Judge: Upinder S. Kalra, Case: 22STCV16450, Date: 2023-10-05 Tentative Ruling
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Case Number: 22STCV16450 Hearing Date: October 5, 2023 Dept: 51
FINAL Ruling
Judge Upinder S.
Kalra, Department 51
HEARING DATE: September
29, 2023
CASE NAME: Corey Fields, et al. v. FPI Management,
Inc., et al.
CASE NO.: 22STCV16450
MOTION
FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION
MOVING PARTY: Plaintiffs Corey Fields, E’mori
Groomes, Emmia Groomes, Larry Fields, Lacey Fields and Nature Fields
RESPONDING PARTY(S): Defendant FPI Management, Inc.
and Suzanne Sparks
REQUESTED RELIEF:
1. An
order granting summary adjudication as to two issues of duty.
RULING:
1. Motion
for Summary Adjudication is DENIED, as to both issues.
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:
On May 18, 2022, Plaintiffs Corey Fields, E’mori Groomes,
Emmia Groomes, Larry Fields, Lacey Fields and Nature Fields (“Plaintiffs”)
filed a complaint against Defendants FPI Management, Inc., Samoa Avenue Housing
LP, and Suzanne Sparks (“Defendants.”) The complaint alleged 8 causes of
action, including retaliatory eviction, infliction of emotional distress and
breach of implied covenant of quiet possession. The complaint alleges that
Defendants denied Plaintiff Corey Fields tenancy. Plaintiffs E’mori Groomes,
Emmia Groomes, Larry Fields, Lacey Fields and Nature Fields were tenants with
their mother at the subject property, when their mother, LaQresha Marketta
Wilks, passed away. Plaintiff Corey Fields applied to be added to the lease but
was denied after Defendants learned of a civil harassment restraining order
filed against Defendant Sparks.
On August 8, 2022, Defendants FPI Management Inc., and
Suzanne Sparks filed an Answer.
On July 14, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Summary
Adjudication against Defendant FPI Management, Inc. Defendant FPI Management,
Inc., filed an Opposition on September 15, 2023. Defendant Suzanne Sparks filed
an Opposition on September 15, 2023. Plaintiffs’ Reply was filed on September
21, 2023.
LEGAL STANDARD:
The purpose of a motion for summary
judgment or summary adjudication “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut
through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their
allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001)
25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c),
requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence
submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and
uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor
Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)
“On a motion for summary judgment,
the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing
that there are no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D.B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128
Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) For the
purposes of motion for summary judgment and summary adjudication, “[a]
plaintiff or cross-complainant has met his or her burden of showing that there
is no defense to a cause of action if that party has proved each element of the
cause of action entitling the party to judgment on the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1).) “Once the plaintiff . . . has met that
burden, the burden shifts to the defendant . . . to show that a triable issue
of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense
thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c,
subd. (p)(1).) “When deciding whether to
grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in
the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as
well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the
light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical
Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467; Code
Civ. Proc.,
§ 437c, subd. (c).)
PROCEDURAL ISSUE:
The Notice of Motion for Summary
Adjudication indicates that the motion is directed only at Defendant FPI
Management, Inc., and not Defendant Sparks. Defendant Sparks has filed an
Opposition, but the Court will not be providing an analysis on the merits of
that Opposition as Plaintiffs’ motion is not as to Defendant Sparks.
ANALYSIS:
1.
Issue 1: Duty not
to Retaliate.
Plaintiffs argue that Defendant FPI
had a duty to all plaintiffs not to retaliate. Plaintiff Fields’ application
was denied because he sought a restraining order against Defendant Suzanne
Sparks, the property manager. (UMF 12, 17, 23-25.) When FPI denied the
application, it retaliated against the Plaintiff Children “in violation of
Section 1942.5,” and thus constructively evicting them as they could not remain
in the unit without their father. (UMF 13, 19, 22.)
Defendant FPI
argues that it had no duty to Plaintiff Corey Fields as he was not a lessee.
Civil Code § 1942.5(d) applies to lessees and is inapplicable as Plaintiff
Corey Fields “exercised a right under the law,” but was not a lessee.
Additionally, Defendant argues that the argument about the children being
constructively evicted is not supported by case law or evidence.
Civil Code § 1942.5(d) states:
Notwithstanding subdivision (a), it
is unlawful for a lessor to increase rent, decrease services, cause a lessee to
quit involuntarily, bring an action to recover possession, or threaten to do
any of those acts, for the purpose of retaliating against the lessee because
the lessee has lawfully organized or participated in a lessees' association or
an organization advocating lessees' rights or has lawfully and peaceably
exercised any rights under the law. In an action brought by or against the
lessee pursuant to this subdivision, the lessee shall bear the burden of
producing evidence that the lessor's conduct was, in fact, retaliatory.
The Court finds that Plaintiffs
have failed to meet their burden of establishing that Defendant breached its
duty to not retaliate. Plaintiffs’ arguments rely on Civil Code § 1924.5, which
applies to lessees. As Defendant correctly argues, the evidence indicates that
Plaintiff Corey Fields was not a lessee, as the application to become a lessee
was denied. Most significantly, Plaintiff has not provided authority
of what specific duty was owed by Defendant to any Plaintiff under Civil Code §
1924.5. The plain reading of the statue reveals no duty implicated in this
action. While Plaintiffs contend that they are only asking the Court to make a
finding of a duty, it appears to the Court that Plaintiff is really asking the
Court to make issue Declaratory relief that the facts of this case implicate Civil
Code 1924.5.
Motion for Summary Adjudication as
to Issue 1 is DENIED.
2.
Issue 2: Duty to
Plaintiff’s Children
Plaintiffs argue that Defendant FPI
had a duty to the Plaintiff children to process their father’s application to
live with them. Four of the five children were minors when the application was
withdrawn and thus, FPI had a duty to process the application as it knew the
children “would not be able to remain in the unit without their father, and
because it had already qualified and seemingly approved Fields for tenancy in
the unit.” (Motion 7: 8-14; UMF 12-13.)
Defendant argues that the alleged
duty that FPI had is based on the “heightened duty of care landlords owe to
tenants.” (Opp. 5: 1-5.) Additionally, as to the arguments concerning whether
there was fear for Sparks’ safety due to the civil harassment restraining order
(“CHRO”), Defendant contends that the argument about an investigation is
speculative. Moreover, a triable issue of fact remains as to whether
Defendant’s fear for Sparks’ safety was legitimate.
The Court finds that Plaintiff has
failed to meet their burden of establishing that Defendant breached a duty to
the Plaintiff’s children and process their father’s application. Landlords owe
a duty of care to their tenants to “provide and maintain safe condition on
leased premises.” (Martinez v. Bank of
America Nat. Trust & Sav. Ass'n (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 883, 893.) Additionally,
when a landlord has “actual knowledge of a dangerous condition on his
property,” that landlord has a duty of care to “prevent the presence of
dangerous condition on his premises” when he or she has the opportunity and ability
to eliminate that condition.” (Id. at
892.) Other duties of care include taking measures to secure areas against
foreseeable criminal acts of outside parties (Castaneda v. Olsher (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1205, 1213) or preventing
injury from a vicious dog if the dog’s propensity is known to the landlord. (See Yuzon v. Collins (2004) 116
Cal.App.4th 149, 163.) The Plaintiffs have not provided any other duty, besides
the above stated heightened duty of landlords, that pertains to this situation.
Plaintiffs have not cited any authority whereby a defendant landlord has a duty
to process and accept a person’s application. As indicated above for the first
cause of action, landlords do have a duty of care to maintain the premises, but
do not have a duty to the children of non-tenants to process applications. In
the supplemental declaration, Plaintiff cite It appears that Schmidt v. Superior Court (1989) 48
Cal.3d 370 (Schmidt)for the
proposition that Defendants conduct breached the children’s right familial privacy
by preventing the children from living with their parent. Plaintiffs’ reliance on
Schmidt is misplaced. A close reading
of Schmidt reveals that the Court
rejected Plaintiffs’ broad expansion of familial rights. In Schmidt, a mobile home park’s rule prohibiting
children under 25 was challenged. While the net effect of such a rule did
result in children not being able to live with their parents, the Schmidt panel concluded that the
rule did not “purport to compel the separation of parent and child or to
preclude the family from living together in an entire city.” (Id.
at p. 389.) Similarly here, while the net effect of Defendant’s actions may
result in the children not being able to live with their father, the action of
Defendant does not compel such a result or preclude the family from living
together. In sum, Plaintiffs have not satisfied their burden that Defendant
owed the children a duty to process their father’s application.
Motion for Summary Adjudication as
to Issue 2 is DENIED.
CONCLUSION:
For the foregoing reasons, the
Court decides the pending motion as follows:
Motion for
Summary Adjudication is DENIED, as to both issues of duty.
Moving party is to give notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: October
5, 2023 __________________________________ Upinder
S. Kalra
Judge of the Superior Court