Judge: Upinder S. Kalra, Case: 20STCV46528, Date: 2022-08-11 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20STCV46528 Hearing Date: August 11, 2022 Dept: 51
Tentative Ruling
Judge Upinder S.
Kalra, Department 51
HEARING DATE: August
11, 2022
CASE NAME: Norman
Celik, et al v. California Fair Plan Association
CASE NO.: 20STCV46528
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DEFENDANT’S
MOTION TO SEVER
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MOVING PARTY: Defendant California Fair Plan
RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiffs Norman Celik, et al.
REQUESTED RELIEF:
1. An
order severing the claims of Plaintiffs
TENTATIVE RULING:
1. Motion
to Sever is DENIED.
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:
On December 4, 2020, Plaintiffs Norma Celik and Saro
Tomasian (“Plaintiffs”) filed a complaint against Defendant California FAIR
Plan Association (“Defendant”). The complaint alleged two causes of action: (1)
Breach of Contract and (2) Breach of Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing. The
complaint alleges that both Plaintiffs had been insured by Defendant. As a
result of the Saddleridge Wildfire, both Plaintiffs suffered property damages. However,
after filing claims with Defendant, Defendant delayed payments, partially
denied, and refused to consider hygienist’s report.
Defendant filed an Answer on January 27, 2021.
Defendant filed this current Motion to Sever on May 18,
2022. Plaintiffs’ opposition was filed on July 29, 2022. Defendant’s reply was
filed on August 4, 2022.
LEGAL STANDARD
Pursuant to CCP § 1048(b), “the court, in furtherance of
convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to
expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any cause of action,
including a cause of action asserted in a cross-complaint, or of any separate
issue or of any number of causes of action or issues, preserving the right of
trial by jury required by the Constitution or a statute of the state or of the
United States.”
Service:
Proofs of Service attached to the motions indicate that the
opposing parties were served via email.
ANALYSIS:
Defendant moves to sever the claims for further handling and
trial.
Defendant contends that the two
Plaintiffs’ claims are conceptually and legally distinct. Plaintiffs filed two
separate claims, based on two different sets of facts, alleging two different
types of damages that are governed by different policy language. Specifically,
one Plaintiff, Norman Celik, claimed damages to stucco, roof riles, windows and
doors, garage door, blinds, and shutters, melted glass around deck, claimed he
replaced outdoor furniture, repainted the ground floor, and replaced air
condition and duct work, as well as replace many items inside the house. (Motion,
Deposition Celik, pg. 18, 20, 22, 23, 28, 34, 37, 39, 58). However, Plaintiff
Saro Tomasian indicated that there was no physical damage to the house, but
rather the grass in the front yard. Mr. Tomasian did state that there was ash
and soot throughout the house, but no structural or property damage. (Motion, Deposition
Tomasian, pg. 14). Without severing these two claims, there is a risk of
prejudice to Defendant as well as potential jury confusion.
Plaintiffs claim that under CCP §
378, multiple parties may be joined if “they assert any right to relief,
severally, or in the alternative, in respect of or arising out of the same
transactions, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any
question of law or fact common to all these persons in the action.” Specifically,
these matters arise out of the same transaction or occurrence because the
complaint alleges that Defendant underpaid fire damage claims.
Plaintiff cites to State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v.
Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1093 (State Farm) for the contention that CCP § 378 allows for joinder of
parties that arise out of the same transaction. In State Farm, 165 Plaintiffs, who suffered damage from the 1994
earthquake, alleged that State Farm “engaged in a systematic practice to
deceive its policyholders with respect to their purchase of earthquake
insurance.” (State Farm Fire &
Casualty Co. v. Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1093, abrogated by Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co.
(1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, on other grounds).
Those Plaintiffs also alleged “systematic claims handling practices” that
invaded the Plaintiffs rights. (Id.).
Here, Plaintiffs contend that they are alleging a common scheme by Defendant of
underpaying claims; even though they may not have experienced the exact same
treatment, Plaintiffs allege an “organized, calculated scheme of denials and underpayments,
establishing commonality of law and fact.”
A motion for severance asks the
Court for separate trials on certain issues. Generally, the purpose of such
motion is to avoid prejudice, promote
convenience, or allow for economic and efficient handling of the case. (See CCP
§1048(b).)
Under CCP §1048(b), the court, in
furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will
be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any cause
of action, including a cause of action asserted in a cross-complaint, or of any
separate issue or of any number of causes of action or issues, preserving the
right of trial by jury required by the Constitution or a statute of this state
or of the United States. In general, whether there will be a severance and
separate trials on issues in a single action is a matter within the discretion
of the trial court. (Shade Foods, Inc. v.
Innovative Products Sales & Marketing, Inc. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 847,
911-912, citing Downey Savings & Loan
Assn. v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1072, 1086.
Here, both Plaintiffs sustained some type of damage from the
Saddleridge Fire; both were insured by Defendant and filed claims after the
fire; both allege that Defendant underpaid certain claims and denied others, as
well as refusing to consider a hygienist report. However, Plaintiffs are owners
of separate properties, different policies and making distinct claims,i.e.
claims for ash and soot versus claims for repairing garage doors, the issues
are similar enough to allow for joinder. While both claims involve one tragic “occurrence’—the
Saddleridge Wildfire—no one disputes this. The overlapping facts play a minor
role in this controversy. The real issue is whether Defendant underpayed two
distinct claimants for separate claims. Thus, what is most significant in this
analysis is risk of undue prejudice if a joint trial was held when much of the
evidence is not cross-admissible.
To be sure, the jury will have to assess each claim independently.
Contrary to the assertion of Plaintiffs’ counsel, there are no allegations in the
Complaint of “an organized, calculated scheme of denials and underpayments” as
there was alleged in State Farm. Accordingly,
Plaintiffs’ announced plan to make such an argument is questionable. Defendant’s
concerns, however, that a joint trial will prejudice them in the sense that
jurors may use evidence of two separate claimants unfairly against Defendant and
thereby reduce the burden of proof is real.
Since the potential for jurors improperly using the evidence of one claimant
in evaluating another claimant’s claim is significant, the risk of undue prejudice
is substantial. Accordingly, severance is warranted.
Conclusion:
For
the foregoing reasons, the Court decides the pending motion as follows:
Motion to Sever is GRANTED.
Moving party is to give notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: August
11, 2022 __________________________________ Upinder
S. Kalra
Judge
of the Superior Court