENERAL MOTORS LLC’S PERSON(S) MOST KNOWLEDGEABLE, WITH PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS

Tentative Ruling

(1)   DEFENDANT NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC.’S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND STAY PROCEEDINGS is GRANTED.

(2)   PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL THE DEPOSITION OF DEFENDANT GENERAL MOTORS LLC’S PERSON(S) MOST KNOWLEDGEABLE, WITH PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS is MOOT because all matters are stayed.

Background

This is a lemon law case.

On September 2, 2022, Plaintiff filed suit.

On October 14, 2022, Defendant filed its Answer.

On November 14, 2022, Defendant filed the instant motion.

On January 3, 2023, Plaintiff filed three further discovery motions.

On February 9, 2023, Plaintiff filed a motion to compel the deposition of Defendant’s PMK.

On March 15, 2023, Plaintiff filed its Opposition to the instant motion.

On March 21, 2023, Defendant filed its Reply to the instant motion.

Discussion

Defendant moves for arbitration because the sales contract Plaintiff signed contained an arbitration provision. The arbitration provision states the following:

Any claim or dispute, whether in contract, tort, statute or otherwise (including the interpretation and scope of this Arbitration Provision, and the arbitrability of the claim or dispute), between you and us or our employees, agents, successors or assigns, which arises out of or relates to your credit application, purchase or condition of this vehicle, this contract or any resulting transaction or relationship (including any such relationship with third parties who do not sign this contract) shall, at your or our election, be resolved by neutral, binding arbitration and not by a court action.

(Ex. 4 to Maugeri Decl) (emphasis added).

The court finds that there is a valid agreement signed by Plaintiff and that the arbitration agreement (via doctrine of equitable estoppel) extends to nonsignatories (as applied in Felisilda v. FCA US LLC (2020) 53 Cal.App.4th 486). After all, the crux of the Complaint pertains to “defects, malfunctions, misadjustments, and/or nonconformities existent with the Vehicle” and that Defendant failed to conform the vehicle to the applicable warranties that came with his purchase of the 2020 Nissan Kicks.

Therefore, having examined the facts of the complaint wherein Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant directly relate to the condition of the vehicle, the court determines that Plaintiff’s claims is founded on and intimately connected with the sales contract. To hold otherwise, would undermine the maxim of jurisprudence that “[h]e who takes the benefit must bear the burden.”

To the extent that Plaintiff avers that Felisilda does not apply because the dealership is not a party to the action, the court is unpersuaded because the finding in Felisilda was that non-signatories can enforce the arbitration agreement. Felisilda is binding on this court and controlling. Rather, Plaintiff relies on numerous federal cases. But federal district authorities “are not binding on state courts, even as to issues of federal law.” (Reply p. 5, quoting, Felisilda, supra, Cal.App.5th at p. 497.) Therefore, as Felisilda has directly spoken on an issue of state law, reliance on a federal court’s view of state law is improper.

To the extent that Plaintiff avers that Defendant waived its right to arbitration because it filed an Answer, the court is again unpersuaded. As noted by Defendant in its Reply, “waiver does not occur by mere participation in litigation if there has been no judicial litigation of the merits of arbitrable issues.” (Reply p. 9, Quach v. California Commerce Club, Inc. (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 470, 478, quoting St. Agnes Medical Center v. PacifiCare of California (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1187, 1203 [“Because merely participating in litigation, by itself, does not result in a waiver, courts will not find prejudice where the party opposing arbitration shows only that it incurred court costs and legal expenses.”].) In fact, the only party that appears to be actively litigating the issues and adding costs despite notice of the motion to compel arbitration is Plaintiff as he filed four complex discovery motions.

Therefore, recognizing that California's arbitration statutes reflect a strong public policy in favor of arbitration as a speedy and relatively inexpensive means of dispute resolution, the court finds that Defendant has not waived its right to arbitration.

Lastly, to the extent that Plaintiff avers that the arbitration provision is procedurally unconscionable because it “strips Plaintiff of statutorily guaranteed rights available to Plaintiff under The Song-Beverly Act,” the court is again unpersuaded. (Opp. p.14.) If that were the case, then the Legislature in the creation of the SBA would have precluded arbitration agreements altogether. In any event, Plaintiff has not provided authority that precludes arbitration in lemon law cases.

All in all, as this sales contract and complaint is akin to most others in lemon law cases, and cases where many courts enforce arbitration, the court compels arbitration. As for Plaintiff’s requests that Defendant be ordered to provide a list of names of proposed arbitrators, the court finds that request appropriate and will hear from Defense Counsel on the matter during the hearing.

Conclusion

 “‘The fundamental point is that a party is ‘not entitled to make use of [a contract containing an arbitration clause] as long as it worked to [his or] her advantage, then attempt to avoid its application in defining the forum in which [his or] her dispute ... should be resolved.’” (Jensen v. U-Haul Co. of California (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 295, 306, quoting NORCAL Mutual Ins. Co. v. Newton (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 64, 84.) This fundamental point is what Plaintiff is attempting to undermine: to deny the applicability of a material term of the very agreement it sues on.

Based on the foregoing, the court compels arbitration and stays all proceedings.