Judge: Upinder S. Kalra, Case: 20STCV46528, Date: 2022-08-11 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV46528    Hearing Date: August 11, 2022    Dept: 51

Tentative Ruling

 

Judge Upinder S. Kalra, Department 51

 

HEARING DATE:   August 11, 2022                                             

 

CASE NAME:            Norman Celik, et al v. California Fair Plan Association

 

CASE NO.:                20STCV46528

 

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SEVER

 

MOVING PARTY: Defendant California Fair Plan

 

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiffs Norman Celik, et al.

 

REQUESTED RELIEF:

 

1.      An order severing the claims of Plaintiffs

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

1.      Motion to Sever is DENIED.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

On December 4, 2020, Plaintiffs Norma Celik and Saro Tomasian (“Plaintiffs”) filed a complaint against Defendant California FAIR Plan Association (“Defendant”). The complaint alleged two causes of action: (1) Breach of Contract and (2) Breach of Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing. The complaint alleges that both Plaintiffs had been insured by Defendant. As a result of the Saddleridge Wildfire, both Plaintiffs suffered property damages. However, after filing claims with Defendant, Defendant delayed payments, partially denied, and refused to consider hygienist’s report.

 

Defendant filed an Answer on January 27, 2021.

 

Defendant filed this current Motion to Sever on May 18, 2022. Plaintiffs’ opposition was filed on July 29, 2022. Defendant’s reply was filed on August 4, 2022.

 

LEGAL STANDARD

 

Pursuant to CCP § 1048(b), “the court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any cause of action, including a cause of action asserted in a cross-complaint, or of any separate issue or of any number of causes of action or issues, preserving the right of trial by jury required by the Constitution or a statute of the state or of the United States.” 

 

Service:

Proofs of Service attached to the motions indicate that the opposing parties were served via email.

 

ANALYSIS:

 

Defendant moves to sever the claims for further handling and trial.

 

Defendant contends that the two Plaintiffs’ claims are conceptually and legally distinct. Plaintiffs filed two separate claims, based on two different sets of facts, alleging two different types of damages that are governed by different policy language. Specifically, one Plaintiff, Norman Celik, claimed damages to stucco, roof riles, windows and doors, garage door, blinds, and shutters, melted glass around deck, claimed he replaced outdoor furniture, repainted the ground floor, and replaced air condition and duct work, as well as replace many items inside the house. (Motion, Deposition Celik, pg. 18, 20, 22, 23, 28, 34, 37, 39, 58). However, Plaintiff Saro Tomasian indicated that there was no physical damage to the house, but rather the grass in the front yard. Mr. Tomasian did state that there was ash and soot throughout the house, but no structural or property damage. (Motion, Deposition Tomasian, pg. 14). Without severing these two claims, there is a risk of prejudice to Defendant as well as potential jury confusion.

 

Plaintiffs claim that under CCP § 378, multiple parties may be joined if “they assert any right to relief, severally, or in the alternative, in respect of or arising out of the same transactions, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all these persons in the action.” Specifically, these matters arise out of the same transaction or occurrence because the complaint alleges that Defendant underpaid fire damage claims.

 

Plaintiff cites to State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1093 (State Farm) for the contention that CCP § 378 allows for joinder of parties that arise out of the same transaction. In State Farm, 165 Plaintiffs, who suffered damage from the 1994 earthquake, alleged that State Farm “engaged in a systematic practice to deceive its policyholders with respect to their purchase of earthquake insurance.” (State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1093, abrogated by Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, on other grounds). Those Plaintiffs also alleged “systematic claims handling practices” that invaded the Plaintiffs rights. (Id.). Here, Plaintiffs contend that they are alleging a common scheme by Defendant of underpaying claims; even though they may not have experienced the exact same treatment, Plaintiffs allege an “organized, calculated scheme of denials and underpayments, establishing commonality of law and fact.”

 

 

A motion for severance asks the Court for separate trials on certain issues. Generally, the purpose of such motion is to avoid prejudice, promote convenience, or allow for economic and efficient handling of the case. (See CCP §1048(b).)

 

Under CCP §1048(b), the court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any cause of action, including a cause of action asserted in a cross-complaint, or of any separate issue or of any number of causes of action or issues, preserving the right of trial by jury required by the Constitution or a statute of this state or of the United States. In general, whether there will be a severance and separate trials on issues in a single action is a matter within the discretion of the trial court. (Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative Products Sales & Marketing, Inc. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 847, 911-912, citing Downey Savings & Loan Assn. v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1072, 1086.

 

Here, both Plaintiffs sustained some type of damage from the Saddleridge Fire; both were insured by Defendant and filed claims after the fire; both allege that Defendant underpaid certain claims and denied others, as well as refusing to consider a hygienist report. However, Plaintiffs are owners of separate properties, different policies and making distinct claims,i.e. claims for ash and soot versus claims for repairing garage doors, the issues are similar enough to allow for joinder. While both claims involve one tragic “occurrence’—the Saddleridge Wildfire—no one disputes this. The overlapping facts play a minor role in this controversy. The real issue is whether Defendant underpayed two distinct claimants for separate claims. Thus, what is most significant in this analysis is risk of undue prejudice if a joint trial was held when much of the evidence is not cross-admissible.

 

To be sure, the jury will have to assess each claim independently. Contrary to the assertion of Plaintiffs’ counsel, there are no allegations in the Complaint of “an organized, calculated scheme of denials and underpayments” as there was alleged in State Farm. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ announced plan to make such an argument is questionable. Defendant’s concerns, however, that a joint trial will prejudice them in the sense that jurors may use evidence of two separate claimants unfairly against Defendant and thereby reduce the burden of proof is real.  Since the potential for jurors improperly using the evidence of one claimant in evaluating another claimant’s claim is significant, the risk of undue prejudice is substantial. Accordingly, severance is warranted.

 

 

Conclusion:

 

            For the foregoing reasons, the Court decides the pending motion as follows:

 

Motion to Sever is GRANTED.

 

Moving party is to give notice.

 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

Dated:             August 11, 2022                      __________________________________                                                                                                                Upinder S. Kalra

                                                                                    Judge of the Superior Court