Judge Timothy Patrick Dillon, Case 22STCV21612 2022-10-19 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Timothy Patrick Dillon, Case: 22STCV21612, Date: 2022-10-19 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV21612 Hearing Date: October 19, 2022 Dept: 73

Buddy Knoles v. Veolia North America, LLC, et al.

Counsel for Defendant (Movant): James P. Carter, Alissa D. Hurns (Jackson Lewis P.C.)

Counsel for Plaintiff (Opposition): Maryann P. Gallagher, Viridiana E. Aceves

(Law Offices of Maryann P. Gallagher)

MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE

(filed 09/16/2022)

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendants’ motion to transfer venue is GRANTED.

Background

On July 1, 2022, Plaintiff Buddy Knoles filed this action against Defendants Veolia North America, LLC (“Veolia N.A.”), Veolia Water West Operating Services, Inc. (“Veolia Water West”), and Ken Huntzinger (“Huntzinger”), in Los Angeles County. The complaint alleges, among others, violations of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”) and wrongful termination in violation of public policy arising out of Plaintiff’s employment with Veolia Water West in Palm Springs, California. Veolia Water West is a subsidiary of Veolia N.A. The principal place of business of Veolia N.A. is Boston, Massachusetts. Huntzinger, Plaintiff’s supervisor at the time of the alleged violations, was and is a resident of Riverside County.

On September 16, 2022, Defendant moved to transfer venue to Riverside County. Plaintiff filed opposition on October 6, 2022, and Defendant replied on October 11, 2022.

Legal Standard

The general venue rule is that “‘the superior court in the county where the defendants or some of them reside at the commencement of the action is the proper court for the trial of the action.’ [Citation.]” (Fontaine v. Superior Court (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 830, 837 (Fontaine); Civ. Proc. Code, § 395.) “A corporation or association may be sued in the county where the contract is made or is to be performed, or where the obligation or liability arises, or the breach occurs; or in the county where the principal place of business of such corporation is situated, subject to the power of the court to change the place of trial as in other cases.” (Civ. Proc. Code, § 395.5.)

A FEHA action may be brought in the county where the unlawful practice is alleged to have been committed, where the records relevant to the practice are maintained and administered or, where the aggrieved person would have worked or would have had access to the public accommodation but for the alleged unlawful practice. (Gov. Code, § 12965, subd. (c)(3).) “[I]f the defendant is not found within any of these counties, an action may be brought within the county of the defendant’s residence or principal office.” (Ibid.) This includes related non-FEHA claims brought under alternative theories but based on the same set of facts, such as Plaintiff’s cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. (Brown v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 477, 487.)

A court may change the place of trial when the court designated in the complaint is not the proper court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 397, subd. (a).) “‘It is the moving defendant’s burden to demonstrate that the plaintiff’s venue selection is not proper under any of the statutory grounds.’ [Citation.] In opposing the motion to change venue, ‘[t]he plaintiff may bolster his or her choice of venue with counteraffidavits consistent with the complaint’s theory of the type of action but amplifying the allegations relied upon for venue.’ [Citation.]” (Fontaine, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 836.)

Discussion

The complaint alleges that Veolia N.A. and Ken Huntzinger reside and conduct business in Los Angeles County (Complaint p. 5 at ¶¶ 1, 3), and that Veolia Water West is a foreign corporation that conducts business in Los Angeles County (Complaint, p. 5 at ¶ 2). The Human Resources Director for Veolia N.A. declares otherwise. In her declaration, she indicates that the principal place of business of Veolia N.A and Veolia Water West is in Boston, Massachusetts, and that Veolia Water West maintains all personnel records for its employees in the Palm Springs office. (Barber Decl. ¶¶ 6-10.) She further declares “[a]ll decisions regarding Plaintiff’s hiring, separation, supervision, performance reviews, and the terms and conditions of his employment were made at Veolia Water West’s Palms Springs office. [¶] Had Plaintiff not been separated from his employment, he would have continued working through and reporting to the Palm Springs office.” (Barber Decl. ¶¶ 13, 15.) Huntzinger also worked out of the Palm Springs office during Plaintiff’s employment. (Barber Decl. ¶ 12.) Huntzinger resides in Riverside County. (Barber Decl. ¶ 16.) Moreover, all other employees referred to in the complaint worked out of Veolia Water West’s Palm Springs office and either resided in Riverside County or San Bernardino County, not Los Angeles County. (Barber Decl. ¶¶ 17-18.) For these reasons, Defendants submit that Riverside County is the proper venue for this action.

Plaintiff does not refute any of Defendants’ contentions. Instead, Plaintiff relies on Easton v. Superior Court (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 243 for the proposition that venue is proper in any county in the State because Veolia N.A. and Veolia Water West are foreign corporations who have not filed any statement designating a principal place of business in California. However, Easton is unavailing. In Easton, a foreign corporation successfully moved the trial court to transfer venue from San Diego to Los Angeles County despite not having filed a statement designating its principal place of business. (Easton, 12 Cal.App.3d at p. 246.) The court issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate the order transferring venue of the action. (Id.) In so doing, the court held that petitioner’s choice of venue was presumptively correct for two reasons. First, the foreign corporation did not file a statement designating its principal place of business. Second, and crucial to the instant case, the corporation failed to meet its two-pronged burden of showing that plaintiff filed suit in an improper county and that the county to which it sought transfer was proper. (Easton, 12 Cal.App.3d at p. 246-47.) The corporation did not show any grounds for the transfer. (Id. at p. 246.)

Like Easton, Defendants Veolia N.A. and Veolia Water West are foreign corporations who have not filed the requisite statement. But, the similarities end there. Defendants in this action have met their burden. As set forth in the Barber Declaration, Plaintiff was hired, supervised, and worked through the Palm Springs office. Huntzinger worked in the Palm Springs office and resides in Riverside County. Veolia Water West maintains all personnel records of its employees in the Palm Springs office. And had Plaintiff not been separated from his employment with Veolia Water West, he would have continued working through and reporting to the Palm Springs office. Plaintiff did not deny that he worked in Riverside County. Nor does he provide evidence to contradict Defendants’ evidence or otherwise connect Defendants or the violations alleged to Los Angeles County.

Plaintiff cites Richfield Hotel Mgmt., Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 222, 225 for the contention that FEHA provides liberal choice to the plaintiff as to where to file the lawsuit. However, Richfield is inapplicable here. In Richfield, the court agreed with petitioner that its motion for change of venue should have been granted because the FEHA venue statute “must yield to the application of [Code of Civ. Proc.] section 397, subdivision (3) which provides for a change of venue ‘[w]hen the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice would be promoted by the change.’” (Richfield, 22 Cal.App.4th at p. 225.) Here, the court may not consider the convenience of the witnesses or whether the ends of justice would be promoted by the change of venue because Defendants have not filed an answer. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 396b, subd. (d).) If the court does consider the evidence regarding convenience and ends of justice, all points to venue in Riverside County. Plaintiff did not submit evidence on these issues. Defendant’s’ evidence stands uncontested.

Establishing proper venue pursuant to the FEHA venue statute is similarly unhelpful to Plaintiff. A FEHA action may be brought in the county where the unlawful practice is alleged to have been committed, where the records relevant to the practice are maintained and administered or, where the aggrieved person would have worked or would have had access to the public accommodation but for the alleged unlawful practice. (Gov. Code, § 12965, subd. (c)(3).) On each element, Defendants have established that Riverside County is the proper venue. Plaintiff’s causes of action arise from alleged violations in the Palm Springs office. Defendants provide that Veolia Water West maintains all personnel records of its employees in the Palm Springs office. And further, had Plaintiff not been separated from his employment with Veolia Water West, he would have continued working through and reporting to the Palm Springs office. Plaintiff does not offer evidence to the contrary.

Accordingly, the motion to transfer venue is GRANTED. This matter is ordered transferred to Riverside County. Defendants to pay all fees within five days.

Moving party to give notice.