Judge: Upinder S. Kalra, Case: 20STCV48900, Date: 2024-03-08 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 20STCV48900    Hearing Date: March 8, 2024    Dept: 51

Tentative Ruling

Judge Upinder S. Kalra, Department 51

HEARING DATE:   March 8, 2024                        

CASE NAME:            Andrea Arambula v. General Motors, LLC

CASE NO.:                20STCV48900

MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS

MOVING PARTY:   Plaintiff Andrea Arambula

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Defendant General Motors

REQUESTED RELIEF:

1.      An Order awarding attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses.

TENTATIVE RULING:

1.      Motion for Attorneys’ Fees is GRANTED in part.

2.      Motion for Costs is GRANTED.

3.      Defendant is ORDERED to remit payment within 45 days of notice of this ruling.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

Plaintiff Andrea Arambula (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Defendant General Motors, LLC on December 22, 2020. The complaint alleged causes of action based on a breach of the Song-Beverly Warranty Act. Plaintiff alleges that she purchased the Subject Vehicle from the Defendant, which later contains defects and malfunctions. After returning the Vehicle to the Defendant on three separate occasions to fix these defects, the Vehicle still contains defects.

Defendant General Motors, LLC filed an Answer on June 4, 2021.

On August 9, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Settlement.

On November 8, 2023, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs requesting 172.60 hours and $68,311.90. On January 18, 2024, Defendant filed an opposition suggesting that no more than $39,000 should be awarded. On January 25, 2024, Plaintiff filed a reply.

On January 31, 2024, after conferring with the court, the parties agreed to meet and confer regarding settlement as to Attorney Fees. The court continued the hearing on the motion for attorney fees to March 8, 2024.

On February 14, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Joint Status Report. Plaintiff reduced its request to $63,904.90 and Defendant conveyed a final offer of $48,000 inclusive of costs.

LEGAL STANDARD:

A prevailing buyer in an action under Song-Beverly “shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the Court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.”  (Civ. Code, § 1794(d).) By permitting buyers who prevail under Song-Beverly to recover their attorneys’ fees, “our Legislature has provided injured consumers strong encouragement to seek legal redress in a situation in which a lawsuit might not otherwise have been economically feasible.” (Murillo v. Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 985, 994.)  However, “ ‘[r]easonable compensation does not include compensation for ‘ “padding” in the form of inefficient or duplicative efforts....’ [Citations.] ‘A reduced award might be fully justified by a general observation that an attorney over litigated a case or submitted a padded bill or that the opposing party has stated valid objections.’ ” (Morris v. Hyundai Motor America (2019) 41 Cal.App.5^th 24, 38 (Morris).)

The prevailing party has the burden of showing that the requested attorney fees are reasonable. (Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 817.) The party seeking attorney fees “is not necessarily entitled to the compensation of the value of attorney services according to [his or her] own notion or to the full extent claimed . . . .”  (Levy v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 807, 816.) If the “time expended or the monetary charge being made for the time expended are not reasonable under all circumstances, then the court must take this into account and award fees in a lesser amount.” (Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 104.)  “ ‘A trial court may not rubber stamp a request for attorney fees, but must determine the number of hours reasonably expended.’ ” (Morris, supra, at p. 38.)

A calculation of attorneys’ fees for a Song-Beverly action begins with the “lodestar” approach, under which the Court fixes the lodestar at “the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (Margolin v. Regional Planning Com. (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 999, 1004-1005.) “California courts have consistently held that a computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys’ fee award.” (Ibid.)

“It is appropriate for a trial court to reduce a fee award based on its reasonable determination that a routine, non-complex case was overstaffed to a degree that significant inefficiencies and inflated fees resulted.”  (Morris v. Hyundai Motor America (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 39.) It is also appropriate to reduce a fee award based on “inefficient or duplicative efforts” in the billing record. (Id. at p. 38.) However, the analysis must be “reasonably specific” and cannot rely on general notions about the fairness of the fee award. (Kerkeles v. City of San Jose (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 88, 102.) Moreover, in conducting the analysis, courts are not permitted to tie any reductions in the fee award to some proportion of the buyer’s damages recovery. (Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 24, 39.) 

The lodestar figure may also be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided. (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49; PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1095.) The factors considered in determining the modification of the lodestar include the nature and difficulty of the litigation, the amount of money involved, the skill required and employed to handle the case, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case. (EnPalm, LLC v. Teitler Family Trust (2008) 162 Cal. App. 4th 770, 774 (emphasis in original).) A negative modifier was appropriate when duplicative work had been performed. (Thayer v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 819.) 

ANALYSIS:

Prevailing Party

On or about August 10, 2023, Plaintiff accepted Defendant’s July 17, 2023 CCP § 998 Offer to Compromise. (Barry Decl., ¶ 34, Exhibit 4.) Under the SBA, Plaintiff is the prevailing party, and thus, fees and costs are mandatory.

Lodestar Fees

The lodestar method looks at the time spent on a matter multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. (Serrano, supra 20 Cal.3d at 49). The two-step process begins with the lodestar method, which is the time spent on the matter multiple by the hourly rate. After the lodestar method, the second step is determining whether a multiplier should be applied. The factors that courts look at to determine if a multiplier is reasonable are: 1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132).

Reasonableness of Hourly Rate

Plaintiff contends that the hourly rates for the attorneys on the current matter are reasonable. The hourly rates range from $250 to $625 per hour. (Barry Decl. ¶¶ 37, 38, 43.) These rates are appropriate based on the qualifications of the attorneys and have been previously approved by the Superior Court, District Court, and other courts throughout California. Defendant does not oppose the reasonableness of hourly rates proposed.

“In determining hourly rates, the court must look to the “prevailing market rates in the relevant community.” (Bell v. Clackamas County (9th Cir.2003) 341 F.3d 858, 868.) The rates of comparable attorneys in the forum district are usually used. (See Gates v. Deukmejian (9th Cir.1992) 987 F.2d 1392, 1405.) In making its calculation, the court should also consider the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees.” (Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1009.)

Here, Plaintiff provided each attorney’s experience, their schooling background, year admitted to practice, as well as rates that have been approved by other courts. (Barry Decl. ¶¶ 37, 38, 43, 48-104.)

Accordingly, the hourly rates are reasonable.

Reasonableness of Hours Billed

Plaintiff originally sought 172.6 hours and $63,904.90 in attorney fees. Plaintiff subsequently reduced this request by 9.2 hours for a new total of 163.4 hours and $58,963.[1] (Joint Status Report, 2:6-10.) Defendant argues that only 91.8 hours of work on this case are reasonable. (Opp. 9:4-8.)

Although a verified fee bill is “prima facie evidence the costs, expenses and services listed were necessarily incurred,” (Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 682), ultimately, Plaintiff still has the burden to demonstrate the reasonableness of charges. The court has reviewed the fee bill submitted by Plaintiff and the proposed reductions by Defendant. As will be shown, Defendant’s contention that the billings are excessive, duplicative and unreasonable is well taken.

The trial court may reduce a fee award to a car buyer who prevailed on Song-Beverley Act claims if it finds that it was unreasonable to have numerous lawyers on a matter that did not present unique or complex issues, did not involve discovery motions, did not go to trial, and the attorneys' hourly rates were unreasonably high. (Morris, supra, at p. 37.) Here, the Court has reviewed the detailed fee bill with an eye for excessive, duplicative or unreasonable charges as contended by Defendant. Other than some excessive charges for charges related to motions in limine, fees motion, and miscellaneous discovery charges, the fees appear reasonable to the Court.

As such, the Court reduces the requested lodestar by $6,300. In all other respects, the billings are proper and reasonable. To be clear, the Court finds the reasonable amount of fees, based upon its experience and knowledge of this type of litigation, the lack of novelty and complexity of this case, and the professed specialization of Plaintiff’s counsel is $52,663.

Costs

Plaintiff requests $4,941.90 in costs. Defendant asks the court to reduce this request by $550 for court reporter fees that they did not actually incur. At the time of the initial hearing, the fees had not yet been incurred. As of today, however, the costs have been incurred. As such, the Court awards the full amount requested.

Conclusion:

            For the foregoing reasons, the Court decides the pending motion as follows:

1.      Motion for Attorneys’ Fees is GRANTED in part as follows:$52,663.

2.      Motion for Costs is GRANTED in the amount of $4,941.90;

3.      Defendant is ORDERED to remit payment within 45 days of notice of this ruling.

Moving party is to give notice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:             March 8, 2024                         __________________________________                                                                                                                Upinder S. Kalra

                                                                                    Judge of the Superior Court