Judge Upinder S. Kalra, Case 21STCV38957 2023-04-27 Tentative Ruling

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiff Alexander Cavano, LLC, Diana Randle, Dierdre Watson, Jason E. Turner and J. Turner Law Group, APC

1. An order granting monetary and non-monetary sanctions as to Plaintiffs Cavano, Watson and Randle

On October 21, 2021, Plaintiff Persevero, LLC, Diedre Watson, Alexander Cavano, LLC, and Daina Randle (“Plaintiffs”) filed a complaint against Defendants Kevin Harrington, Michael Lauchlan, Mark Campbell, Joe Parker, Crowdfund, LLC formerly dba Crowdfund Rescue, LLC, Inventure X (“Defendants”.) The complaint alleges seven causes of action: (1) Fraud, (2) Rescission, (3) Violation of CA Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq., (4) Violation of CA Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500, (5) Conversion, (6) Negligent Misrepresentation, and (7) Breach of Contract. The complaint alleges that Plaintiffs entered into a contract with Defendant InventureX to obtain crowdfunding assistance and expertise. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants did not perform the services promised in the contract.

The current Motion for Sanctions was filed on October 24, 2022. Plaintiff’s Opposition was filed on January 24, 2023. Defendant’s Reply was filed on January 30, 2023.

CCP section 128.7 states that a court may impose sanctions on a party or attorney that presents a pleading, petition, motion, or other similar papers in the following circumstances:

1) the document is presented primarily for an improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.

2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are not warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law.

CCP section 128.7 permits the Court to impose monetary sanctions on an attorney or an unrepresented party that violates any one of these requirements. (Eichenbaum v. Alon (2003) 106 Cal App 4th 967, 976.) In addition, section 128.7 does not require a finding of subjective bad faith; instead it requires only that the Court find that the conduct be objectively unreasonable. (In re Marriage of Reese & Guy (1999) 73 Cal. App. 4th 1214, 1221.)

Under section 128.7, a court may impose sanctions if it concludes a pleading was filed for an improper purpose or was indisputably without merit, either legally or factually. (Bucur v. Ahmad (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 175, 189–190.) A claim is factually frivolous if it is “not well grounded in fact” and is legally frivolous if it is “not warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.” (Ibid.) In either case, to obtain sanctions, the moving party must show the party's conduct in asserting the claim was objectively unreasonable. (Ibid.) A claim is objectively unreasonable if “any reasonable attorney would agree that [it] is totally and completely without merit.” (Ibid.) However, “section 128.7 sanctions should be ‘made with restraint’ [Citation], and are not mandatory even if a claim is frivolous.” (Peake v. Underwood (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 428. at 448.)

In addition, Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7 “contains a safe harbor provision. It requires the party seeking sanctions to serve on the opposing party, without filing or presenting it to the court, a notice of motion specifically describing the sanctionable conduct. Service of the motion initiates a 21-day ‘hold’ or ‘safe harbor’ period. [Citations.] During this time, the offending document may be corrected or withdrawn without penalty. If that occurs, the motion for sanctions ‘‘shall not’’ be filed. [Citations.] By mandating a 21-day safe harbor period to allow correction or withdrawal of an offending document, section 128.7 is designed to be remedial, not punitive. [Citation.]” (Li v. Majestic Industry Hills, LLC (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 585, 590-591.)

The Court may take judicial notice of the existence of the records, but not the truth of matters asserted in such records. (Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1565). As a result, although the court may take judicial notice that the documents exists, the Court may not take judicial notice of the truth of the facts in the documents.

Additionally, Evidence Code only allows the Court to take judicial notice of certain types of documents. The court may take judicial notice of “official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States and of any state of the United States,” “[r]ecords of (1) any court of this state or (2) any court of record of the United States or of any state of the United States,” and “[f]acts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy.” (Evid. Code § 452, subds. (c), (d), and (h).) The Evidence Code does not allow the Court to take judicial notice of discovery responses or parts of cases, such as depositions.

1. Request for Dismissal without prejudice of Kevin Harrington, entered by Sacramento Co. Superior Court in Case ¹34-2020-283953-CL-BC-GDS

The Declaration of Katja M. Grosch indicates that on September 30, 2022, this motion was served on counsel for Plaintiffs. Additionally, the declaration states that the motion will not be filed until the safe harbor period has lapsed. The current Motion for Sanctions was filed on October 24, 2022.

Defendant contends that the FAC filed by Plaintiffs warrants sanctions for two main reasons. First, the claims asserted by Settled Plaintiffs are frivolous. Second, Plaintiff Deidre Watson has a pending action against the same defendants. Defendant seeks monetary sanctions totaling $7,484.08, based on the expenses incurred thus far. Additionally, Defendant seeks non-monetary sanctions and requests the court strike the FAC as it pertains to Plaintiffs Cavano, Randle, and Watson.

Under CCP § 128.7(b)(2), a party must certify that the claims are no frivolous. Here, Defendants assert that Plaintiff Cavano and Plaintiff Daina Randle both executed a Settlement agreement with Defendants, which indicates that Plaintiff would release Defendant InventureX and all affiliates and related parties, including Kevin Harrington. (Dec. Grosch, Ex. 1 & 2.)

In response, Plaintiffs argue that first, Plaintiff Randle has reached a settlement agreement with all Defendants, including Defendant Harrington. As to Plaintiff Cavano, Plaintiffs argue that because there is growing evidence that Mark Campbell, who signed one of the settlement agreements, does not exist, there is an issue as to whether the agreements are void or voidable.

As to Plaintiff Randle, Defendant Harrington withdraws the request to strike Plaintiff Randle from the FAC, but asserts that monetary sanctions are appropriate. As to Plaintiff Cavano, Defendant contends that the argument about whether Campbell exists is meritless. In the Declaration filed concurrently with the Reply, Michael Lauchlan indicates that he is known by Mark Campbell. Additionally, Defendant argues that the settlement agreement was signed by Scott Talkov, “who adopted the authorized digital signature of InventureX through its authorized signer, Mark Campbell.” (Reply, 3: 6-19; Dec. Talkov ¶ 7-9, filed 1/29/23.)

Defendant contends that Diedre Watson has filed this current claim in violation of 128.7(b)(2), as there is another pending action filed in Sacramento County against the same defendants. Despite Plaintiff Watson attempting to dismiss the case on August 23, 2022, it was denied because the case was stayed pending the completion of arbitration. (Dec. Gorsch, Ex. 4.) Defendant refers to res judicata, but the Court notes that res judicata requires final judgment on the merits. Here, the other matter has been filed, but there is no indication that a final judgment has been rendered. Therefore, Defendant’s argument concerning res judicata is misplaced.

In response, Plaintiff Watson dismissed Defendant Harrington from the Sacramento lawsuit in October 2022. (RJN A, Request for Dismissal without prejudice.) In reply, Defendant withdraws the request to be stricken from the FAC, but still argues that monetary sanctions are proper as Defendant was required to defendant the frivolous claim.

“A claim is factually frivolous if it is ‘not well grounded in fact’ and is legally frivolous if it is ‘not warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.’ [Citation.] In either case, to obtain sanctions, the moving party must show the party's conduct in asserting the claim was objectively unreasonable. [Citation.] A claim is objectively unreasonable if ‘any reasonable attorney would agree that [it] is totally and completely without merit.’ [Citations.]” (Kumar v. Ramsey (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 1110, 112, reh'g denied (Dec. 21, 2021.)

“Because our adversary system requires that attorneys and litigants be provided substantial breathing room to develop and assert factual and legal arguments, [section 128.7] sanctions should not be routinely or easily awarded even for a claim that is arguably frivolous” [citation omitted], and instead “should be ‘made with restraint.’ ” (Kumar, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at 1121.) Previously, this Court determined that as to Plaintiffs Cavano and Randle, sanctions were not appropriate at that time because it was unclear to this Court whether Randle could bring a suit asking for injunctive relief. However, given the fact that Randle has since settled with Defendant and Defendant has withdrawn the request to be stricken from the FAC, sanctions are moot as to Plaintiff Randle. The Court will not award monetary sanctions at this time either. Additionally, as to Plaintiff Cavano’s claim that Mark Campbell is not a real person, the Court also will not impose sanctions at this time as the Declaration of Michael Lauchlan indicates that he uses the name Mark Campbell.

As to Plaintiff Watson, sanctions are not appropriate. As seen by the Request for Judicial Notice, there is no pending lawsuit as to Kevin Harrington, as Ms. Watson requested a dismissal without prejudice as to Defendant Harrington on October 17, 2022.

MOVING PARTY: Defendants Michael Lauchlan, and Crowdfund, LLC dba InventureX

On May 31, 2022, Defendants Michael Lauchlan and Crowdfund, LLC filed a Demurrer without a Motion to Strike, which was SUSTAINED, with leave to amend, in part, and without leave to amend, in part.

On April 12, 2023, Defendants filed an Amended Motion to Strike. Plaintiff’s Opposition was filed on April 17, 2023. Defendants’ Reply was filed on April 19, 2023.

The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436(a).) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Id., § 436(b).) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Id. § 437.) “When the defect which justifies striking a complaint is capable of cure, the court should allow leave to amend.” (Vaccaro v. Kaiman (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 761, 768.)

Prior to filing a motion to strike, the moving party is required to satisfy their meet and confer obligations pursuant to Code of Civ. Proc. §430.41, and demonstrate that they so satisfied their meet and confer obligation by submitting a declaration pursuant to Code of Civ. Proc. §430.41(a)(2) & (3). The Declaration of Scott Talkov indicates that the parties met and confer via telephone on November 11, 2022. The parties were unable to agree about the portions of the SAC. (Dec. Talkov ¶ 3.)

Paragraph 19: “It appears that Mark Campbell is a fake identity created and assumed by Michael Lauchlan. On its website, InventureX portrayed Mark Campbell as its "VP of Marketing", and many of the emails that each of the Plaintiffs received while they attempted to get their 4 crowdfunding programs started appeared to be from Mark Campbell. But, Michael Lauchlan has 5 filed at least one declaration admitting that he used the name "Mark Campbell" for business 6 7 purposes, even though he has no court order or other government document changing his legal 8 name to Mark Campbell.”

Paragraph 20: “However, Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Mark Campbell 10 does not exist. Plaintiffs have researched the purported photograph of Mark Campbell that 11 12 appears on InventureX's website, and have discovered that it is a stock photo taken from another 13 website for a "St. Alphonsus" hospital or nursing college.”

Defendant argues that it is legally irrelevant if Michael Lauchlan used a different name. There is nothing improper about using a name that is different than the one on a birth certificate. Citing to Cabrera v. McMullen, “a person may change his or her name at any time without any legal formalities. More importantly, a person may sue or be sued in any name in which he or she is known and recognized.” (Cabrera v. McMullen (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 1, 3–4.) The SAC does not contain any allegation that if Plaintiff had known Mark Campbell was Michael Lauchlan, it would not have used its services. There are no allegations that Mark Campbell is not the same person that Plaintiff contacted. Moreover, Defendant argues that many other professionals use pseudonyms, such as Michael Kors, John Legend, Elton John, George Orwell, Maya Angelou, etc.

Plaintiff argues that the allegations in the SAC are sufficient. In paragraphs 19, 20, and 25, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants, including Mark Campbell, perpetuated a scheme, which was fraudulent, was “the set of “phantom” executives projected by InventureX to the world, and this set of “phantom” executives included Mark Campbell.” (Opp. 4: 20-26.) Additionally, Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s statement that the SAC does not allege that they would not have utilized InventureX if Plaintiff had known about Mark Campbell’s name is false. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that paragraph 47 states that Plaintiff “would not have purchased services from any of the defendants had a full and honest disclosure of the true nature of the defendants' scheme and intentions been made to them.” (Opp. 5: 3-9.)

The Court finds that the two paragraphs, Nos. 19 and 20, are relevant. Whether or not there is any legal prohibition for Mr. Lauchlan using the pseudonym of Mark Campbell does not address the fundamental question of relevancy. Using a false identity is circumstantial evidence that one may be trying to hide their true identity to mask a fraudulent scheme.

1. An order sustaining the demurrer as to causes of action 2 through 7 in the Second Amended Complaint.

On May 31, 2022, Defendants Michael Lauchlan and Crowdfund, LLC filed a Demurrer, which was SUSTAINED, with leave to amend.

On October 14, 2022, Defendant Harrington filed a Demurrer, which was SUSTAINED, with leave to amend.

On February 28, 2022, Plaintiff Persevero, LLC, filed a Second Amended Complaint, alleging six causes of action.

On March 29, 2023, Defendant Harrington filed the current Demurrer. Plaintiff Persevereo, LLC’s Opposition was filed on April 13, 2023. Defendant’s Reply was filed on April 20, 2023.

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. …. The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.” (Hahn 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.)

Prior to filing a demurrer, the demurring party is required to satisfy their meet and confer obligations pursuant to Code of Civ. Proc. §430.41, and demonstrate that they so satisfied their meet and confer obligation by submitting a declaration pursuant to Code of Civ. Proc. §430.41(a)(2) & (3). The Declaration of Katja Grosch indicates counsel sent a meet and confer letter on March 21, 2023, which was the same day Harrington received the SAC. The parties agreed to dismiss certain causes of action, but kept them in the SAC. Defendant filed the demurrer to ensure it did not miss the Court’s set date for the demurrer hearing.

Defendant demurs to all causes of action against him, 2 through 7.[1] Defendant’s demurrer included the 4^th and 5^th causes of action, despite Plaintiff indicating that it would remove Defendant Harrington from these causes of action. In Opposition, Plaintiff indicates that it failed to do so, but will remove Defendant Harrington from these causes of action.

Defendant argues that the second cause of action fails because it does not contain the necessary specificity that fraud claims require. The allegations against Defendant, which consist of paragraphs 3, 14, 16, 17, 18, 38, and 79, do not contain the requisite “who, what, where, when, and how” information. These allegations add “a few more puff quotations from videos and alleges that a co-defendant, not Harrington, forward one to Plaintiff. (Demurrer 9: 17-19, emphasis in original.) Moreover, the SAC does not indicate which of Harrington’s statements were false, how these statements were directed at Plaintiffs specifically, or why it was reasonable for Plaintiffs to “invest money in InventureX for help with crowdfunding simply because Harrington said in video posted on websites accessible by the general public that InventureX is the business that he “partnered with…” These statements are “puffery.”

Plaintiff argues that the cause of action for intentional misrepresentation has been sufficiently pleaded. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the who, when, where, and what have been alleged sufficiently. The SAC states that Defendant Harrington, in the summer or fall of 2019, Plaintiff saw a video created by Defendants where Harrington made representation about InventureX, and in October 2019, a video from Harrington promising InventureX was ready to successfully launch Plaintiff’s crowdfunding campaign. (SAC ¶¶ 23-27, 38, 79.) Additionally, these statements were made via videos and podcasts, “which were posted by Defendants on websites and social media platforms.” (Opp. 9: 7-21, SAC ¶¶ 37-38.) Lastly, Plaintiff argues that the specific claims were that “Harrington made specific, detailed representations about each of the actions that InventureX would take to successfully launch a crowdfunding campaign for entrepreneurs who paid for InventureX's services.” (SAC ¶ 38 and 79.) Additionally, the SAC also alleges facts that Harrington and Lauchlan worked together in the InventureX scheme.

“The elements of fraud, which give rise to the tort action for deceit, are (a) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity (or 'scienter'); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage.” (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638.)

“[W]hen averments of fraud are made, the circumstances constituting the alleged fraud must be specific enough to give defendants notice of the particular misconduct so that they can defend against the charge and not just deny that they have done anything wrong.” (Vess v. Ciba–Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir.2003) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The allegations “must be accompanied by ‘the who, what, when, where, and how’ of the misconduct charged.” (Arikat v. JP Morgan Chase & Co. (N.D. Cal. 2006) 430 F.Supp.2d 1013, 1022.) 157.)

After a review of the SAC, the Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged specific facts to constitute fraud. The SAC states that Defendant Harrington, in some videos, in 2019 and until January 2020, stated " ‘every month, my team and I at 3 InventureX are helping entrepreneurs launch hot new products on all the top 4 crowdfunding platforms’ like ‘Kickstarter.corn, Indigogo.corn, Equity 5 crowdfunding and others.’ " (FAC ¶ 38.) The complaint further alleges that these statements were false. Pleading specific facts that Defendant Harrington partnered with InventureX to provide services that have successfully helped launch businesses, that these facts were false and misleading and Defendant knew the claims were false is sufficient to meet the pleading requirements for this cause of action.

Defendant’s argument for the third cause of action are combined with the arguments made for the second cause of action: that the SAC does not contain the required specificity for a fraud claim.

Plaintiff argues that the SAC sufficiently alleges a cause of action for false promise. Specifically, in paragraphs 26, 27, 37, and 38, the SAC states with specificity that Defendant’s promises of crowd funding services, via representations from Lauchlan/Mark Campbell or Harrington’s videos were directed at Plaintiff. (Opp. 13: 1-5.) Additionally, in the second cause of action, the SAC sufficiently alleges a “conspiracy or agreement between Lauchlan and Harrington to work together to promote and operate the InventureX scheme, which supports Harrington being liable for the false promises made by Lauchlan.” (Opp. 13: 7-9, citing to SAC ¶ 51.)

“Promissory fraud or false promise “ ‘is a subspecies of the action for fraud and deceit…The elements of promissory fraud ... are: (1) a promise made regarding a material fact without any intention of performing it; (2) the existence of the intent not to perform at the time the promise was made; (3) intent to deceive or induce the promisee to enter into a transaction; (4) reasonable reliance by the promisee; (5) nonperformance by the party making the promise; and (6) resulting damage to the promise[e].” (Rossberg v. Bank of America, N.A. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1498 [162 Cal.Rptr.3d 525, 539], as modified on denial of reh'g (Sept. 26, 2013) “As with any other form of fraud, each element of a promissory fraud claim must be alleged with particularity.” (Id.).

“[T]he intent element of promissory fraud entails more than proof of an unkept promise or mere failure of performance. We note also that promissory fraud, like all forms of fraud, requires a showing of justifiable reliance on the defendant's misrepresentation.” (Riverisland Cold Storage, Inc. v. Fresno-Madera Production Credit Assn. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1169, 1183). 2..

“[W]hen averments of fraud are made, the circumstances constituting the alleged fraud must be specific enough to give defendants notice of the particular misconduct so that they can defend against the charge and not just deny that they have done anything wrong.” Vess v. Ciba–Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir.2003) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The allegations “must be accompanied by ‘the who, what, when, where, and how’ of the misconduct charged.” (Arikat v. JP Morgan Chase & Co. (N.D. Cal. 2006) 430 F.Supp.2d 1013, 1022).

After a review of the SAC, the Court finds that, similar to above, Plaintiff sufficiently alleges facts with the required specificity for fraud.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to plead all the required elements for negligent misrepresentation. Specifically, Plaintiff cannot and has not established the element of justifiable reliance. Plaintiff indicates that they are up and coming entrepreneurs with no prior relationship with Defendant Harrington, but do not allege Defendant made specific statements to Plaintiffs or why it was reasonable to invest in InventureX “simply because Harrington said in video posted on websites accessible by the general public” about partnering with InventureX. (Demurrer 12: 16-27.)

Plaintiff argues that the SAC alleges, with specificity, that Defendants targeted Plaintiff with Defendant Harrington’s videos, Defendant Lauchlan assured Plaintiff that InventureX would perform “a broad range of crowdfunding services,” Harrington was aware of Lauchlan’s fraudulent scheme, and Plaintiff relied on those representations. (SAC ¶¶ 77-79, 81-85.) Despite Defendant’s citation to Bily v. Arthur Young & Co. (1992) 3 Cal.4th 375, Plaintiff argues that the Supreme Court stated that a negligent misrepresentation cause of action will succeed if “where the representation, or misrepresentation was to persons “for whose guidance information was supplied; there is justifiable reliance on the information; and most importantly, who were intended to be influenced by the communication.”” (Opp. 15: 10-15, citing to Bily, supra, 3 Cal.4th at 412.)

Negligent misrepresentation requires the defendant to make false statements believing them to be true but without reasonable ground for such belief. (Bily¿v. Arthur Young & Co.¿(1992) 3 Cal.4th 370, 407.)¿“The elements of negligent misrepresentation are (1) the misrepresentation of a past or existing material fact, (2) without reasonable ground for believing it to be true, (3) with intent to induce another’s reliance on the fact misrepresented, (4) justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation, and (5) resulting damage.” ((National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. Cambridge Integrated Services Group, Inc.¿(2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 35, 50 [internal quotations omitted].)¿ Negligent representation must be¿pleaded¿“with particularity and by facts that show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered. " (Charnay¿v.¿Cobert, 145 Cal.App.4th at p. 185, fn. 14 [internal quotations omitted].)

After a review of the SAC, similar to above, Plaintiff sufficiently alleges facts with the required specificity for negligent representations.

Defendant contends that the tenth cause of action fails because unjust enrichment “does not lie where, as here, express binding agreements exist and define the parties’ rights.” (California Med. Ass'n, Inc. v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare of California, Inc. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 151, 172.) In paragraphs 26-28 and 87, the parties entered into written contracts. Additionally, because the claim for fraud fails, so to does the claim for unjust enrichment.

Plaintiff argues that restitution can be awarded if the parties entered an express contract that was procedure by fraud or is unenforceable. Plaintiff likens this matter to Rutherford, as this case involves express agreements and a “plaintiff’s allegations that the defendant wrongfully or intentionally decided not to perform under those express agreements.” (Opp. 18: 3-9, referencing (Rutherford Holdings, LLC v. Plaza Del Rey (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 221).)

While unjust enrichment is not a cause of action, courts have stated that unjust enrichment is synonymous with restitution and allowed recovery where the plaintiff asserts a proper basis for recovering restitution.¿(See¿Durrell v. Sharp Healthcare¿(2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1370;¿McBride v.¿Boughton¿(2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 379, 387-88.) “The elements for a claim of unjust enrichment are ‘receipt of a benefit and unjust retention of the benefit at the expense of another.’ [Citation.] ‘The theory of unjust enrichment requires one who acquires a benefit which may not justly be retained, to return either the thing or its equivalent to the aggrieved party so as not to be unjustly enriched.” (Lyles v. Sangadeo-Patel (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 759, 769.)

Here, the SAC does sufficiently allege a cause of action for unjust enrichment. As stated above, the SAC does contain the required specificity for fraud.

[1] The Court notes that on the title page of the SAC, Plaintiff indicates that there are six causes of action. However, in the SAC, Plaintiff alleges seven causes of action.