Judge Upinder S. Kalra, Case Number: 20STCV27443, Date: 2025-01-03 Tentative Ruling

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1. An Order Granting Summary Judgment in Defendant’s Favor as to the Entire Complaint.

On July 21, 2020, Plaintiff Daanesh Chanduwadia (Plaintiff) filed a Complaint against Defendant Melanie Linehan (Defendant) alleging various common counts (open book account, money lent, and money had and received). Plaintiff seeks damages of $53,178.99 and interest according to proof.

On January 27, 2022, Defendant filed a Motion to Quash Service of Summons which the court DENIED.

On August 30, 2024, Defendant filed the instant Motion for Summary Adjudication. On December 20, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition. On December 23, 2024, Plaintiff filed an untimely Amended Declaration In Support of their Opposition.[1] Defendant’s reply was due on or before December 27, 2024. As of December 30, 2024, the court has not received a reply.

In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, courts must apply a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent’s claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue.” (Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.)

“[T]he initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facia showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) A moving defendant need not conclusively negate an element of plaintiff’s cause of action. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 854.)

To meet this burden of showing a cause of action cannot be established, a defendant must show not only “that the plaintiff does not possess needed evidence” but also that “the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain needed evidence.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 854.) It is insufficient for the defendant to merely point out the absence of evidence. (Gaggero v. Yura (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 884, 891.) The defendant “must also produce evidence that the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain evidence to support his or her claim.” (Ibid.)¿ The supporting evidence can be in the form of affidavits, declarations, admissions, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and matters of which judicial notice may be taken. (Aguilar, 25 Cal.4th at p. 855.)

“Once the defendant … has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff … to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) The plaintiff may not merely rely on allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists, but instead, “shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action.” (Ibid.) “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)

The court must “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve all doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party,” including “all inferences reasonably drawn therefrom.” (Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1037; Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 844-45.) “On a summary judgment motion, the court must therefore consider what inferences favoring the opposing party a factfinder could reasonably draw from the evidence. While viewing the evidence in this manner, the court must bear in mind that its primary function is to identify issues rather than to determine issues. [Citation.] Only when the inferences are indisputable may the court decide the issues as a matter of law. If the evidence is in conflict, the factual issues must be resolved by trial.” (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 839.) “Put another way, have defendants conclusively negated a necessary element of the [plaintiff’s] case or demonstrated that under no hypothesis is there a material issue of fact that requires the process of trial?” (Jeld-Wen, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 853, 860 [cleaned up].) Further, “the trial court may not weigh the evidence in the manner of a factfinder to determine whose version is more likely true. [Citation.] Nor may the trial court grant summary judgment based on the court’s evaluation of credibility. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 840; see also Weiss v. People ex rel. Department of Transportation (2020) 9 Cal.5th 840, 864 [“Courts deciding motions for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not weigh the evidence but must instead view it in the light most favorable to the opposing party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party”].)

Defendant contends the court should grant summary judgment in their favor because Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiff argues that there are triable issues of material facts concerning the timeliness of the Complaint pursuant to CCP § 337(b) because there is a spreadsheet produced by Defendant indicating some expenses within the limitations period.

The court finds that the statute of limitations on the common counts action depends on whether CCP § 337 or CCP § 339 apply. According to CCP § 337, the statute of limitations for an action for an open book account is four years and “begins to run from the date of the last item.” Alternatively, according to CCP § 339, in the absence of an open book account, the statute of limitation is two years for an oral agreement.

To establish a cause of action for open book account, the following elements must be satisfied: (1) plaintiff and defendant had financial transactions, (2) plaintiff kept an account of the debits and credits involved in the transactions, (3) defendant owes plaintiff money on the account, and (4) the amount of money that the defendant owes the plaintiff.¿ (State Comp. Ins. Fund v. ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc. (2020) 50 Cal. App. 5th 422, 449; CACI 372.)¿ A book account is “open” if a balance remains due on this account.¿ (Interstate Group Administrators, Inc. v. Cravens, Dargan & Co. (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 700, 708.) “The law does not prescribe any standard of bookkeeping practice which all must follow, regardless of the nature of the business of which the record is kept. We think it makes no difference whether the account is kept in one book or several so long as they are permanent records, and constitute a system of bookkeeping as distinguished from mere private memoranda.” (Egan v. Bishop (1935) 8 Cal.App.2d 119, 122.)

Here, Defendant did not meet their initial burden that Plaintiff’s claim is time barred. Notably, Defendant attests that she did not promise in writing or orally to repay Plaintiff. (Linehan Decl. ¶¶ 3-5.) This does not support Defendant’s argument that the claims are time barred for two reasons.[2] First, it does not address any of the elements for an open book account. Second, it is not evidence showing when Plaintiff’s claim began to run. The court can deny Defendant’s motion without further analysis.

Nonetheless, the court will briefly address Plaintiff’s opposition as it provides more reasons why denial is appropriate. Critically, Plaintiff produced an excel spreadsheet produced by Defendant in discovery that indicates continuing payments up until July 31, 2016. (Chanduwadia Decl. ¶ 4, Exhibit 1.) [Placeholder for Reply.] Accordingly, until this issue of fact is resolved, the court cannot determine whether a two-year or four-year statute of limitations applies to the Complaint.

[1] The court declines to review the untimely amended declaration.

[2] The court can also deny the motion for non-compliant Separate Statement. (Beltran v. Hard Rock Hotel Licensing, Inc. (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 865, 875-876.) Here, Defendant’s Separate Statement refers to the Complaint and to the Declaration of Ms. Linehan. Plaintiff’s Separate Statement in response is no better. It refers to “Declaration of Plaintiff.” The court declined to exercise this discretion because the “facts” and “evidence” submitted by both parties was short.