Judge: Upinder S. Kalra, Case: 21STCV37652, Date: 2024-06-24 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV37652 Hearing Date: June 24, 2024 Dept: 51
Tentative Ruling
Judge Upinder S.
Kalra, Department 51
HEARING DATE: June
24, 2024
CASE NAME: Seonah Jo v. Jinyeung Choi
CASE NO.: 21STCV33286![]()
MOTION
TO DISQUALIFY COUNSEL
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MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Seonah Jo
RESPONDING PARTY(S): Defendants Los Coyotes
Veterinary Practice, P.C. and Jinyeung Choi
REQUESTED RELIEF:
1. An
order disqualifying counsel for Defendant Los Coyotes Veterinary Practice, P.C.
TENTATIVE RULING:
1. Motion
to Disqualify Counsel is DENIED.
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:
On September 9, 2021, Plaintiff Seonah Jo (“Plaintiff”)
filed a complaint against Defendant Jinyeung Choi (“Defendant.”) The complaint
alleged four causes of action: (1) Breach of Contract, (2) Breach of Fiduciary
Duty, (3) Unjust Enrichment, and (4) Declaratory Relief. The complaint alleges
that the parties entered into an oral agreement to operate a business
partnership regarding the operation of Los Coyotes Veterinary Practice, P.C.,
agreeing to work equal time during the week, which was later reduced due to the
Covid-19 pandemic. Plaintiff argues that Defendant refused to work the agreed
upon hours per week. After an appraisal determined gthe value of Los Coyotes,
the parties provided various offers to buy out the other party, but the parties
have reached a deadlock. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant received a
third-party offer to merge Los Coyotes with the third party.
On November 1, 2021, Defendant filed a Demurrer with Motion
to Strike which was OVERRULED.
On February 28, 2022, Defendant filed an Answer.
On February 3, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to
Amend the Complaint, which was GRANTED.
On March 2, 2023, Plaintiff filed the First Amended
Complaint.
On March 10, 2023, Defendant filed a Motion to Bifurcate.
On May 3, 2023, Defendant Jinyeung Choi filed a Demurrer.
On June 15, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Disqualify
Counsel which the court GRANTED.
On April 17, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion to
Disqualify Counsel. On June 10, 2024, each Defendant separately filed
Oppositions. On June 13, 2024, Plaintiff filed Replies.
LEGAL STANDARD:
“A judge’s authority to disqualify an attorney has its
origins in the inherent power of every court in the furtherance of justice to
control the conduct of ministerial officers and other persons in pending
judicial proceedings.”¿(Neal v. Health
Net, Inc.¿(2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 831, 840;¿see also¿Code Civ. Proc., § 128,
subd. (a)(5)
[“Every court shall have the power to . . . control in furtherance of justice,
the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all other persons in any manner
connected with a judicial proceeding before it, in every matter pertaining
thereto”].) “The power is frequently exercised on a showing that
disqualification is required under professional standards governing avoidance
of conflicts of interest or potential adverse use of confidential
information.”¿(Responsible Citizens v.
Superior Court¿(1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1717, 1723-1724.)
“Motions to disqualify counsel present competing policy
considerations. On the one hand, a court must not hesitate to¿disqualify an
attorney when it is satisfactorily established that he or she wrongfully
acquired an unfair advantage that undermines the integrity of the judicial
process and will have a¿continuing effect on the proceedings before the court.
[Citations.] On the other hand, it must be kept in mind that disqualification
usually imposes a substantial hardship on the disqualified attorney’s innocent
client, who must bear the monetary and other costs of finding a replacement. A
client deprived of the attorney of his [or her] choice suffers a particularly
heavy penalty where ... his [or her] attorney is highly skilled in the relevant
area of the law.”¿(Gregori v. Bank of
America (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 291, 300.) “The paramount concern must be to
preserve public trust in the scrupulous administration of justice and the
integrity of the bar. The important right to counsel of one’s choice must yield
to ethical considerations that affect the fundamental principles of our
judicial process.”¿(People ex rel. Dept.
of Corporations v. SpeeDee Oil Change Systems, Inc. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1135,
1145.) Generally, the disqualification of an attorney vicariously disqualifies
his or her firm.¿(William H. Raley Co. v.
Superior Court (1983)¿149 Cal.App.3d 1042, 1048–1049.)
ANALYSIS:
Plaintiff moves to disqualify counsel for Defendant Los
Coyotes Veterinary Practice. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts Attorney David
Fraser’s (Fraser) impartiality is compromised due to a direct relationship with
Defendant Choi, that Fraser and Defendant Choi are colluding against Plaintiff,
and that he was previously disqualified as counsel in this matter. Defendant
Los Coyotes argues that Plaintiff’s argument is conjecture not rooted in fact,
misunderstands the role of corporate counsel, or otherwise attempts to mislead
this court. Additionally, Defendant Los Coyotes argues that authority does not
prohibit Fraser’s representation because he does not, and never did, represent
Defendant Choi individually.[1]
Defendant Choi’s opposition includes the same arguments and adds that Plaintiff
waited 75-80 days to file this motion after Fraser’s January 24, 2024 appointment.
Plaintiff replies that Fraser’s use of Dr. Hanna as a point of contact for
Defendant Los Coyotes exceeds the scope of his appointment, that Fraser
credited $8,963.93 before he was disqualified, and that Fraser’s former client
was Defendant Choi because he was never officially retained by Defendant Los
Coyotes.[2]
This court previously disqualified Fraser because he was
purportedly retained to represent Defendant Los Coyotes in violation of
corporate procedures. The board, with the vote of the provisional director
appointed by this court, voted to retain Fraser at a Special Meeting. [Mot. 4:19-23.]
Plaintiff voted against retaining Fraser. [Id.]
The main argument is whether Defendant Choi, individually, has a conflict of
interest with Fraser.[3]
Defendant Choi
& Fraser Conflict of Interest
Plaintiff proposes that Defendant Choi’s objection based on
attorney-client privilege in her responses to Plaintiff’s Requests for
Production (Set One) indicate such a relationship existed.[4]
(Reply 5:21-6:5.) Plaintiff provides no other “evidence” of Defendant Choi’s attorney-client
relationship with Fraser. Defendants argue that Fraser has always been
corporate counsel because Defendant Choi retained Fraser, albeit improperly,
for Defendant Los Coyotes while serving in her capacity as CEO.
Neither party included authority for this situation when an
individual defendant includes a boilerplate discovery objection based on
attorney-client privilege relating to their actions as a corporate officer. Put
differently, is Defendant Choi’s discovery objection really evidence of a
subjective belief that she, personally, was Fraser’s client? The court is not
convinced.[5]
There is no other proffered evidence of Fraser’s bias.[6]
Indeed, there is no evidence that Fraser’s continued representation of
Defendant Los Coyotes harms Plaintiff’s interests. (See City of San Diego v. Sup. Ct. (Hoover) (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 457,
471-743 [finding that attorney disqualification not warranted where no
“reasonable probability” or “genuine likelihood” the misconduct will provide
unfair advantage or otherwise affect the outcome of the proceeding.]) Rather,
granting the motion would harm Defendant Los Coyotes.
Accordingly, the court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to
disqualify counsel.
Conclusion:
For
the foregoing reasons, the Court decides the pending motion as follows:
Motion to Disqualify Counsel is DENIED.
Moving party is to give notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: June
24, 2024 __________________________________ Upinder
S. Kalra
Judge of the Superior Court
[1]
Defendant Los Coyotes relies on Coldren
v. Hart, King & Coldren, Inc. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 237.
[2]
The court disregards Plaintiff’s reply to the extent it includes a stale
discovery dispute. Plaintiff does not cite authority indicating that Fraser
must return billed amounts to Defendant Los Coyotes.
[3]
In passing, Plaintiff argues that Dr. Hanna exceeds his scope as the appointed
third board member by continuing to discuss this matter with Fraser on
Defendant Los Coyotes’ behalf. However, neither party fully briefed this issue.
The court therefore declines to entertain it.
[4]
Indeed, Plaintiff “infers” this relationship exists. (Reply 7:22-24.)
[5]
Without weighing the merits of a discovery motion, the more appropriate
question is whether Defendant Choi could properly assert the objection on
behalf of Defendant Los Coyotes. Additionally, Plaintiff admittedly received
unredacted copies of the requested documents after meet and conferring with
Defendant Choi’s counsel. (Reply 6:6-19.)
[6]
Plaintiff’s argument that Fraser is improperly loyal to Defendant Choi because
she pays his bill is not well taken. Such reasoning would prohibit Defendant
Los Coyotes from having counsel at all so long as Defendant Choi participates
in her role as CEO to pay its bills. Plaintiff has implied that Dr. Hanna could
not do so by arguing that his involvement stopped at the Special Meeting. So,
contrary to Plaintiff’s assertions, it appears she is impeding Defendant Los
Coyotes’ ability to defend itself in this lawsuit.