Judge: Upinder S. Kalra, Case: 21STCV26504, Date: 2023-03-16 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 21STCV26504    Hearing Date: March 16, 2023    Dept: 51

Tentative Ruling

Judge Upinder S. Kalra, Department 51

HEARING DATE:   March 16, 2023                                  

CASE NAME:           Janice R. Boyd v. VIP Princess Court HOA, an unincorporated association, et al.

CASE NO.:                21STCV26504                       

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

MOVING PARTY: Defendant First Light Property Management, Inc.

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiff Janice R. Boyd

REQUESTED RELIEF:

1.      An order granting summary judgment.

TENTATIVE RULING:

1.       Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

On July 19, 2021, Plaintiff Janice R. Boyd (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against VIP Princess Court HOA and First Light Property Management, Inc. (“Defendants.”) The complaint alleged two causes of action: (1) Nuisance and (2) Negligence. The complaint alleges that Plaintiff and Defendant’s Property adjoin each other, separated by a large wall. Plaintiff noticed water leaking from the wall, which the City of Redondo Beach Police, Fire and Building and Safety Division all determined was from Defendant’s property. Defendant has failed to fix the problem.

On September 20, 2021, Defendants VIP Princess Court HOA and First Light Property Management, Inc., filed an Answer.

On July 22, 2022, Defendant First Light Property Management, Inc. filed the current Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff’s Opposition was filed on March 2, 2023.

On October 17, 2022, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint.

LEGAL STANDARD:

The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.”  (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.)  “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)

“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.”  (Scalf v. D.B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.)  A defendant or cross-defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)  “Once the defendant or cross-defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff or cross-complainant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)  “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.”  (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)  “When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.”  (Id. at p. 467; Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)

ANALYSIS:

Defendant First Light Property Management, Inc., moves for summary judgment as to both causes of action.

Defendant argues that no triable issues of material fact exist because there is indisputable evidence that the parties settled the matter on November 15, 2021. Defendant asserts that the parties entered a valid contract. Specifically, counsel for both parties exchanged emails between November 8^th and 15^th, whereby the parties discussed the terms of settling the matter. On November 15, 2021, the parties agreed that in exchange for waiving costs, Plaintiff would dismiss the matter without prejudice. (UMF 8.) Therefore, Defendant argues that the settlement agreement was written and contained the terms, including dismissing Defendant. Defendant has not been dismissed from the current matter. Moreover, Defendant argues that even without a formal settlement agreement, the parties’ settlement discussions resulted in a valid contract. (UMF 3-7.)

Plaintiff argues that there is no evidence of a signed settlement agreement. Specifically, no agreement has been provided or that Plaintiff accepted the settlement. Additionally, Plaintiff argues that Defendant failed to include any mention of repairing the leak, which Defendant has yet to do. Plaintiff questions the reasoning behind dismissing Defendant without prejudice without repairing the leak. Lastly, the repairs were less than $4,000, which is less than the cost of this current motion.

Summary judgment is a valid procedural vehicle in which to enforce a settlement agreement. (Kilpatrick v. Beebe (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 1527, 1530.) “ ‘ “A settlement agreement is a contract, and the legal principles [that] apply to contracts generally apply to settlement contracts.” [Citation.] Its validity is thus “judged by the same legal principles applicable to contracts generally.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.] The elements of a cause of action for breach of contract include the existence of a contract, the plaintiff's performance or excuse for nonperformance, the defendant's breach, and resulting damages to the plaintiff. [Citation.]The first element—the existence of a contract—requires parties capable of contracting, their consent, a lawful object, and a sufficient cause or consideration. (Civ. Code, § 1550.)” (J.B.B. Investment Partners Ltd. v. Fair (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 1(J.B.B. Investment).)

As shown below, Defendant has met their burden establishing a settlement as a matter of law. Plaintiff’s  actions arise from water leaks. After the lawsuit was filed, in in a series of emails between counsel November 2021, plaintiff’s counsel Keith Turner offered to dismiss the complaint without prejudice in exchange for mutual waiver of costs. (UMF 3, Decl. Yee, Exhibits A.) “My client intends to dismiss your client, First Light, and requests in exchange a waiver of costs, which I assume are minimal, if any.” Initially, Defendant’s counsel Steve Yee asked for dismissal with prejudice, but Plaintiff insisted on dismissal without prejudice. “Counsel, It can’t be with prejudice.” (UMF 5, Decl. Yee, Exhibit C.) Two days later, counsel Turner followed up with the following email: “Do we have a deal for dismissing First Light? If you need more time to consider, can we extend existing deadlines two more weeks?” (UMF 6, Decl. Yee, Exhibit D.) Two days later counsel Turner repeated the inquiry. (UMF 7, Decl. Yee, Exhibit D.) Ultimately, on November 15, 2021, counsel Yee agreed to Plaintiff’s terms. “Yes, our client agrees to a dismissal without prejudice in exchange for a mutual waiver of fees and costs. We will forward the draft settlement agreement to you soon.”  (UMF 7, Decl. Yee, Exhibit E.) With this final exchange, a settlement agreement was formed.

Plaintiff does not challenge the authenticity of the email exchange. Instead, Plaintiff argues the email exchange did not constitute a valid contract in the absence of a signed settlement agreement.  Plaintiff is mistaken. The holding of J.B.B. Investment is instructive. There, the Court of Appeal sustained the trial court’s finding that email exchanges between the parties was sufficient to establish, as a matter of law, a settlement agreement. (J.B.B. Investment, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p.11.) The Court of Appeal Court explicitly found that the specific language of the email exchange created a binding settlement agreement. The fact that the parties intended to follow up with a written agreement and the subsequent written agreement added additional standard terms, did not render the earlier agreement invalid. (Id. at p. 12.)

            Similarly, here the undisputed email exchange between Plaintiff’s counsel and Defendant’s counsel permits only one conclusion, the parties had a binding settlement as of November 15, 2021. While Plaintiff argues in their opposition and in the Declaration of counsel that “a material settlement required Defendants to permanently repair, the water leak and pay Plaintiff’s monetary compensation,”(Turner Dec. ¶48), such terms, while reasonable, are nowhere to be found in the email exchange. Even  if counsel was contemplating including such terms, there is no evidence such terms were actually a part of Plaintiff’s initial offer or any subsequent emails reiterating that same offer. Rather, the only term was waiver of costs, period. In the absence of evidence of missing material terms in the email exchange, there are no disputed material facts to undermine the November 15, 2021 settlement. Stated otherwise, Plaintiff has failed in its burden to raise material issues of material fact. As such, the email exchange in Exhibits A-E constitute all of the material terms of the a settlement. Accordingly, as a matter of law, Plaintiff has established the terms of the settlement that required Plaintiff to dismiss Defendant from this Complaint without prejudice in exchange for a waiver of costs.

Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

CONCLUSION:

For the foregoing reasons, the Court decides the pending motion as follows:

            Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

Moving party is to give notice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:             March 16, 2023                       _________________________________                                                                                                                  Upinder S. Kalra

                                                                                    Judge of the Superior Court