Judge: Thomas S. Mcconville, Case: 2021-01180845, Date: 2023-08-07 Tentative Ruling

Defendant Planned Parenthood/Orange and San Bernadino Counties, Inc.’s (“PPOSBC”) motion for summary judgment or in the alternative, summary adjudication as to Plaintiff Djuanique Slaughter’s first through fourth causes of action of her First Amended Complaint is GRANTED in its entirety.

A defendant seeking summary judgment or adjudication bears the burden of persuasion and burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence to negate the plaintiff’s claim. It may do this by demonstrating the claim has no merit, that plaintiff cannot prove an element of the claim, or that it has a complete defense entitling it to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850-851 (Aguilar).)  

If the defendant fails to meet this initial burden, the plaintiff need not oppose the motion and the motion must be denied. (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840.) If the defendant meets this initial burden, however, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to produce evidence demonstrating the existence of a triable issue of material fact. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 850-851.)    

First cause of action for breach of employment agreement and Second cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing

PPOSBC contends these causes of action are barred as plaintiff’s employment was at-will.  That contention finds support in PPOSBC’s evidence.  (Undisputed Material Facts “UMF” 1-3)  (ROA 24). 

It is further supported by Labor Code § 2922, which creates a presumption of at-will employment that may be overcome if the employee establishes the existence of an implied contract not to terminate the employment except for good cause. The presumption is based on public policy considerations and is therefore one affecting the burden of proof. (Haycock v. Hughes Aircraft Co. (1994) 22 C.A.4th 1473, 1489.)  As there is no opposition, plaintiff hasn’t overcome either the affirmative evidence presented by PPOSBC or the presumption  under Labor Code § 2922 to show her employment was contractual, rather than at-will.

Where there is no contract there can be no breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  [“The covenant of good faith and fair dealing, implied by law in every contract, exists merely to prevent one contracting party from unfairly frustrating the other party's right to receive the benefits of the agreement actually made. The covenant thus cannot ‘ “ ‘be endowed with an existence independent of its contractual underpinnings.’ ” ’ It cannot impose substantive duties or limits on the contracting parties beyond those incorporated in the specific terms of their agreement.” (Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal. 4th 317, 349–350)  (internal citations omitted.)]

PPOSBC has demonstrated that it has no contract with plaintiff.  Therefore the first and second causes of action fail.

Third cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy

PPOSBC contends this cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations.  An action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy is governed by a two-year statute of limitations.  Code Civ. Proc., 335.1; Prue v. Brady Co./San Diego, Inc. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1382; Barton v. New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1200, 1208–1209.)

PPOSBC  has produced evidence that plaintiff was terminated on December 14, 2018.  (UMF 7).  As such, the two-year statute ran on December 14, 2020.  This action was not filed until January 25, 2021.  This action is time-barred.

Fourth cause of action for racial discrimination

Plaintiff can establish a prima facie case for unlawful discrimination by providing evidence that: (1) she was a member of a protected class; (2) she was performing satisfactorily at work; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) some circumstance suggests discriminatory motive behind the adverse employment action.  Guz, supra, 24 Cal. 4th  at 354-355. 

An employer seeking summary judgment on this cause of action may meet its initial burden on a motion for summary judgment or adjudication by demonstrating that the alleged adverse employment action was based upon legitimate, nondiscriminatory or nonretaliatory factors. (See Serri v. Santa Clara University (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 830, 861-862.)   If the employer carries this burden, then the employee must then demonstrate a triable issue of material fact. (Serri, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 861.)

Here, PPOSBC has produced evidence demonstrating plaintiff’s ongoing poor job performance and unprofessional behavior.  (See UMF 57, 59-71, 77-79).  These are nondiscriminatory and legitimate bases for an adverse employment action.  Therefore, the burden shifts to plaintiff.

As plaintiff has not opposed this motion, she has not met her now shifted burden of showing that PPOSBC’s proffered reasons for her termination were pretextual, or that the employer acted with a discriminatory animus, such that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the employer engaged in intentional discrimination or other unlawful action.  (Serri, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at 861-862). 

The fourth cause of action does not survive PPOSBC’s motion for summary judgment.  PPOSBC’s motion for summary judgment is granted in its entirety.

The court sets a hearing on August 25, 2023 at 9:00 a.m. in Department C28, wherein plaintiff is ordered to show cause why the remaining unserved defendants should not be dismissed from this action.  Should plaintiff fail to appear, the remaining defendants will be dismissed.

PPOSBC shall give notice.