Judge Upinder S. Kalra, Case Number: 21STCV00743, Date: 2025-01-28 Tentative Ruling

MOTION TO VACATE CONDITIONAL DISMISSAL AND FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 664.6

On January 8, 2021, Plaintiff American Express National Bank (Plaintiff) filed a Complaint against Defendant Marylouise Stoughton (Defendant) with one cause of action for common counts. According to the Complaint, Plaintiff extended credit to Defendant via an American Express credit card, ending in account no. 6007. Defendant has an outstanding balance of $38,082.89.

On April 26, 2021, the parties stipulated for the court to dismiss the case and retain jurisdiction pursuant to Cal. Code Civ. Proc. (CCP) § 664.6 because the parties settled.

On August 30, 2023, Plaintiff filed a first motion to vacate the conditional dismissal. Per the stipulation, the parties agreed that Defendant is indebted to Plaintiff in the amount of $36,582.89 on account no. 6007. Defendant agreed to pay this amount in installments beginning March 2021. Plaintiff subsequently withdrew the motion.

On September 13, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant motion to vacate the conditional dismissal. Oppositions were due on or before January 14, 2025. As of January 23, 2025, the court has not received any opposition.

CCP § 664.6, provides a summary procedure that enables judges to enforce a settlement agreement by entering a judgment pursuant to the terms of the parties’ settlement. In particular the statute provides:¿

(a) If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside of the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.¿

(b) For purposes of this section, a writing is signed by a party if it is signed by any of the following:¿

(3) If the party is an insurer, an agent who is authorized in writing by the insurer to sign on the insurer's behalf.¹¿
¿

Strict compliance with the statutory requirements is necessary before a court can enforce a settlement agreement under this statute.¿(Sully-Miller Contracting Co. v. Gledson/Cashman Construction, Inc.¿(2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 30, 37; Mesa RHF Partners, L.P. v. City of Los Angeles (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 913, 917.)¿¿¿

Plaintiff contends that the court retained jurisdiction and may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the agreement because Defendant defaulted on the agreement, that it entered a second settlement agreement with Defendant on November 8, 2023, that Defendant defaulted under the second settlement agreement, that Plaintiff provided notice of the default, and that Defendant failed to cure.

The court agrees with Plaintiff. First, the parties entered into an agreement that contained a provision allowing the court to set aside the dismissal. The first settlement agreement contains the following language:

In the event that Defendant fails to comply with the terms of this settlement agreement, Defendant agree that the Court can enter a judgment against Defendant in the amount of $36,582.89 plus costs. Defendant shall receive a credit for any payments made under this agreement. The parties agree that if the Court enters judgment for this amount that it is not liquidated damages and is an entry of judgment for the amount Defendant truly owes Plaintiff on the account. Plaintiff and Defendant further agree that the amount of damages in this case is not speculative or uncertain and that Plaintiff is entering into this agreement solely because of Defendant’s documented hardship. (Decl. Dyle, Exhibit A, Stipulation, ¶ 5.)

In the event of a default, Plaintiff shall be entitled to file with the Court a request to enter a judgment consistent with paragraph 5, above. Prior to filing the request with the Court, Plaintiff will mail written notice of the default to Defendant. Defendant shall have 14 days from the date of mailing to cure their default. (Decl. Dyle, Exhibit A, Stipulation, ¶ 12.)

If Defendant fails to cure the default within the allotted time, Plaintiff may immediately move for entry of judgment against Defendant under all applicable California law, including but not limited to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6, and to file a motion to have judgment entered against Defendant consistent with paragraph 5 above. (Decl. Dyle, Exhibit A, Stipulation, ¶ 13.)

The second settlement agreement is substantially identical to the first settlement agreement. It differs only in the indebted amount. Plaintiff did not file this second settlement agreement stipulation with the court.

Pursuant to each Stipulation, the court retains jurisdiction in the event of default. Defendant has not made payments pursuant to the second settlement agreement since December 27, 2023.[1] (Dyle Dec. ¶ 10.) Plaintiff sent Defendant notice of default and request to cure on June 24, 2024. (Dyle Decl. ¶ 11.) Defendant has not cured. (Ibid.) Plaintiff seeks $14,383.00. (Dyle Dec. ¶ 13[2].) Upon reviewing the proof of service, Plaintiff served Defendant at her last known address, which she was obligated to update pursuant to the Stipulation if she moved.

[1] The declaration states “2003” but the court infers this is a typo.

[2] This court infers that this paragraph is mistakenly labeled as paragraph 10.