Judge Upinder S. Kalra, Case 21STCV06753 2022-12-12 Tentative Ruling

MOVING PARTY: Defendants Talk WW Production, Inc., and Fox Broadcasting Company

On February 19, 2021, Plaintiff Darryl Wilkins (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Defendants Hillary Duff, Wendy Williams, The Wendy Williams Show, Talk WWW Production Inc., Fox Broadcasting Company, and Does 1 through 50. The complaint alleged two causes of action: (1) Libel and (2) Slander. The complaint alleges that while the Plaintiff was taking photographs at a public park when Defendant Duff confronted Plaintiff and videotaped their interaction. This interaction was posted on Defendant’s Duff’s social media profile, where the Defendant called the Plaintiff pejorative terms, such as a child predator. The other Defendants, like Wendy Williams and the Wendy Williams Show, posted disparaging comments on television.

On November 17, 2021, Plaintiff and Defendants Talk WW Production Inc. and Fox Broadcasting filed a stipulation to extend the deadlines for Defendants to respond.

On January 24, 2022, Defendants Talk WW Production, Inc., and Fox Broadcasting Company filed a Special Motion to Strike under CCP Section 425.16 (Anti-SLAPP), which was GRANTED.

On July 8, 2022, Defendants Talk WW Production, Inc., and Fox Broadcasting Company filed a Motion for Attorney’s Fees.

On November 3, 2022, the Minute Order issued by the Court continued the Motion for Attorney’s Fees to December 12, 2022.

Plaintiff’s Opposition was filed on November 29, 2022. Defendants Reply was filed on December 5, 2022.

California Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16(c) states that “a prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike shall be entitled to recover his or her attorney's fees and costs.” The prevailing party has the burden of showing that the requested attorney fees are reasonable. (Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 817.) The party seeking attorney fees “is not necessarily entitled to the compensation of the value of attorney services according to [his or her] own notion or to the full extent claimed . . . .” (Levy v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 807, 816.) If the “time expended or the monetary charge being made for the time expended are not reasonable under all circumstances, then the court must take this into account and award fees in a lesser amount.” (Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 104.)

“California courts have consistently held that a computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys’ fee award.” (Ibid.)

It is also appropriate to reduce a fee award based on “inefficient or duplicative efforts” in the billing record. (Id. at p. 38.) However, the analysis must be “reasonably specific” and cannot rely on general notions about the fairness of the fee award. (Kerkeles v. City of San Jose (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 88, 102.) Moreover, in conducting the analysis, courts are not permitted to tie any reductions in the fee award to some proportion of the buyer’s damages recovery. (Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 24, 39.)

The lodestar figure may also be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided. (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49; PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1095.) The factors considered in determining the modification of the lodestar include the nature and difficulty of the litigation, the amount of money involved, the skill required and employed to handle the case, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case. (EnPalm, LLC v. Teitler Family Trust (2008) 162 Cal. App. 4th 770, 774 (emphasis in original).) A negative modifier was appropriate when duplicative work had been performed. (Thayer v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 819.)

Defendants Talk WW Production, Inc., and Fox Broadcasting Company move for attorneys’ fees, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16(c). Defendants seek $55,809.00 in fees, $8,989 for the current motion, and $1,503 for costs, totaling $66,301.00.[1]

Under CCP § 425.16(c), a prevailing defendant “shall be entitled to recover his or her attorney’s fees and costs.”

Defendants argue that the fees requested are reasonable because they are the prevailing party. To determine if the requested amount is reasonable, California courts utilize the lodestar method. The two-step process begins with the lodestar method, which is the time spent on the matter multiple by the hourly rate. After the lodestar method, the second step is determining whether a multiplier should be applied. The factors that Courts look at to determine if a multiplier is reasonable are: 1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.)

Plaintiff argues that the requested fees are outrageous and unreasonable. Plaintiff asserts that the more than $55,000 in requested fees is excessive, given that the motion is a “15-page standard issue SLAPP motion.” (Opp. 4: 21-24.) A more reasonable amount would be $15,000 for the SLAPP motion and $5,000 for the fee motion. (Id. at 5: 4-6.) This was not a “complex” case, the facts were simple, and it could have “relegated to a second-year associate at a billable rate of $275.00 an hour.” (Opp. 6: 20-22.)

Defendants have provided verified billing invoices, attached to the Declaration of Joel R. Weiner, as Exhibits 12 and 13. A verified fee bill is “prima facie evidence the costs, expenses and services listed were necessarily incurred, and when they are properly challenged the burden of proof shifts to the party claiming them as costs.” (Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 682.) Still, the Court is the ultimate arbiter in deciding whether expenses are reasonable. A review of the billings indicates that the requested fees are appropriate. The billings provided pertain to the Anti-SLAPP motion only, not the demurrer. Defendants have provided detailed invoices demonstrating the various tasks, such as analyzing case law pertaining to the various requirements under the anti-SLAPP statute, drafting the motion and the accompanying declaration and requests for judicial notice, and communicating to the clients as well as with Plaintiff’s counsel, who was not responsive to many emails and phone calls. (Motion 10: 14 – 11: 19; Ex. 8-13.)

Additionally, Plaintiff’s argument that this is a standard Anti-SLAPP motion is without merit. An Anti-SLAPP motion is different from a regular motion to strike, in that there is a two separate process. Here, in their Anti-SLAPP motion, Defendant established that the claims arise from acts in furtherance of constitutionally protected speech and established that Plaintiff’s did not have a probability of succeeding on the merits. Thus, as provided by Defendants, the time to research and compose such a motion would not be considered “standard,” especially given that the protected activity is specific to each complaint. Therefore, Plaintiff’s argument fails, and the provided billings are proper and reasonable.

Defendants contend that the rates requested for this matter are reasonable. Specifically, Defendants argue that the hourly rates are based on community standard. Plaintiff makes not argument as to whether the hourly rates are reasonable.

“In determining hourly rates, the court must look to the “prevailing market rates in the relevant community.” (Bell v. Clackamas County (9th Cir.2003) 341 F.3d 858, 868.) The rates of comparable attorneys in the forum district are usually used. (See Gates v. Deukmejian (9th Cir.1992) 987 F.2d 1392, 1405.) In making its calculation, the court should also consider the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees.” (Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1009.) Here, the rates for the various attorneys range from $435 to $595, which are discounted rates. (Dec. Weiner, ¶ 20.) These rates are reasonable based on similar work performed in the Los Angeles area.

Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and costs is in the amount of $66,301.00 is GRANTED.

[1]The Court notes that as of July 7, 2022, Defendant anticipated another $5,000 for finalizing the fee motion, preparing a Reply and attending the hearing. (Mot. Weiner Dec. ¶ 21.) Defendant did not present an updated declaration on these costs so the Court declines to consider these anticipated costs.