Judge Upinder S. Kalra, Case Number: 18STCV04019, Date: 2025-03-28 Tentative Ruling

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CASE NAME: Young Men’s Christian Association of the Foothills v. Jay L. Schieffelin, et al.

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Young Men’s Christian Association of the Foothills

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Defendant Wai Kai Tsang, Defendants Brian Andrew McGoldrick and Emily Michelle McGoldrick, Trustees of the Brian & Michelle McGoldrick 2013 Trust dated May 28, 2013; Marta Ruiz Alfaro; Jeung Sook Lee; and Sung Hae Yea and Yoon J. Yea as Trustees of the Sung Hae Yea and Yoon J. Yea Living Trust dated July 5, 2017, Defendants Jonathan Barr, Trustee of the Rancho Canada Trust, UDT Dated January 9, 1995; and Nirmal R. Jain and Neena Jain, each erroneously sued as Nirmal R. Jain and Neena N. Jain and their successors, as Trustees of the Jan Family Trust, Established Under Agreement Dated May 17, 2007, and Defendants Mark Adler; Mark S. Hunter; Leonard E. Torres and Anita Susan Brenner as Co-Trustees of the Torres Family Living Trust U/D/T 9/28/99; Victor M. Garcia and Ana L. Vizcarra as Trustees of the Victor M. Garcia and Ana L. Vizcarra Living Trust, UTD October 28, 2009.

1. Summary Adjudication of the Second Cause of Action for Prescriptive Easement in Plaintiff’s favor.

On November 7, 2018, Plaintiff Young Men’s Christian Association of the Foothills (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Defendants Jay L. Schieffelin and Emma R. Schieffelin, natural persons believed to be deceased, the testate and intestate successors of Jay L. Schieffelin and Emma R. Schieffelin, and all persons claiming by, through, or under such persons or either of them; all persons unknown, claiming fee title or any legal or equitable right, title, estate, lien, or interest that may give rise to fee title to all or any portion of the real property described in the complaint (at 1930 Foothill Boulevard, La Cañada Flintridge, California 91011) adverse to Plaintiff’s title; and Does 1-100 to quiet title.¿The complaint alleged one cause of action for adverse possession.

On June 24, 2022, the court DENIED Plaintiff’s prior fifteen Motions for Summary Judgment, or Alternatively for Summary Adjudication without prejudice because there was evidence that Plaintiffs did not join all indispensable parties.

On August 5, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Third Amended Complaint (TAC) with two causes of action for: (1) Quiet Title by Adverse Possession; and (2) Quiet Title by Prescriptive Easement. The Fee Property is informally described as a strip of land located at or about the street address of 1930 Foothill Blvd., La Canada Flintridge, California 91011. (TAC ¶ 40.) The Easement Property is informally described as adjacent to a portion of the Fee Property and is smaller than the Fee Property. (TAC ¶ 42.)

On April 28, 2023, Plaintiff filed four Motions for Summary Judgment, or Alternatively for Summary Adjudication which the court DENIED.

On January 7, 2025, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion for Summary Adjudication of its Second Cause of Action for Prescriptive Easement. On March 7, 2025, Defendants filed a joint opposition. On March 17, 2025, Plaintiff filed a reply.

“A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if the party contends that the cause of action has no merit, that there is no affirmative defense to the cause of action, that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs. A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.”

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial.¿(Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843). In analyzing such motions, courts must apply a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent's claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue.”¿(Hinesley¿v.¿Oakshade¿Town Center¿(2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294).¿ Thus, summary judgment or summary adjudication is granted when, after the Court’s consideration of the evidence set forth in the papers and all reasonable inferences accordingly, no triable issues of fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.¿(CCP § 437c(c);¿Villa v.¿McFarren¿(1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 733, 741).¿

As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the party¿moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element.¿(Scalf¿v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc.¿(2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520). Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.”¿(Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc.¿(2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389). A motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication must be denied where the moving party's evidence does not prove all material facts, even in the absence of any opposition or where the opposition is weak.¿(See¿Leyva v. Superior Court¿(1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 462, 475;¿Salesguevara¿v. Wyeth Labs., Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 379, 384, 387.¿¿¿

Once the¿moving¿party has met the burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party¿to show via specific facts that a triable issue of material facts exists as to a cause of action or a defense thereto.¿(CCP § 437c(o)(2)).¿ When¿a¿party¿cannot¿establish an essential element or defense, a court must grant a motion for summary adjudication.¿(CCP § 437c(o)(1)-(2)).¿

The court declines to rule on the evidentiary objections because they are not pertinent to how the court reached its decision. (See CCP § 437c(q).)

Plaintiff contends that summary adjudication is proper because there are no triable facts that it established a prescriptive easement between January 1962 and January 1967. Defendants argue, among other things, that this is Plaintiff’s third attempt for summary adjudication on this issue and is an improper motion for reconsideration without new facts or law. Plaintiffs reply that the summary judgment motion limitation does not apply to summary adjudication motions.[1]

“A party shall not bring more than one motion for summary judgment against an adverse party to the action or proceeding. This limitation does not apply to motions for summary adjudication.” A party “may make a subsequent application for the same order upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, in which case it shall be shown by affidavit what application was made before, when and to what judge, what order or decisions were made, and what new or different facts, circumstances, or law are claimed to be shown.”[2] (CCP § 1008(b).) (CCP § 437c(a)(4).) CCP § 437c and CCP § 1008 are “designed to conserve the court’s resources by constraining litigants who would attempt to bring the same motion over and over” again. (Le Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094, 1104.) “Limiting the parties' ability to file repetitive motions does not defeat, or even materially impair, the court's power to resolve specific controversies between parties.” (Ibid.)

Here, Plaintiff brought an improper reconsideration motion disguised as a second motion for summary adjudication on its Second Cause of Action that this court already considered on the merits. First, the court observes there are no new facts – only new legal theory interpreting facts known to Plaintiff and within their control at the time they brought the prior summary adjudication motion. (Compare 2023 Samuelson Decl. ¶¶ 2, 9, 10-15 with 2025 Samuelson Decl. ¶¶ 3-7, 10-11.) Notably, Plaintiff relies on the same witness to establish the prescriptive easement. (Ibid.) Second, Plaintiff misconstrues the carve out of CCP § 437c(a)(4). The court is unaware of authority, and Plaintiff provided none, that proposes CCP § 437c(a)(4) allows a party to bring multiple (even infinite) summary adjudication motions to attack a cause of action after a court has ruled on the merits. Indeed, Plaintiff’s interpretation would allow a party to recast their legal theories in response to a court’s ruling on their failed summary adjudication. This cannot be the Legislature’s intent.[3]

Accordingly, the court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for summary adjudication of its Second Cause of Action.

[1] Aside from referring to CCP § 437c(a)(4) in the introduction, Plaintiff does not provide authority addressing this point.

[2] CCP § 1008(a) provides for a 10 day window for “any party” to file such a reconsideration motion. That timeline does not apply to subd. (b)’s moving party bringing such a motion. Here, subd. (b) likely applies because Plaintiff originally brought the motions for summary adjudication. The court therefore rejects

[3] Such a result would not only inundate the courts with complex motions but could also be improper advisory opinions.