Judge: Upinder S. Kalra, Case: 19STCV09859, Date: 2024-08-19 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 19STCV09859    Hearing Date: August 19, 2024    Dept: 51

Tentative Ruling

Judge Upinder S. Kalra, Department 51

HEARING DATE:   August 19, 2024                                             

CASE NAME:           Bishop L. J. Guillory, et al. v. Charisse Browner, et al.

CASE NO.:                19STCV09859

MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS AS PREVAILING PARTY

MOVING PARTY:  Plaintiff bishop L. J. Guillory

RESPONDING PARTY(S): None as of July 1, 2024

REQUESTED RELIEF:

1.      An Order Compelling Defendant Robin Petgrave to reimburse Plaintiff $155,967.55 in Attorneys’ Fees and $26,976.89 in Costs.

TENTATIVE RULING:

1.      Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs is GRANTED.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

On March 21, 2019, Plaintiffs Bishop Guillory and Mark Kudler filed an action against Defendants Charisse Browner, Robin Petgrave, Tomorrow’s Aeronautical Museum, Xavier Becerra. (“Defendants”) for damages, declaratory relief, and injunctions based on Defendants’ alleged defamation and retaliatory measures against Plaintiffs while serving as directors of Defendant Tomorrow’s Aeronautical Museum (“TAM”).¿ 

On April 17, 2019, Defendant Xavier Bacerra filed an Answer.  

¿ 

On May 16, 2019, Defendants TAM and Robin Petgrave (collectively “Cross-Complainants”) filed a Cross-Complaint, and on May 31, 2019, the operative First Amended Cross-Complaint (“FACC”) against Plaintiffs Bishop Guillory (“Guillory”) and Mark Kudler (“Kudler”) (collectively “Cross-Defendants”) for the following causes of action:¿ 

¿ 

(1) Defamation;¿ 

(2) Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage;¿ 

(3) Declaratory Relief; and¿ 

(4) Fraudulent Concealment.¿ 

On May 31, 2019, Cross-Complainants filed a First Amended Cross-Complaint.

On August 5, 2019, Cross-Defendants filed a Special Motion to Strike (Anti-SLAPP Motion) and Demurrer to the First Amended Cross-Complaint which was denied and sustained with leave to amend.

On September 6, 2019, the court GRANTED Defendant’s ex parte application to stay the matter until December 5, 2019.

On December 5, 2019, the court continued the status conference to December 12, 2019.

On December 12, 2019, the court continued to stay the case in its entirety to February 26, 2020.

On January 28, 2020, Plaintiff Mark A. Kudler filed a request for dismissal as to all defendants for his claims only.

On January 29, 2020, Cross-Complainants filed a request for dismissal as to Cross-Defendant Mark Kudler only.

On March 25, 2020, the court continued the Post-Mediation Status Conference to July 6, 2020.

On April 27, 2020, the court continued the Post-Mediation Status Conference to November 4, 2020 and continued the Final Status Conference to March 12, 2021 and Trial to March 23, 2021 due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

On December 7, 2020, Cross-Complainants filed a Second Amended Cross-Complaint which was STRICKEN on March 30, 2022.

On November 27, 2023 and November 28, 2023, the matter was called for trial.

On May 3, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs as Prevailing Party.

On July 2, 2024, Defendant filed an ex parte application to set aside and vacate judgment which the court DENIED.

On July 18, 2024, Plaintiff filed an amended declaration in support of the Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs as Prevailing Party.

As of August 13, 2024, Plaintiff’s fee motion remains unopposed.

LEGAL STANDARD:

A prevailing party is entitled to recover costs as a matter of right.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (a)(4).) Attorney’s fees may be recovered as costs when authorized by contract, statute, or law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (a)(10).)  

“A notice of motion to claim attorney's fees for services up to and including the rendition of judgment in the trial court . . . must be served and filed within the time for filing a notice of appeal under . . . rules 8.822 and 8.823 in a limited civil case.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1702, subd. (b)(1).) In a limited civil case, a notice of appeal must be filed on or before the earliest of 30 days after service of a document entitled “Notice of Entry” of judgment or 90 days after the entry of judgment. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.822, subd. (a)(1).) 

The fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins with the “lodestar” method, i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.  A computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys’ fee award.  The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.  (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49.)  Such an approach anchors the trial court’s analysis to an objective determination of the value of the attorney’s services, ensuring that the amount awarded is not arbitrary.  (Id., at p. 48, fn. 23.)  After the trial court has performed the lodestar calculations, it shall consider whether the total award so calculated under all of the circumstances of the case is more than a reasonable amount and, if so, shall reduce the section 1717 award so that it is a reasonable figure.  (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095-1096.) 

As explained in Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 154: 

“[T]he lodestar is the basic fee for comparable legal services in the community; it may be adjusted by the court based on factors including, as relevant herein, (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. [Citation.] The purpose of such adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular action. In effect, the court determines, retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market rate for such services. . . . This approach anchors the trial court's analysis to an objective determination of the value of the attorney's services, ensuring that the amount awarded is not arbitrary.” [Internal citations and internal quotation marks omitted.] 

(Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140.) “It is well-established that the determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees is committed to the discretion of the trial court, whose decision cannot be reversed in the absence of an abuse of discretion. [Citations.]  The value of legal services performed in a case is a matter in which the trial court has its own expertise. . . . The trial court makes its determination after consideration of a number of factors, including the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required in its handling, the skill employed, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case.  [Citations.]”  (Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623624.)   

No specific findings reflecting the court’s calculations are required.  The record need only show that the attorney fees were awarded according to the “lodestar” or “touchstone” approach.  The court’s focus in evaluating the facts should be to provide a fee award reasonably designed to completely compensate attorneys for the services provided.  The starting point for this determination is the attorney’s time records. (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of Calif. State Univ. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 395-397 [verified time records entitled to credence absent clear indication they are erroneous].)  However, California case law permits fee awards in the absence of detailed timesheets. (Sommers v. Erb (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1644, 1651; Dunk v. Ford Motor Co. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1810; Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 103.)  An experienced trial judge is in a position to assess the value of the professional services rendered in his or her court.  (Id.; Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49; Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 255.) 

ANALYSIS:

Plaintiff contends that he is entitled to his costs as the prevailing party and that the court may award attorneys’ fees pursuant to Cal. Corp. Code § 6337 and § 1021.5. Plaintiff further contends that the court need not apportion the attorneys’ fees because they are inextricably intertwined with each cause of action and all recoverable.  

Cal. Corp. Code § 6337 states in pertinent part:

“In any action or proceeding under this article . . . if the court finds that failure of the corporation to comply with a proper demand thereunder was without justification, the court may award the member reasonable costs and expenses, including reasonable attorneys’ fees, in connection with such action or proceeding.”

A prevailing party may recover attorney fees under CCP § 1021.5. (Choi v. Orange County Great Park Corp. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 524 (Choi).) CCP § 1021.5 provides:

“Upon motion, a court may award attorneys’ fees to a successful party against one or more opposing parties in any action which has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest if:

(a)   a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has been conferred on the general public or a large class of persons,

(b)   the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement, or of enforcement by one public entity against another public entity, are such as to make the award appropriate, and

(c)   such fees should not in the interest of justice be paid out of the recovery, if any.”

The Court presided over the bench trial where Plaintiff was the prevailing party. The Court finds that attorney fees are warranted under both theories. First, TAM’s refusal to comply with Plaintiff’s inspection demands was without justification. At the time, Plaintiff was a member of the board. As such, his request for inspection was appropriate. Moreover the refusal of TAM to comply with the request was unjustified. Second, TAM had a significant presence in the greater Compton area. They garnered national attention for providing education and mentoring to at risk youth in an underserviced community. This national exposure led to tremendous national fundraising and donations of goods. Plaintiff’s lawsuit revealed significant financial malfeasance by the Executive Director, Robin Petgrave, that undermined the mission of TAM and caused significant pecuniary and non- pecuniary damage to TAM and the community it sought to serve. In fact, TAM was in danger of becoming insolvent if not for this lawsuit. As such, it cannot be reasonably disputed that the public received a significant benefit due to Plaintiff’s initiation of this action.

Reasonableness of Hourly Rate

Plaintiff contends that the rates requested for this matter are reasonable. “In determining hourly rates, the court must look to the “prevailing market rates in the relevant community.” (Bell v. Clackamas County (9th Cir.2003) 341 F.3d 858, 868.) The rates of comparable attorneys in the forum district are usually used. (See Gates v. Deukmejian (9th Cir.1992) 987 F.2d 1392, 1405.) In making its calculation, the court should also consider the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees.” (Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1009.) Here, the rates for the various attorneys and a paralegal range from $150 to $450. (7/18/24 amended. Dec. Sanders at ¶5-6.) These rates are reasonable based on this court’s knowledge and experience of similar work performed in the Los Angeles area.

Thus, the court finds that these requested hourly rates are reasonable.

Reasonableness of Hours Billed

Plaintiff have provided verified billing invoices, attached to the July 18, 2024 Amended Declaration of Justin Sanders. A verified fee bill is “prima facie evidence the costs, expenses and services listed were necessarily incurred, and when they are properly challenged the burden of proof shifts to the party claiming them as costs.” (Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 682.) Still, the Court is the ultimate arbiter in deciding whether expenses are reasonable. A review of the billings indicates that the requested fees are appropriate. Plaintiffs have provided detailed invoices demonstrating the various tasks over the almost five years the matter took to litigate.

The provided billings are proper and reasonable

Costs

Plaintiff seeks $26,976.89 in costs. These include filing and motion fees, jury fees, depositions costs, service of process, witness fees, court reporter fees, electronic filing or service fees, costs for milage and parking for trial.

            The Court finds that the requested costs are appropriate.

CONCLUSION:

            For the foregoing reasons, the Court decides the pending motion as follows:

Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs is GRANTED in the amount of $155,967.55 in Attorneys’ Fees and $26,976.89 in Costs payable within 30 days.

Moving party is to give notice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:  August 19, 2024                                 __________________________________                                                                                                                Upinder S. Kalra

                                                                                    Judge of the Superior Court