Judge: Upinder S. Kalra, Case: 22STCV07308, Date: 2023-02-22 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV07308    Hearing Date: February 22, 2023    Dept: 51

Tentative Ruling

 

Judge Upinder S. Kalra, Department 51

 

HEARING DATE:   February 21, 2023      

                       

CASE NAME:           Ali Ebneshahidi DC v. Law Office of Willoughby and Associates Inc.

 

CASE NO.:                22STCV07308

 

DEFENDANT’S DEMURRER WITHOUT MOTION TO STRIKE

 

MOVING PARTY: Defendant Law Office of Willoughby and Associates Inc.

 

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiff Ali Ebneshahidi DC

 

REQUESTED RELIEF:

 

1.      An order sustaining the demurrer as to two causes of action in the Second Amended Complaint

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

1.      Demurrer as to 1st and 2nd Causes of Action is SUSTAINED, with leave to amend.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

On February 28, 2022, Plaintiff Ali Ebneshahidi DC filed a complaint against Law Offices of Willoughby and Associates Inc.

 

The First Amended Complaint was filed on June 13, 2022. The complaint raised three causes of action: (1) Breach of Contract, (2) Breach of Implied Contract, and (3) Breach of Fiduciary Duty. This action is to recover $93,970 in payment for services rendered under various medical liens signed by various patients promising to pay Plaintiff. These various patients retained Defendant in suits against unknown third parties. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant did not use an interpleader and has failed to disburse funds.

 

On July 15, 2022, Defendant field a Demurrer with a Motion to Strike, which was SUSTAINED, in part as to the 1st and 2nd causes of action, and OVERRULED, as to the 3rd cause of action.

 

On November 21, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint.

 

The current Demurrer was filed on December 20, 2022. Plaintiff’s Opposition was filed on February 6, 2023.

 

LEGAL STANDARD

 

Demurrer

 

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. …. The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.” (Hahn 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.)

 

Meet and Confer:

 

Prior to filing a demurrer, the demurring party is required to satisfy their meet and confer obligations pursuant to Code of Civ. Proc. §430.41, and demonstrate that they so satisfied their meet and confer obligation by submitting a declaration pursuant to Code of Civ. Proc. §430.41(a)(2) & (3). No declaration has been filed by Defendant’s counsel indicating that the parties met and conferred.

 

ANALYSIS:

 

First and Second Causes of Action: Breach of Contract & Breach of Implied Contract

 

Defendant argues that these causes of action fail for two main reasons. First, these causes of action are defective because Plaintiff failed to join necessary and indispensable parties. Because there are various patients to have alleged contracts with Plaintiff, they are necessary parties and Plaintiff must “join the various patients, each of which has a separate and distinct interest.” (Demurrer 6: 7-10.) Not only are the patients separate and distinct, Plaintiff has alleged that the funds are subject to an interest belonging to various patients and may increase litigation, and the alleged reason for failure to join is based on having to enter into separate litigation, which is costly, timely, and “does not do a great deal for the reputation of the physician…when comments on social media platforms like Yelp can make or break a business.” (SAC ¶ 22.) This reason is “nonsensical.” (Demurrer 8: 2-8.)

 

Second, the causes of action are devoid of necessary contract details, specifically the contract. Plaintiff has failed to allege the existence of the contract, only attaching Exhibit A “which Plaintiff has alleged contains the same terms as the contracted sued on.” (Demurrer 8: 19-23.) Plaintiff has failed to comply with the Court’s order and either provide the contract or their terms by their legal effect. (Id. at 8: 26 – 9: 5.)

 

Plaintiff argues that the complaint is sufficient. First, the issues are between Plaintiff and Defendants. In almost “all of these matters, the facts in each are remarkably similar.” Therefore, it is better to conserve judicial resources rather than Plaintiff filed 31 separate cases to then have them consolidated. Second, Plaintiff argues it is not the intent of the parties to pursue the individual patients; the issues here relate to “Defendants’ failures to pay the amounts that they previously agreed to pay.” (Opp. 4: 15-18.) Lastly, Plaintiff argues that the contracts are clearly provided. Here, the terms are the same, with the difference between the liens being the dates signed and the names of the patient. Exhibit B provides the names of the patients and the dates of the accidents.

 

“To establish a cause of action for breach of contract, the plaintiff must plead and prove (1) the existence of the contract, (2) the plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) the defendant’s breach, and (4) resulting damages to the plaintiff.  [Citation.]”  (Maxwell v. Dolezal (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 93, 97-98.)

 

“A cause of action for breach of implied contract has the same elements as does a cause of action for breach of contract, except that the promise is not expressed in words but is implied from the promisor's conduct.” (Yari v. Producers Guild of America, Inc. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 172, 182.)

 

            A review of the SAC indicates that the first two causes of action are not sufficiently pleaded. As Defendant argues, and cites to, “A written contract may be pleaded either by its terms—set out verbatim in the complaint or a copy of the contract attached to the complaint and incorporated therein by reference—or by its legal effect. [Citation.] In order to plead a contract by its legal effect, plaintiff must ‘allege the substance of its relevant terms.” (Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 993.) 

 

Previously, this Court stated that the Plaintiff failed to provide the separate contracts, “which indicate which specific patient, the exact terms (despite Plaintiff stating the terms are the same), and the specific dates.” Here, Plaintiff has failed to comply with this. Plaintiff has only provided one contract. Additionally, in the SAC, Plaintiff states that “in almost all matters Willoughby signed a copy of the Lien.” Which specific matters did Willoughby not sign? Are those included in the 31 patients? Would Willoughby have a contract with that patient? These are questions cannot be answered without the alleged contracts. Further, in Opposition, Plaintiff states that “if the Court believes that a copy of each Lien is necessary then Plaintiff can adduce the same.” The Court specifically stated in the ruling issued on November 15, 2022, that: “While Plaintiff need not file 31 separate causes of action, the separate contracts should be provided, which indicate which specific patient, the exact terms (despite Plaintiff stating the terms are the same), and the specific dates.” (Ruling 11/16/2022, pg. 4.)

 

      The First And Second Cause of Action are SUSTAINED, with leave to amend.

 

CONCLUSION:

 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court decides the pending motion as follows:

 

Demurrer is SUSTAINED, with leave to amend as to 1st and 2nd Causes of Action.

 

Moving party is to give notice.

 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

Dated:             February 21, 2023                   __________________________________                                                                                                                Upinder S. Kalra

                                                                                    Judge of the Superior Court