Judge: Upinder S. Kalra, Case: 21STCV43988, Date: 2024-03-07 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 21STCV43988    Hearing Date: March 7, 2024    Dept: 51

Tentative Ruling

Judge Upinder S. Kalra, Department 51

HEARING DATE:   March 7, 2024                                    

CASE NAME:           Claire Lin v. General Motors LLC

CASE NO.:                21STCV43988

MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS

MOVING PARTY:  Plaintiff Claire Lin

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Defendant General Motors LLC

REQUESTED RELIEF:

1.      An Order Awarding Attorneys’ Fees of $63,612;[1]

2.      An Order Awarding Costs of $4,959.92.

TENTATIVE RULING:

The fee motion is granted in part.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

On December 2, 2021, Plaintiff Claire Lin (Plaintiff) filed a Complaint against Defendant General Motors, LLC (Defendant) with two causes of action for: (1) Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act; and (2) Breach of Express Warranty under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. The Complaint concerns Plaintiff’s lease of a 2019 Chevrolet Bolt EV, VIN 23 1G1FZ6S05K4108229.

On January 7, 2022, Defendant filed an Answer.

On January 28, 2022, Plaintiff moved for leave to file a First Amended Complaint (FAC), which the court granted on March 28, 2022.

On March 28, 2022, Plaintiff’s FAC was deemed filed. Plaintiff’s FAC added a third cause of action for Violation of Business and Professions Code § 17200.

On April 25, 2022, Defendant filed an Answer to the FAC.

On October 17, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Settlement.

On December 20, 2023, Plaintiff filed the instant motion for attorneys’ fees and costs. On January 22, 2024, Defendant filed an opposition. On January 29, 2024, Plaintiff filed a reply.

On February 5, 2024, the court held a hearing on Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs with an Order to Show Cause re: Dismissal (Settlement). The parties agreed to further meet and confer regarding settlement as to Attorney Fees and the court continued the hearing to March 7, 2024.

On February 22, 2024, the parties filed a Joint Report re Status of Settlement of Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs.

LEGAL STANDARD:

A prevailing buyer in an action under Song-Beverly “shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the Court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.”  (Civ. Code, § 1794(d).) By permitting buyers who prevail under Song-Beverly to recover their attorneys’ fees, “our Legislature has provided injured consumers strong encouragement to seek legal redress in a situation in which a lawsuit might not otherwise have been economically feasible.” (Murillo v. Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 985, 994.)   

The prevailing party has the burden of showing that the requested attorney fees are reasonable. (Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 817.) The party seeking attorney fees “is not necessarily entitled to the compensation of the value of attorney services according to [his or her] own notion or to the full extent claimed . . . .”  (Levy v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 807, 816.) If the “time expended or the monetary charge being made for the time expended are not reasonable under all circumstances, then the court must take this into account and award fees in a lesser amount.” (Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 104.)   

A calculation of attorneys’ fees for a Song-Beverly action begins with the “lodestar” approach, under which the Court fixes the lodestar at “the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (Margolin v. Regional Planning Com. (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 999, 1004-1005.) “California courts have consistently held that a computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys’ fee award.” (Ibid.)  

“It is appropriate for a trial court to reduce a fee award based on its reasonable determination that a routine, non-complex case was overstaffed to a degree that significant inefficiencies and inflated fees resulted.”  (Morris v. Hyundai Motor America (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 39.) It is also appropriate to reduce a fee award based on “inefficient or duplicative efforts” in the billing record. (Id. at p. 38.) However, the analysis must be “reasonably specific” and cannot rely on general notions about the fairness of the fee award. (Kerkeles v. City of San Jose (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 88, 102.) Moreover, in conducting the analysis, courts are not permitted to tie any reductions in the fee award to some proportion of the buyer’s damages recovery. (Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 24, 39.)   

The lodestar figure may also be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided. (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49; PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1095.) The factors considered in determining the modification of the lodestar include the nature and difficulty of the litigation, the amount of money involved, the skill required and employed to handle the case, the attention given, the success or failure,¿and other circumstances in the case. (EnPalm, LLC v.¿Teitler¿Family Trust¿(2008) 162 Cal. App. 4th 770, 774 (emphasis in original).) A negative modifier was appropriate when duplicative work had been performed. (Thayer v. Wells Fargo Bank,¿N.A.¿(2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 819.)¿ 

ANALYSIS:

Plaintiff requests $65,159.50 in attorneys’ fees and $4,959.92 in costs for a total of $70,119.42. Defendant requests that the court reduce the attorneys’ fees to $27,680.00 and costs to $3,676.60.

In the Joint Status Report, the parties indicate that Plaintiff reduced their fee demand by 5.6 hours or $1,547.50 representing the time spent drafting memos to file re case status and travel time to the first Motion to Compel the Deposition of GM’s Person Most Knowledgeable hearing. Plaintiff reiterates another voluntary reduction of 5.7 hours or $2,157.50 from the billing that was filed with Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs. In sum, Plaintiff reduces their original request for Attorneys Fees request from $65,159.50 to $61,454.50. Defendant’s position is unchanged.

Prevailing Party

Here, the parties entered a Settlement Agreement that provided for GM to pay Plaintiff $40,000.00 cash, inclusive of civil penalties, with no obligation for Plaintiff to return the subject vehicle; that Plaintiff is the prevailing party; and that attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses incurred by Plaintiff would be paid in compliance with Civil Code § 1794(d) by way of motion. (Barry Decl. ¶42, Exhibit 10.)

Lodestar Fees  

The lodestar method looks at the time spent on a matter multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. (Serrano, supra 20 Cal.3d at 49). The two-step process begins with the lodestar method, which is the time spent on the matter multiple by the hourly rate. After the lodestar method, the second step is determining whether a multiplier should be applied. The factors that Courts look at to determine if a multiplier is reasonable are: 1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132). 

“In determining hourly rates, the court must look to the “prevailing market rates in the relevant community.” (Bell v. Clackamas County¿(9th Cir.2003) 341 F.3d 858, 868.) The rates of comparable attorneys in the forum district are usually used. (See¿Gates v. Deukmejian¿(9th Cir.1992) 987 F.2d 1392, 1405.) In making its calculation, the court should also consider the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees.” (Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy¿(2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1009.) 

Plaintiffs argue the hourly rates are reasonable. Here, the requested hourly rates are as follows:

·         David N. Barry: 35.2 hours at $625/hour

·         Anna H. Galaviz: 5.3 hours at $515/hour

·         Logan G. Pascal: 4.6 hours at $350/hour

·         Brian J. Kim: 129.4 hours at $300/hour

The court finds that these hourly rates are reasonable based on the hourly rate of similarly situated attorneys in the Los Angeles area. Based on the Laffey Matrix, attorneys with similar years of experience as Plaintiffs’ counsel as identified above have comparable, if not a higher hourly rate. However, billing at a high rate comes with the expectation that the attorney also works in an efficient manner that reflects the premium paid for his or her services. The court considers this fact in addressing the reasonableness of the hours expended, below.  

Thus, the hourly rates are appropriate.

Reasonableness of Hours Billed  

To determine if the requested amount is reasonable, California courts utilize the lodestar method. The two-step process begins with the lodestar method, which is the time spent on the matter multiple by the hourly rate. After the lodestar method, the second step is determining whether a multiplier should be applied. The factors that Courts look at to determine if a multiplier is reasonable are: 1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.)  

Although a verified fee bill is “prima facie evidence the costs, expenses and services listed were necessarily incurred,” (Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 682), ultimately, Counsel still has the burden to demonstrate the reasonableness of charges. (Mikhaeilpoor, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 247.) The court has reviewed the fee bill submitted by Counsel and the proposed reductions by Defendant.

Plaintiffs contend that the billable hours are reasonable. The total amount billed is 180 hours. While Plaintiff is to be commended for not billing for all work and assigning much of the work to a junior associate billing at $300 per hour, the hours billed for this unremarkable lemon law case with no dispositive motions and very little other motion work seems high. Upon review of the billing, the Court questioned the reasonableness of some billing entries.

Pleadings, Motions, & Discovery

Boilerplate filings serve a useful purpose. They increase productivity by allowing for simple edits to existing documents. Thus, utilizing templates is to be commended when it results in efficiency. However, if templates are employed but attorneys are still billing significant time to make minor changes, such use of legal resources is unwarranted and any such bill is unreasonable, particularly if the attorney is billing at a high hourly rate. (Mikhaeilpoor, supra, at p. 250.) Here, the court found instances where the time spent for minor cut and paste edits to templates was unreasonable.

i.                    Complaint/Amended Complaint

Counsel acknowledged that because of their oversight, they failed to file a UCL claim in the initial pleading. While it would have been a better practice for Defendant to stipulate to the amendment, it nonetheless is not reasonable to have Defendant pay for Plaintiff’s admitted oversight. This is worthy of a $1,600 reduction.

ii.                  Discovery Requests to Defendant

Counsel billed 12.6 hours at $300.00 per hour to draft initial discovery requests to Defendant that were identical in several other cases. (Quezada Decl., Exhibit A, B, E, and F.) The review of these billing entries reveals unreasonable charges. To start, Form Interrogatories are a Judicial Council form that merely requires checking boxes. Deposition notices are also templates. The remaining discovery requests appear to be standard Song-Beverly Act discovery questions with minimal edits tailored to the subject vehicle. This hardly warrants 12.6 hours from a seasoned Lemon Law attorney even at a discounted $300.00 per hour. Accordingly, these fees are unreasonably inflated by 50 %. The court finds that no more than $1,800 should have been expended instead of the billed $3,780.

iii.                Motion in Limine

The Motions in limine are templates and are routinely filed. Other than the motion to exclude the expert witness, the Court questions whether the in limine motion are even proper motions since they do not seek to exclude identifiable evidence or resolve difficult evidentiary issues. Plaintiff billed 19.7 hours for a total of $5,910. Much of these charges are unreasonable and unnecessary. The court finds that no more than $1200 should have been expended resulting in a reduction of $4,710.

The Court appreciates that Plaintiff has voluntarily further reduced their own bill by

5.6 hours for $1,547.50 for drafting file memos and 5.7 hours for $2,157.50 related to the fee motion. Otherwise, the Court finds that Plaintiff has satisfied their burden justifying the reasonableness of their fee bill.

As such, the Court reduces the requested lodestar by $8,290. In all other respects, the billings are proper and reasonable. To be clear, the Court finds the reasonable amount of fees, based upon its experience and knowledge of this type of litigation, the lack of novelty and complexity of this case, and the professed specialization of Plaintiff’s counsel is $55,322.

Costs:

            Plaintiffs request $4,959.92 in costs and expenses. The memorandum of Costs is attached as Exhibit 8. “Items on a verified cost bill are prima facie evidence the costs, expenses and services listed were necessarily incurred, and when they are properly challenged the burden of proof shifts to the party claiming them as costs.” (Hadley, supra, 167 Cal.App.3d at 682). Under CCP § 1794(d) “If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney's fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.”

Defendant argues that the Court should reduce the requested amount by $1,283.32. This is based on the parking and mileage, the filing fee, and future estimated court reporter fees.

            The Court finds that Defendant has failed to file a Motion to Tax Costs. Thus, the requested costs are appropriate. Moreover, while the reporter charge was estimated at the first hearing, the charge has been incurred as of this, the subsequent hearing. Thus, as of today, the $550 for a future hearing is an “incurred cost” Thus, the Court will deny the request to reduce the costs.

CONCLUSION:

            For the foregoing reasons, the Court decides the pending motion as follows:

Motion for Attorneys’ Fees is GRANTED, in the amount of $55,322 and costs in the amount of $4,959.92 for a total of $60,281.92 payable within 45 days of service of this order.

Moving party is to give notice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:             March 6, 2024             __________________________________                                                                                                                Upinder S. Kalra

                                                                                    Judge of the Superior Court