Judge: Thomas Falls, Case: 22STCV24253, Date: 2023-01-30 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV24253 Hearing Date: January 30, 2023 Dept: O
Monday, January 30, 2023
RE: OSCAR DENA, et al. vs AURORA CHARTER OAK, et al. (22STCV24253)
________________________________________________________________________
(1) DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT BY
DEFENDANT AURORA CHARTER OAK - LOS ANGELES, LLC
(2) MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF
PLAINTIFFS' FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT BY DEFENDANT AURORA CHARTER OAK—LOS
ANGELES, LLC (ERRONEOUSLY NAMED AND SUED AS AURORA CHARTER OAK HOSPITAL)
Responding Party: Unopposed (as of
1/25, due 9 court days before hearing)
Tentative Ruling
(1)
DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT BY DEFENDANT AURORA CHARTER OAK -
LOS ANGELES, LLC is SUSTAINED. Leave to amend is TBD, but likely
sustained without leave to amend.
(2)
MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFFS' FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT BY
DEFENDANT AURORA CHARTER OAK—LOS ANGELES, LLC (ERRONEOUSLY NAMED AND SUED AS
AURORA CHARTER OAK HOSPITAL) is TBD/MOOT, but likely moot.
The court requests that during the hearing, Plaintiff be
prepared to state the specific allegations it intends to add/amend to support
its statutory cause of action. If Plaintiff does not present such allegations
during the hearing, the court will sustain the demurrer without leave to amend,
thereby dismissing the entire action.
Background
This is a
wrongful death case. Plaintiffs OSCAR DENA, an individual; MARICELA DENA, an
individual; OSCAR MATTHEW DENA, an individual; THOMAS DENA, an individual; and
CHRISTINA SENDEJAS, an individual, allege the following against Defendants
AURORA CHARTER OAK – LOS ANGELES, LLC, a California limited liability company;
AURORA CHARTER OAK HOSPITAL (“Defendant”): On June 5, 2021, Decedent Richard
Peter Dena (“decedent”) was involuntarily admitted to Defendant’s Hospital
after he made suicidal statements. “Defendants had a duty to provide safe
equipment and a safe environment to Richard to prevent him from committing
suicide, but failed to do so in numerous ways, including but not limited to: i.
Leaving his jacket on his persons ii. Placing him in a room with a vent that
can be easily removed iii. Placing him in a room with easy access to the pipe
that can withstand his body weight.” (First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) ¶24(l).)
On June 5, 2021, the decedent was able remove a vent from the ceiling in the
bathroom of his room and used his jacket to hang himself on the pipe behind the
vent. (FAC ¶30.)
On July 27,
2022, Plaintiffs filed suit.
On October
24, 2022, Defendant filed a Demurrer, that was rendered Moot.
On January
17, 2023, Plaintiffs filed suit for: 1. SURVIVOR ACTION 2. WRONGFUL DEATH –
WELFARE & INSTITUTIONS CODE, § 15600 ET SEQ.
On January
18, 2023, Defendant filed the instant Demurrer with a motion to strike.
On January
20, 2023, Plaintiffs dismissed Oscar Matthew Dena, Thomas Dena, and Christina
Sendejas, leaving Maricela Dena as the sole Plaintiff.
Legal
Standard
A demurrer
may be asserted on any one or more of the following grounds: (a) The court has
no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the pleading;
(b) The person who filed the pleading does not have legal capacity to sue; (c)
There is another action pending between the same parties on the same cause of
action; (d) There is a defect or misjoinder of parties; (e) The pleading does
not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action; (f) The pleading is
uncertain (“uncertain” includes ambiguous and unintelligible); (g) In an action
founded upon a contract, it cannot be ascertained from the pleading whether the
contract is written, is oral, or is implied by conduct; (h) No certificate was
filed as required by CCP §411.35 or (i) by §411.36. CCP §430.10.
Accordingly, a demurrer tests the sufficiency of a pleading, and the grounds
for a demurrer must appear on the face of the pleading or from judicially
noticeable matters. CCP §430.30(a); Blank v. Kirwan, (1985) 39
Cal.3d 311, 318.
The face of
the pleading includes attachments and incorporations by reference (Frantz v.
Blackwell, (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 91, 94); it does not include inadmissible
hearsay. Day v. Sharp, (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 904, 914.
Discussion
Defendant
demurs to the FAC on the following grounds:
1. Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint is
time-barred on its face.
2. The sibling plaintiffs lack standing
to sue.
3. The survival claim fails for want of
an estate, successor in interest, or personal representative.
4. The dependent adult abuse claim fails
to state a cause of action.
Statute of Limitations
The court
will begin its analysis with the statute of limitations argument as it would
render the complaint time barred.
Defendant
argues that though the FAC is predicated upon alleged violations of the Elder
Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (“EADACPA”), the FAC sounds in
professional negligence. The court agrees.
“The
purpose of the [EADACPA was] essentially to protect a particularly vulnerable
portion of the population from gross mistreatment in the form of abuse and
custodial neglect.” (Covenant Care, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004)
32 Cal.4th 771, 787.) The EADACPA excludes liability for acts of
professional negligence; it does not apply to simple or gross negligence by
health care providers. (Delaney v. Baker (1999) 20 Cal.4th 23, 32; Covenant
Care, Inc., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 785.) Several factors “must be present for conduct to constitute neglect
within the meaning of the Elder Abuse Act and thereby trigger the enhanced
remedies available under the Act. The plaintiff must allege (and ultimately
prove by clear and convincing evidence) facts establishing that the defendant:
(1) had responsibility for meeting the basic needs of the elder or dependent
adult, such as nutrition, hydration, hygiene or medical care; (2) knew of
conditions that made the elder or dependent adult unable to provide for his or her
own basic needs; and (3) denied or withheld goods or services necessary to meet
the elder or dependent adult's basic needs, either with knowledge that injury
was substantially certain to befall the elder or dependent adult (if the
plaintiff alleges oppression, fraud or malice) or with conscious disregard of
the high probability of such injury (if the plaintiff alleges recklessness).
“Recklessness, unlike negligence, involves more than ‘inadvertence,
incompetence, unskillfulness, or a failure to take precautions’ but rather
rises to the level of ‘conscious choice of a course of action . . . with
knowledge of the serious danger to others involved in it.’” (Delaney,
supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 31-32) (emphasis added). (The plaintiff must also
allege (and ultimately prove by clear and convincing evidence) that the neglect
caused the elder or dependent adult to suffer physical harm, pain or mental
suffering. Finally, the facts constituting the neglect and establishing the
causal link between the neglect and the injury must be pleaded with
particularity, in accordance with the pleading rules governing statutory
claims.” (Carter v. Prime Healthcare Paradise Valley LLC (2011) 198
Cal.App.4th 396, 406-407 [quotation marks and citations omitted].)
Neglect under the EADACPA “refers not
to the substandard performance of medical services but, rather, to the failure
of those responsible for attending to the basic needs and comforts of elderly
or dependent adults, regardless of their professional standing, to carry out their
custodial obligations. Thus, the statutory definition of ‘neglect’ speaks not
of the undertaking of medical services, but of the failure to provide
medical care.” (Sababin v. Superior Court (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th
81, 89 [quotation marks and citation omitted].)
Moreover, “[i]n order to obtain the
[EADACPA’s] heightened remedies, a plaintiff must allege conduct essentially
equivalent to conduct that would support recovery of punitive damages. (Compare
Welf & Inst. Code, § 15657 [requiring ‘clear and convincing evidence that a
defendant is liable for’ elder abuse and ‘has been guilty of recklessness,
oppression, fraud, or malice in the commission of the abuse’] with Civ. Code, §
3294, subd. (a) [requiring ‘clear and convincing evidence’ that the defendant
has been guilty of oppression, fraud or malice].)” (Covenant Care,
supra, 32 Cal.4th at 789.) Thus, “a
health care provider sued for violating the [EADACPA] must defend against allegations of egregious conduct.”
(Id. at p. 787.)
Here, Plaintiffs
allege facts that are based on a seeming breach of the Defendant’s “standard
of care.” (See FAC, ¶18,
19, 21, 22, 23, 27, 30 [All allegations alleging that “Defendants have safety
rules, policies, procedures, guidelines, and directives which make up the standard
of care, and must be strictly followed in order to prevent serious injury
and death to patients in psychiatric facilities on a 5150 hold for harm to self
and others” but that “Defendants chose not to strictly follow safety rules,
policies, procedures, guidelines, and directives which make up the standard
of care, which foreseeably caused serious injury.”]) (emphasis added).
Further, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants, “based upon the interview and
intake assessment,” determined that Decedent’s score for suicide was high such
that he was placed on 15-minute safety checks and suicide precautions. (FAC ¶17.) As such, Plaintiffs’ repeated references to decisions
made by “health care providers to strictly follow safety rules,
polices, procedures, guidelines, and directives which make up the standard
of care” inherently concedes that negligence is at issue, not egregious
conduct that amounts to violations of the EADACPA.
Therefore, the FAC sounds in
professional negligence.
Next, the court turns to the statute
of limitations in a professional negligence cause of action. CCP section 340.5
provides in relevant part that “in an action for
injury or death against a physician or surgeon . . . based upon such person's
alleged professional negligence . . . [the statute of limitations shall be]
four years after the date of injury or one year after the plaintiff discovers,
or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury,
whichever first occurs.” The California Supreme Court clarified that the term “injury”
refers to death. (Larcher v. Wanless (1976) 18 Cal.3d 646, 659 [“We
conclude that the word “injury” in section 340.5, as that statute
applies to wrongful death actions, must be read to refer to the wrongfully
caused death of the plaintiff's decedent.”].)
Here, one year from
Decedent’s June 10, 2021 passing is June 10, 2022. However, Plaintiffs filed
suit on July 27, 2022, which is 17 days late.
Therefore, the suit
is time barred. The court SUSTAINS the demurrer. Leave to amend is to be
determined, but likely denied.
Survival Action
The complaint fails
to identify an estate, successor in interest, or personal representative in its
caption.
Therefore, the court
SUSTAINS the demurrer as to the 2nd cause of action. Leave to amend
is to be determined, but likely denied as it will likely be denied as to the
main cause of action for wrongful death.
Leave to Amend
Generally, this court
liberally grants leave to amend to ensure that a plaintiff has his or her day
in court, especially in a case with such grievous facts.
Here, however, the
court is reluctant due to Plaintiffs’ apparent failure to plead sufficient
facts despite two meet and confer efforts wherein Defendant accurately
delineated deficiencies. Notably, after the first meet and confer effort, rather
than remedying the noted deficiencies, Plaintiffs made any necessary amendments
after Defendant filed its initial demurrer. Then the parties again met and conferred
but came to no agreement. Yet rather than making appropriate changes before
Defendant filed its second demurrer, Plaintiffs dismissed three plaintiffs
after the second demurrer was filed, even though the contention was raised
during met and confer effort. Furthermore, not only have Plaintiffs failed to
meet and confer in good faith but they failed to file an opposition.[1]
Therefore, to the
extent that Plaintiff(s) seek leave to amend, the court will inquire as to the specific
allegations that Plaintiff intends to add/amend to state a cause of action. If
Plaintiff does not provide the specific allegations, the court will
sustain the entirety of the demurrer without leave to amend, such
that action will be dismissed.
Conclusion
Based on the
foregoing, the demurrer is SUSTAINED, with leave to amend TBD. The motion to
strike is MOOT/TBD.[2]
[1] The burden of proving a reasonable
possibility that an amendment can cure the defect is squarely on the plaintiff.
(Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) In order to meet this
burden, a plaintiff must submit a proposed amended complaint. (Total Call
Internat. Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 161, 166.) The
plaintiff must demonstrate how the complaint can be amended to state a cause of
action, and such showing may be made to the trial court. (Taxpayers for
Improving Public Safety v. Schwarzenegger (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th
749, 781.) Therefore, leave to amend a complaint is properly denied in
sustaining a demurrer where the plaintiff does not suggest how the complaint
might be amended to state a cause of action. (Grossmont Union High School
Dist. V. State Dept. of Education (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 869, 875-876.)
[2] The motion to strike seeks to strike
references for punitive damages and attorney fees, which are recoverable under
the EADACPA. However, considering that the statutory claim for EADACPA is
unsupported by facts nor pleaded with the required specificity, meaning that
the demurrer would be sustained without leave to amend, the motion to strike
would be moot.