Judge: Upinder S. Kalra, Case: 22STCV10576, Date: 2025-01-10 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 22STCV10576    Hearing Date: January 10, 2025    Dept: 51

Proposed Statement of Decision

 

Judge Upinder S. Kalra, Department 51

 

HEARING DATE:    January 10, 2025                                            

 

CASE NAME:           Reed L. Harman, et al. v. Stanley Francis Cho, et al.

 

CASE NO.:                22STCV10576

 

Pursuant to CCP § 632 and Rule of Court, rule 3.1590, this Court issues the following TENTATIVE findings of fact and conclusions of law as to the each of the “principal controverted issues” at the court trial on this matter, subject to a party’s objection within 15 days of service of this proposed statement. If no objections are timely filed, this tentative decision will become the Statement of Decision.

 

BACKGROUND OF PROCEEDINGS:

 

On March 28, 2022, Plaintiffs Reed L. Harman, and Nan M. Harman, individually and as Trustees of the Visalia Trust (Plaintiffs) filed a Complaint against Defendants Stanley Francis Chao and Steve Francis Chao (Defendants). The Complaint had four causes of action for: (1) declaratory relief; (2) injunctive relief; (3) nuisance; and (4) negligence. 

 

On November 8, 2022, Defendant Stanley Francis Chao filed an Answer. 

 

On December 15, 2022, Plaintiffs filed a Request for Dismissal as to Defendant Steve Francis Chao only. 

 

On March 6, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint against Defendant Steve Francis Chao only, bearing Case No. 23STCV04882 for (1) declaratory relief, (2) injunctive relief, (3) nuisance, and (4) negligence.  

 

On March 22, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Related Case. 

 

On April 5, 2023, the subsequent case was transferred to Dept. 51 and the first case was deemed the lead case. 

 

On April 18, 2023, Cross-Complainants Stanley Francis Chao, Steven Francis Chao, and Herair Garboushian filed a Cross-Complaint against Cross-Defendants Reed L. Harman and Nan M. Harman, individually, and as Trustees of the Visalia Trust.  

 

On May 4, 2023, Defendant Steven Francis Chao filed an Answer to the Complaint in the second action. 

 

On July 26, 2023, Cross-Complainants sought leave to file a First Amended Cross-Complaint, which the court granted. 

 

On August 23, 2023, Cross-Complainants filed a First Amended Cross-Complaint (FACC) with four causes of action for: (1) Trespass; (2) Invasion of Privacy; (3) Nuisance; (4) Declaratory Relief; and (4) Injunctive Relief. 

 

On December 4 and 5, the court heard testimony and received evidence on the first phase of a bifurcated court trial.

 

On December 17, 2024, Defendant filed a closing brief.

 

On December 23, 2024, Plaintiff filed a reply to Defendant’s closing brief.

 

 

BACKGROUND

 

This dispute involves real property located at 1820 Via Visalia, Palos Verdes Estates, California 90274 (Plaintiff’s Property) and real property located at 1113 Via Mirabel, Palos Verdes Estates, California 90274 (Defendant’s Property). Both properties are located within the Palos Verdes Homes Association (PVHA). Properties within the PVHA boundaries are generally subject to the CC&Rs. Article V, Section 7 of the CC&Rs expressly provides that:

 

"No tree over twenty feet in height above the ground shall be trimmed, cut back, removed or killed except with the approval of the Homes Association, and representatives of the Homes Association and/or of the Art Jury shall have the right at any time to enter on or upon any property for the purpose of cutting back trees or other plantings which may grow up to a greater height than in the opinion of the Homes Association is warranted to maintain the view and protect adjoining property. The Homes Association shall have sole authority and right to trim, remove, replace, plant or re-plant or otherwise care for the trees, shrubs and plantings in the sidewalk or other spaces in front of lots or adjoining them, subject to any county or other officials having superior jurisdiction."

(Trial Exhibit 1, pp. 36-37, emphasis added.)

 

In 2021, the PVHA adopted Resolution 191, which expressed the association’s interpretation of Section 7. In relevant part, the Association interpreted the phrase “ ... is warranted to maintain the view and protect adjoining property, ... " to mean that its view maintenance authority extended to maintaining the view of all properties and not just to the view of adjoining properties.

 

CONTENTIONS

 

Plaintiffs claim that Defendants have failed to properly maintain their trees and vegetation which resulted in obstructing Plaintiffs’ views from the main living areas of their property. Plaintiffs contend that that they have a right to their scenic views under the PVHA’s CC&Rs as well as through a 2016 Landscape Approval by the PVHA Art Jury. Plaintiffs allege that they have the right to enforce the Restrictions against Defendants. Thus, Plaintiffs seek a declaration that Defendants’ trees now significantly obstruct those views in violation of the PVHA’s governing documents and the subsequent 2016 Landscaping Approval.

 

Defendants contend that the plain reading of Article V, Section 7, indicates that only the views of adjacent property owners are protected. Defendants add that according to the CC&R’s, Amendments require a two-thirds vote of affected property owners. No such vote was taken. Instead, only a majority of the PVHA Board passed a resolution—Resolution 191—that purporting to interpret Section 7 as applying to non-adjacent property owners.  As such, relying upon Major v. Miraverde Homeowners Assn. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 618, 628["[A]n association may not exceed the authority granted to it by the CC&R's. Where the association exceeds its scope of authority, any rule or decision resulting from such an ultra vires act is invalid whether or not it is a 'reasonable' response to a particular circumstance. Where a circumstance arises which is not adequately covered by the CC&R's, the remedy is to amend the CC&R's."] Thus, Defendants assert, that absent a formal amendment to the relevant terms of the CC&Rs, the PVHA cannot adopt rules, regulations, or resolutions that contradict the plain language of the CC&Rs. Since it is undisputed that Plaintiffs’ property and Defendants’ properties are not adjacent, the CC&Rs do not grant Plaintiffs the right to enforce the trimming of Defendants’ vegetation whether or not they obstruct Plaintiffs’ views.

 

Defendants further contend that since the Art Jury’s authority is derived from the CC&R’s, the Art Jury did not have the power to add more restrictions than the CC&Rs. Thus, the 2016 landscape stamp by the Art Jury has no legal significance. In sum, the Defendants urge the Court to interpret the phrase “ ... is warranted to maintain the view and protect adjoining property, ... " as requiring properties to be adjoining for view maintenance purposes.

 

LEGAL STANDARD:

 

Any person claiming rights under a contract (oral or written) or under a written instrument other than a will or trust, or with respect to property, may bring an action for a declaration of the person's rights or duties with respect to another. (CCP § 1060.)

 

Generally, courts interpret CC&Rs under contract principles (Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condominium Assn. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 361, 380–381. However, courts defer to decisions made by homeowner associations when they act within their authority and in good faith. (Lamden v. La Jolla Shores Clubdominium Homeowners Association (1999) 21 Cal.4th 249, 253.)

 

ANALYSIS:

 

In Phase 1 of the trial, the court was asked to address two issues:  

 

(1) Does the view maintenance authority found in Article V, Section 7 of the Protective Restrictions extend to all Association properties, or to just adjoining properties; and,

(2) Are the Chao’s obligated to cut their trees to maintain the neighbor’s views free from obstruction after accepting the benefits of the 2016 Conditional Landscape Approval?

 

The Court agrees with Defendant’s contention that the Art Jury has no greater authority than the CC&R. Thus, only the first question needs to be answered.

 

The entire dispute comes down to the interpretation of the following part of Section 7: “for the purpose of cutting back trees or other plantings which may grow up to a greater height than in the opinion of the Homes Association is warranted to maintain the view and protect adjoining property.” In actuality it is the meaning of the last seven words in italics that are questioned. Does the phrase “adjoining property apply only to “protect” or also to “the view.” A close examination of the construction of the sentence reveals that each of these nouns are objects of two separate verbs. The first verb in the phrase—maintain—employs the object “view” while the second verb in the phrase—protect— uses the object “adjoining property.” Thus, the plain reading of this sentence demonstrates that the Homes Association has two distinct responsibilities: (1) to maintain the view and (2) to protect adjoining property. It begs the question: maintain the view of whom?

 

One plausible reading, advanced by Defendants, is that Section 7 limits the Association’s view maintenance responsibilities to adjoining properties. Another plausible construction, offered by Plaintiffs, is that Section 7 grants the Association broad authority to maintain scenic views across all properties. The Court rejects Defendants assertion that the only reasonable reading of Section 7 is that the Association can only maintain the view of adjacent properties. To support such a conclusion, the court would have to rewrite the sentence to add the following italics language: “to maintain the view [of adjoining property] and [to] protect adjoining property.” Once it is conceded that there is ambiguity in the structure of the sentence that results in differing reasonable interpretations, the court must defer to the findings of the HOA, if it is reasoned and in good faith.

 

In Resolution 191, the Association states that it has been its experience that “significant view obstructions may occur whether properties are adjoining or are separated by some distance;” and thereby interpreted Section 7 to mean that “properties need not be adjoining” for the view maintenance provisions of Article V, Section 7 to apply. [Exhibit 2, p.2, ¶ 1B]. This interpretation is reasonable. Further, the Association’s findings were made in good faith as supported by their statements that “ ... it has been the Association’s experience that significant view obstructions may occur whether properties are adjoining or separated by some distance…”. “[Trial Exhibit 2. p.2]. Lastly, Resolution 191 was not arbitrary but rather, rationally related to the Association’s view maintenance goals. Accordingly, the Association acted within its authority to promulgate Resolution 191 as a statement of intent of grantors of the CC&Rs.

Further, the court agrees that Resolution 191 was not an amendment to Article V, section 7.

 

CONCLUSION:

 

Plaintiffs have met their burden by a preponderance of the evidence that Resolution 191 is a reasonable interpretation of Article V, Section 7 and was not an amendment to the CC&Rs.

 

Moving party is to give notice.

 

 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

Dated:             January 10, 2025                     __________________________________                                                                                                                        Upinder S. Kalra

                                                                                    Judge of the Superior Court