Judge: Upinder S. Kalra, Case: 22STCV09334, Date: 2024-04-26 Tentative Ruling
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Case Number: 22STCV09334 Hearing Date: April 26, 2024 Dept: 51
Tentative Ruling
Judge Upinder S.
Kalra, Department 51
HEARING DATE: April
26, 2024
CASE NAME: John Doe v. Good Samaritan Hospital, et
al.
CASE NO.: 22STCV09334
DEFENDANT’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
MOVING PARTY: Defendant Good Samaritan Hospital
RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiff John Doe
REQUESTED RELIEF: Grant summary judgment, or in the
alternative, summary adjudication of the first, second, third, fifth, and tenth
causes of action.
TENTATIVE RULING:
Summary judgment is DENIED. Summary Adjudication is DENIED.
STATEMENT
OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:
Plaintiff John Doe (“Plaintiff”) has
brought a suit for the alleged dissemination of his HIV status by Dr. Joshua
Rice while he was a patient at the hospital. Specifically, while a colleague
and friend were visiting, Dr. Rice and Good Samaritan staff walked into the
room with all three, including Plaintiff, and intentionally revealed his HIV
status and treatments.
The operative First Amended
Complaint contains ten causes of action for: (1) Violation of California Health
and Safety Code § 120980; (2) Violation of the Confidentiality of Medical
Information Act (Cal. Civil Code § 56, et seq.); (3) Violation of California
Constitution Article I § 1; (4) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress;
(5) Invasion of Privacy; (6) Violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Cal.
Civil Code § 51, et seq.); (7) Violation of California Uniform Health Care
Decision Act (Cal. Probate Code § 7600, et seq.); (8) Violation of Cal. Civil
Code § 54.1; (9) Violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17200;
and (10) Negligence.
Plaintiff's Counsel and Moving
Defendant's Counsel entered into a stipulation, filed on March 16, 2023 which
struck the following from Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint in its entirety:
(1) Fourth Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress;
(2) Sixth Cause of Action for Violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Cal.
Civil Code § 51, et seq.); (3) Seventh Cause of Action for Violation of
California Uniform Health Care Decision Act (Cal. Probate Code § 7600, et
seq.); (4) Eighth Cause of Action for Violation of Cal. Civil Code § 54.1; (5)
Ninth Cause of Action for Violation of California Business and Professions Code
§ 17200; and (6) the prayer for punitive damages.
Thus, the only remaining claims
against Defendant Good Samaritan Hospital are: (1) First Cause of Action for
Violation of California Health and Safety Code § 120980; (2) Second Cause of
Action for Violation of the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act (Cal.
Civil Code § 56, et seq.); (3) Third Cause of Action for Violation of
California Constitution Article I § 1; (4) Fifth Cause of Action for Invasion
of Privacy; and (5) Tenth Cause of Action for Negligence.
On February 7, 2024, Defendant Good
Samaritan Hospital filed the instant motion for summary judgment, or in the
alternative, summary adjudication. Plaintiff opposes.
LEGAL STANDARD:
Code of Civil Procedure section 437c,
subdivision (a) provides that a “party may move for summary judgment in any
action or proceeding if it is contended that the action has no merit or that
there is no defense to the action or proceeding.” The motion shall be granted
if there is no triable issue as to any material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)
Subdivision (p)(2) of the same section provides that where a defendant presents
evidence showing one or more elements of a cause of action cannot be
established, then the burden shifts to plaintiff to show the existence of a
triable issue of material fact. (See Blue
Shield of California Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Superior Court (2011)
192 Cal.App.4th 727, 732.)¿
The moving party’s burden on summary
judgment “is more properly one of persuasion
rather than proof, since he must persuade the court that there is no
material fact for a reasonable trier of fact to find, and not to prove any such fact to the satisfaction
of the court itself as though it were sitting as the trier of fact.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001)
25 Cal.4th 826, 850 fn.11, original italics.)
EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS
Defendant’s
objections are overruled.
ANALYSIS:
Defendant
Good Samaritan Hospital moves for summary judgment, or alternatively, summary
adjudication of each cause of action against it, on the basis that (1) no
evidence exists to show that the nurses revealed any private/confidential
patient information and the nurses did not cause the injuries alleged; and (2) Defendant
is not vicariously liable for the acts of the doctor because the doctor is not
an ostensible agent of the hospital..
Defendant
argues that it and its nurses did not breach the standard of care or cause the
injuries to Plaintiff because there is no evidence to show that the nurses were
the ones who revealed Plaintiff’s private medical information or caused it to
be revealed. Defendant provides the declaration of Davina Leary, RN who opines
to same. (Leary Decl., ¶¶13-14.)
Plaintiff
does not appear to dispute this in opposition, but rather argues that Defendant
is vicariously liable under the theory of ostensible agency. (See Opp.)
Defendant
argues that doctors are not agents of hospitals and relies heavily on the
recent case Wicks v. Antelope Valley
Healthcare District (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 866 (Wicks).
In Wicks, the court explained “[i]t is well
established in California that a hospital may be liable for the negligence of
physicians on the staff, unless the hospital has clearly notified the patient
that the treating physicians are not hospital employees and there is no reason
to believe the patient was unable to understand or act on the information. This
rule is founded on the theory of ostensible agency.” (Wicks, supra, 49
Cal.App.5th at p. 882.) The court then provided a three-prong test for
determining when a physician is not
an ostensible agent of the hospital:
“[A]
hospital may be liable for their negligence on an ostensible agency theory,¿unless¿(1) the hospital gave the patient
actual notice that the treating physicians are not hospital employees, and (2)
there is no reason
to believe the patient was
unable to understand or act on the information, or (3) the patient was treated by his or her personal physician
and knew or should have known the true relationship between the hospital and
physician.” (Ibid., italics
added.)
The actual
notice requirement may be met by showing that a patient signed a notice
containing words to the effect of “all physicians and surgeons providing
services to me…have been granted the privilege of using the hospital for the
care and treatment of their patients but they are not employees,
representatives, or agents of the hospital. They are independent
practitioners.” (Ibid.) A patient can
negate actual notice by showing that, when they signed the notice form, they
were in no condition to understand it. (Id.
at p. 883 [citing Whitlow v. Rideout
Memorial Hospital (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 631, 633-634 (Whitlow)].)
Here,
Defendant presents evidence that Plaintiff signed a Conditions of Admission on
March 24, 2019 on the day of his admission to the hospital, which states in
relevant part "All physicians and surgeons providing services to me,
including the radiologist, pathologist, emergency physicians, anesthesiologist
and others, are not employees, representatives or agents of the hospital. They
have been granted the privilege of using the hospital for the care and
treatment of their patients but they are not employees, representatives or
agents of the hospital. They are independent practitioners.” (Liu Decl., ¶3,
Exh. A at p. 160.)
Thus,
Defendant has met its burden to show the first prong of Wicks is satisfied.
As to the
second prong, Defendant argues there is no reason to believe that Plaintiff did
not understand or was unable to act on the information. In Wicks, the Court gave weight to the fact that the decedent was
noted as alert and oriented when he was presented with the Consent for
Admission. (Wicks, supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at 883- 884.) Here,
Plaintiff came in through the emergency room. Defenant presents evidence that he
came into the emergency room due to abnormal lab results and he was not in pain
or distress. The records show that he reported denying pain and an assessment
by the nurses found his pain level to be zero and he had no non-verbal pain.
(Liu Decl., ¶3, Exh. A at p. 38.) Plaintiff also denied having neurological
concerns or deficits. (Id. at p. 39.)
The emergency room records also confirm that Plaintiff was alert and oriented.
(Id. at pp. 32-33, 38.)
Lastly,
there is no evidence that Plaintiff was treated by his personal physician and
knew or should have known the true relationship between the hospital and
physician.
Accordingly,
the Court finds that Defendant has shifted the burden to show a triable issue
based on the signed Consent for Admission.
In
opposition, Plaintiff argues that there are triable issues as to Plaintiff’s
state of mind and the conditions of his admission and also as to whether Plaintiff
signed, or Defendant personnel forged, Plaintiff’s signature on the Condition
of Admission form.
The Court
notes that as to the forgery argument, Plaintiff argues that both the signature
and initials on the form presented in support of Defendant’s MSJ are forgeries
and in fact the middle initial on the form is even incorrect. The middle
initial on the form is “B.” Plaintiff’s middle initial is “R.” (Opp. at p. 4.)
However, Plaintiff cites to his own
declaration, but no declaration is filed with the Court. Accordingly, the
Court cannot find a triable issue as to this issue without any evidence.
As to Plaintiff’s state of mind, Plaintiff presents
evidence that on March 24, 2019, Plaintiff presented to the Emergency
Department at Good Samaritan Hospital (“Good Sam”) at 11:43 p.m. via ambulance
from Healthcare Partners Urgent Care Clinic for renal failure. (Mikhail Decl.,
¶6). Plaintiff’s arrival was preceded by a phone call from Dr. Lee stating that
Plaintiff’s creatinine was 9.8, and his hemoglobin was 7.5 at 10:22 p.m. that
evening. (Id. at ¶7). Plaintiff was
seen by the triage nurse at 11:43 p.m., who documented that Plaintiff presented
with nausea, vomiting and abdominal Pain. (Id.
at ¶8). While the triage nurse noted that Plaintiff’s pain level was 0, the RN wrote
“LLQ abd pain” (Left Lower Quadrent Abdominal Pain) in the notes, and under
Presenting Problem, the nurse wrote “Abdominal pain.” (Id. at ¶9). In his declaration in support of Plaintiff’s
opposition, Dr. Peter Mikhail opines that documenting abdominal pain is
significantly more reliable than checking a box on the computer for the pain
scale. (Id. at ¶10). Dr. Mikhail
further opines that he would believe the written word over a 0 marked under
pain. (Ibid.) Plaintiff’s lab results
were provided to the Emergency Department at 1:29 a.m. on March 25, 2019.
Plaintiff’s lab work provided, in relevant part: Creatinine at 8.9; Hemoglobin
at 7.3; and Platelets at 99. (Id. at
¶12). Plaintiff was then seen by medical staff on duty who performed a physical
examination at 2:49 a.m. on March 25, 2019, where it is noted that Plaintiff
was alert and oriented to person, place and time. (Id. at ¶13). Dr. Mikhail maintains that it is significant that the
Alert and Oriented scale is a 0 to 4 scale including person, place, time, and
current situation. (Mikhail Decl., ¶14).The medical staff member left out the
current situation portion of the alert and oriented scale. (Ibid.) Dr. Mikhail concludes that based
on the above, it is reasonable to assume that Plaintiff was not completely
coherent when he arrived at the emergency department by ambulance. (Id. at ¶15.) Dr. Mikhail bases his
assessment on the following factors:
A.
Creatinine at 8.9 is low. One of the
symptoms that can occur with a low creatinine level is confusion;
B.
Hemoglobin at 7.3 is low. One of the
symptoms that can occur with a low hemoglobin level is lowered level of oxygen
to the brain, resulting in confusion;
C.
Platelets at 99 is low. One of the
symptoms of a low platelet count can be confusion; and
D.
Alert and oriented to person, place and
time, suggests that Plaintiff was not oriented to his current situation,
suggesting some confusion. (Ibid.)
The “Conditions of
Admission” forms Good Sam maintains were presented to Plaintiff when he entered
the hospital were signed on March 24, 2019, pursuant to the dates indicated on
the forms. (Id. at ¶16). Dr. Mikhail
maintains that such would indicate Plaintiff signed the documents within the
first 17 minutes arriving to the Good Sam Emergency Department, before he
received any treatment, and while he was experiencing the above-referenced
conditions. (Id. at ¶17). Based on
Plaintiff’s severe pain and anxiety, Plaintiff would have had significant
difficulty understanding or appreciating the significance of the information
communicated to him; especially the complicated legalese in the provision
dealing with the legal relationship between the Good Sam and Dr. Rice. (Id. at ¶18).
Based upon
this evidence, the facts here are closer to Whitlow
than Wicks. Accordingly, the Court
finds that Plaintiff has created a triable issue as to whether there is reason to believe Plaintiff was unable
to understand or act on the information provided in the Conditions of
Admission.
Therefore, the motion for summary
judgment is DENIED. As the same arguments apply to the alternative motion for summary
adjudication of the individual causes of action, the motion for summary
adjudication is also DENIED.
CONCLUSION:
For the foregoing reasons, the
Court decides the pending motion as follows:
The motion for summary judgment, or
in the alternative, summary adjudication, is DENIED.
Moving party to give notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: April 26, 2024 ___________________________________
Upinder
S. Kalra
Judge
of the Superior Court