Judge: Upinder S. Kalra, Case: 21STCV23881, Date: 2022-09-12 Tentative Ruling
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Case Number: 21STCV23881 Hearing Date: September 12, 2022 Dept: 51
Tentative Ruling
Judge Upinder S.
Kalra, Department 51
HEARING DATE: September
12, 2022
CASE NAME: Marlin D. Samuel v. Los Angeles County
Metropolitan Transportation Authority
CASE NO.: 21STCV23881
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DEFENDANT’S
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
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MOVING PARTY: Defendant Los Angeles County
Metropolitan Transportation Authority
RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiff Marlin D Samuel
REQUESTED RELIEF:
1. An
order granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the only cause of
action for breach of contract.
TENTATIVE RULING:
1. Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings is GRANTED. Leave to Amend is DENIED.
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:
On June 28, 2021, Plaintiff Marlin D. Samuel (“Plaintiff”)
filed a complaint against Defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation
Authority (“Defendant.”) The complaint is for one cause of action breach of
contract. The complaint alleges that an oral contract was entered into between
Plaintiff and Defendant during a hearing, where Plaintiff read terms of the
contract and Defendant’s employee accepted the offer.
On September 17, 2021, Defendant filed an Answer.
On August 16, 2022, Defendant filed a Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings. Plaintiff filed an Opposition on August 29, 2022. Defendant
filed a Reply on September 7, 2022. Plaintiff filed a reply to the Opposition
on September 7, 2022.[1]
LEGAL STANDARD
California
Code of Civil Procedure section 438 states, in relevant
part: “(b)(1) A party may move for judgment on the pleadings. . . .
(c)(1) The motion provided for in this section may only be made on
one of the following grounds: . . . . (B) If the moving party is a
defendant, that either of the following conditions exist: (i)
The court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged
in the complaint. (ii) The complaint does not state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant.”
A motion for judgment on the pleadings “has the purpose and
effect of a general demurrer.” (Smiley
v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 138, 146
(citation omitted).) “[T]he trial court generally confines
itself to the complaint and accepts as true all material facts alleged
therein. As appropriate, however, it may extend its consideration to
matters that are subject to judicial notice. In this, it performs
essentially the same task that it would undertake in ruling on a general
demurrer.” (Id. (citations
omitted).) The
grounds for motion for judgment on the pleadings shall appear on either “the
face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is
required to take judicial notice.” (CCP §438(d).)
A party
moving for judgment on the pleadings must meet and confer in person or
telephonically with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the
motion to determine if an agreement can be reached regarding the claims raised
in the motion. (Code Civ. Proc. § 439, subd. (a).) The moving party
must file a declaration detailing the meet and confer efforts. (Code Civ.
Proc. § 439, subd. (a)(3).)
Request
for Judicial Notice:
The Court may take judicial notice of the
existence of the records, but not the truth of matters asserted in such
records. (Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6
Cal.App.4th 1548, 1565). As a result, although the court may take judicial
notice that the documents exists, the Court may not take judicial notice of the
truth of the facts in the documents.
Additionally,
Evidence Code only allows the Court to take judicial notice of certain types of
documents. The court may take judicial notice of “official acts of the
legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States and of
any state of the United States,” “[r]ecords of (1) any court of this state or
(2) any court of record of the United States or of any state of the United
States,” and “[f]acts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to
dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to
sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy.” (Evid. Code § 452, subds. (c),
(d), and (h).) The Evidence Code does not allow the Court to take judicial
notice of discovery responses or parts of cases, such as depositions.
Defendant requests that the Court take Judicial Notice of
the following document:
1. LACMTA
Administrative Code & Ordinances
The Request for Judicial Notice is GRANTED.
ANALYSIS:
Defendant moves for a judgment on
the pleadings on the grounds that complaint does not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action.
A breach of contract cause of
action requires the plaintiff to establish “(1) the existence of the contract,
(2) plaintiff's performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant's
breach, and (4) the resulting damages to the plaintiff.” (D'Arrigo Bros. of California v. United Farmworkers of America
(2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 790, 800.)
Here, a review of the complaint and
attachments indicates that Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege that a
contract exists between Plaintiff and Defendant. “The parties' outward
manifestations must show that the parties all agreed “upon the same thing in
the same sense.” (Civ.Code § 1580.) If there is no evidence establishing a
manifestation of assent to the “same thing” by both parties, then there is no
mutual consent to contract and no contract formation.” (Weddington Productions, Inc. v. Flick (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 793,
811.)
\
Plaintiff argues that during the
hearing after Plaintiff stated, “if it’s a willful breach of contract knowing
the rules and regulations set forth, then you subjugate yourself to state and
federal penalties and fines outside the contractual agreement between Metro and
Smart Union,” a contract was formed when Ms. Tonia Zanders, a , Director of
Transportation Operations Zanders stated “Okay. Noted. Anything else?”
(Complaint p. 53.) The entire transcript, even in a light considered most
favorable to the Plaintiff, paints a different picture.
The transcript provided in the
complaint was for a disciplinary hearing where Plaintiff was accused of
misconduct. Ms. Zanders was a hearing officer. The transcript indicates that
during the hearing, Zanders stated “Okay” and “noted” on at least two occasions
in response to statements made by Plaintiff during argument he was making on why discipline should not be
imposed. Plaintiff ended his argument
about contractual agreement with “and that’s my conclusion.” (Complaint, Ex. P,
pg. 53.) It is clear and unambiguous that Plaintiff was making an argument, not
negotiating the terms of contract. Nothing
in the complaint, specifically the transcript of the hearing, constitutes an
offer, consideration, or mutual assent, all of which are required when forming
a contract. Plaintiff arguing that the contract was made via oral consent
because of the “Okay. Noted,” language is insufficient to constitute a
contract.
Leave to Amend:
Leave to amend should be liberally
granted if there is a reasonable possibility an amendment could cure the
defect. (County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 1018,1035.)
The Plaintiff has the
burden of demonstrating that leave to amend should be granted, and that the
defects can be cured by amendment. (“Plaintiff must show in what manner he can
amend his complaint and how that amendment will change the legal effect of his
pleading.” Goodman v. Kennedy (1976)
18 Cal.3d 335, 349). Here, it is inconceivable that Plaintiff can cure the defects as the alleged
breach of contract stem from a hearing and the transcript has been provided. As
such, leave to amend is DENIED.
Conclusion:
For
the foregoing reasons, the Court decides the pending motion as follows:
Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings is GRANTED. Leave to Amend is DENIED.
Moving party is to give notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: September
12, 2022 _________________________________ Upinder
S. Kalra
Judge
of the Superior Court
[1]Plaintiff
indicates that he was not served at his current address nevertheless he did not
receive notice and copies of all moving papers and filed written
responses.