Judge: Upinder S. Kalra, Case: 22STCV21962, Date: 2023-01-19 Tentative Ruling
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Case Number: 22STCV21962 Hearing Date: January 19, 2023 Dept: 51
Tentative Ruling
Judge Upinder S.
Kalra, Department 51
HEARING DATE: January
19, 2023
CASE NAME: Johann Jauregui v. Shoreline Group,
LLC, et al.
CASE NO.: 22STCV21962
DEMURRER
WITHOUT MOTION TO STRIKE
MOVING PARTY: Shoreline Group, LLC, and Ata Hassani
RESPONDING PARTY(S): None as of January 17, 2023
REQUESTED RELIEF:
1. An
order sustaining the demurrer as to all eleven causes of action
TENTATIVE RULING:
1. Demurrer
as to the 1st, 10th, and 11th causes of action
is SUSTAINED, without leave to amend.
2. Demurrer
as to the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th,
7th, and 9th causes of action is SUSTAINED, with leave to
amend.
3.
Demurrer as to the 8th cause of
action is OVERRULED.
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:
On July 7, 2022, Plaintiff Johann Jauregui (“Plaintiff”)
filed a complaint against Defendants Shoreline Group, LLC and Ata Hassani
(“Defendants.”) The complaint alleged 11 causes of action, including but not
limited to, breach of contract, breach of the warranty of habitability,
negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and fraud. The
complaint alleges that Plaintiff has been living at the Subject Property since
1994, and in 2021, Defendants became the new owners. During Plaintiff’s time at
the subject property, they unknowingly were paying for utilities for the common
spaces until 2014, but has not been reimbursed, despite the meter being fixed
in 2017. In 2021, Plaintiff’s rent was $1,311, but Plaintiff alleges that
Defendants induced and coerced Plaintiff to signing a new lease for $2,000 a
month. Moreover, Defendants have failed to maintain the property in a habitable
condition.
The current Demurrer was filed on November 9, 2022.
Previously, Defendants filed a Declaration of Demurring Party in Support of
Automatic Extension on September 9, 2022. On January 10, 2023, Defendants filed
a notice of Non-Opposition to the Demurrer. As of January 17, 2023, Plaintiff
has failed to provide any opposition.
LEGAL STANDARD
Demurrer
A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether
the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When
considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in
context. In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the
face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968,
994.) “A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other
extrinsic matters. …. The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether
the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a
cause of action.” (Hahn 147
Cal.App.4th at 747.)
Meet and Confer:
Prior to filing a demurrer, the demurring party is required
to satisfy their meet and confer obligations pursuant to Code of Civ. Proc.
§430.41, and demonstrate that they so satisfied their meet and confer
obligation by submitting a declaration pursuant to Code of Civ. Proc.
§430.41(a)(2) & (3). The Declaration of Jacob
Haghazadeh, attached to the end of the Demurrer, indicates that a good faith
attempt at a meet and confer was completed via telephone with Plaintiff’s
counsel. However, the parties were unable to resolve the issues. (Dec. Haghnazadeh
¶ 3.)
ANALYSIS:
1.
Violation
of Business and Professions Code § 17500
Defendants argue that the first
cause of action fails to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of
action. Specifically, the Complaint does not sufficiently allege that
Defendants induced Plaintiff into signed a lease or that Defendant made
misleading statements. (Demurrer 3: 13-17.) Additionally, this statute involves
False Advertising, which Defendants argue is inapplicable as Defendants were
not advertising the property to Plaintiff since Plaintiff was already living at
the Subject Property before Defendants became the owner. (Id. at 18-20.)
Business and Professions Code § 17500 states:
It
is unlawful for any person, firm, corporation or association, or any employee
thereof with intent directly or indirectly to dispose of real or personal
property or to perform services, professional or otherwise, or anything of any
nature whatsoever or to induce the public to enter into any obligation relating
thereto, to make or disseminate or cause to be made or disseminated before the
public in this state, or to make or disseminate or cause to be made or
disseminated from this state before the public in any state, in any newspaper
or other publication, or any advertising device, or by public outcry or
proclamation, or in any other manner or means whatever, including over the
Internet, any statement, concerning that real or personal property or those services,
professional or otherwise, or concerning any circumstance or matter of fact
connected with the proposed performance or disposition thereof, which is untrue
or misleading, and which is known, or which by the exercise of reasonable care
should be known, to be untrue or misleading, or for any person, firm, or
corporation to so make or disseminate or cause to be so made or disseminated
any such statement as part of a plan or scheme with the intent not to sell that
personal property or those services, professional or otherwise, so advertised
at the price stated therein, or as so advertised.
After a review of the complaint, the Court finds that the
complaint fails to state a cause of action for Business and Professions Code §
17500. First, the allegations in the complaint about making misleading
statements are conclusory and do not provide any facts as to what those
statements were. Moreover, as Defendants correctly argue, this statute concerns
False Advertising. The facts as alleged in the complaint do not indicate that
Defendants were advertising to Plaintiff, especially given the fact that
Plaintiff has leased the subject property since 1994 (Complaint ¶ 10) and
Defendants did not become the owner until September 2021. (Id.)
Demurrer
as to the First Cause of Action is SUSTAINED, without leave to amend.
2.
Violation
of Business and Professions Code § 17200
Defendants
argue that this cause of action fails to state facts to constitute a cause of
action. Specifically, defendants argue that the complaint does not contain
factual allegations to support “the legal conclusions that Defendants engaged
in acts that constituted unlawful, unfair, and/or fraudulent business practices
that would violate FEHA” and the current statute. (Demurrer 4: 18-24.)
California
Business and Professions Code section 17200 prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or
fraudulent business act or practice.” (Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200; see Clark v. Superior Court (2010) 50
Cal.4th 605, 610.) “An unlawful business practice or act is an act or
practice, committed pursuant to business activity, that is at the same time
forbidden by law.” (Klein v. Earth
Elements, Inc. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 965, 969.) A violation of other laws
is deemed independently actionable under the UCL. (See Law Offices of Mathew Higbee v. Expungement Assistance Services (2013)
214 Cal.App.4th 544, 554.) “‘Virtually any law—federal, state or local—can
serve as a predicate for a section 17200 action.’” (Id. (quoting Troyk v. Farmers
Group, Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1305, 1335).)
“A plaintiff alleging
unfair business practices under these statutes must state with reasonable
particularity the facts supporting the statutory elements of the violation.” (Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993)
14 Cal.App.4th 612, 619).
Here, the Court finds
that the Complaint fails to provide sufficient factual allegations to support a
cause of action for a § 17200 violation. As stated in Khoury, there must be reasonable particularity as to the facts
supporting the elements of this violation. However, the complaint contains
conclusory allegations that Defendants harassed Plaintiffs and denied
reasonable requests. The complaint does not provide any further details about
the specific discrimination and harassment that would trigger this cause of
action.
Demurrer as to the Second Cause of Action is SUSTAINED, with
leave to amend.
3. Breach of Implied Covenant of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing
Defendant
argues that this cause of action fails for two reasons. First, it is superfluous
as it is duplicative of the breach of contract cause of action. Second, this
cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations. Under CCP § 337, an
action arising out of contract must be brought within four years. The original
contract was entered in 1994. Moreover, the cause of action does not allege
that Defendants caused injury to Plaintiff as Defendants became owners in 2021.
“The
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, implied by law in every contract,
exists merely to prevent one contracting party from unfairly frustrating the
other party's right to receive the benefits of the agreement actually made.” (Guz v. Bechtel Nat. Inc. (2000) 24
Cal.4th 317, 349.)
After a review of the Complaint, the Court finds that the
cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing is insufficient. First, the basis for the alleged breach is the 1994
lease agreement, with entities that are not the current Defendants.
Specifically, in paragraph 35, Plaintiff argues that Defendants breached their
duty by failing to reimburse Plaintiff from electricity paid from 1994 to 2021.
Again, Defendants did not own this building, as the Complaint states earlier,
until 2021. Thus, there was no breach by Defendants as to the contract from
1994 with other individuals. Moreover, the statute of limitations has run as
the contract was entered in 1994.
Demurrer as to the Third Cause of Action is SUSTAINED,
with leave to amend.
4.
Promissory
Estoppel
Defendants argue that this cause
of action fails to allege sufficient facts. Specifically, while the Complaint
states that Defendants coerced Plaintiff into signing a new lease agreement for
$2,000, the complaint does not show that “Defendant made a clear and
unambiguous promise to Plaintiff with regard to any rent related matter.”
(Demurrer 7: 20-25.) Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to allege injury because
the CA Covid-19 Rent Relief Program covered the different in rent
“The elements of a promissory
estoppel claim are ‘(1) a promise clear and unambiguous in its terms; (2)
reliance by the party to whom the promise is made; (3) [the] reliance must be
both reasonable and foreseeable; and (4) the party asserting the estoppel must
be injured by his reliance.’” (Jones v.
Wachovia Bank (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 935, 945).
After a review of the complaint,
the Court finds that Plaintiff failed to sufficiently allege facts for this
cause of action.“[A] promise is an indispensable element of the doctrine of
promissory estoppel. The cases are uniform in holding that this doctrine cannot
be invoked and must be held inapplicable in the absence of a showing that a
promise had been made upon which the complaining party relied to his
prejudice.” (Garcia v. World Savings, FSB
(2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1044.) Moreover, “to be enforceable, a promise
need only be “ ‘definite enough that a court can determine the scope of the
duty[,] and the limits of performance must be sufficiently defined to provide a
rational basis for the assessment of damages.” (Id. at 1045.) Here, while the complaint alleges a promise (to not
raise rent) and reliance on that promise, Plaintiff has failed to plead injury.
The complaint states that Plaintiff has agreed to a monthly rent increase and
then states that “in order to avoid inequity that will result if Defendants are
allowed to raise the rent to $2,000.” Therefore, the facts as alleged do not
indicate that Plaintiff has been injured, only a potential to be injured by a
raise in rent.
Demurrer as to the Fourth Cause
of Action is SUSTAINED, with leave to amend.
5.
Fraud
Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to plead with the
required specificity for fraud causes of action. The complaint does not state
specific claims or statements that were made by Defendant to “induce” Plaintiff
into signing a new lease.
“The elements of fraud, which give rise to the tort action
for deceit, are (a) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or
nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity (or 'scienter'); (c) intent to
defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting
damage.” (Lazar
v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th
631, 638.)
“In California, fraud must be pled specifically; general and
conclusory allegations do not suffice…this particularity requirements
necessitates pleading facts which
show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were
tenders.” (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996)
12 Cal.4th 631, 645.)“[W]hen averments of fraud are made, the circumstances
constituting the alleged fraud must be specific enough to give defendants
notice of the particular misconduct so that they can defend against the charge
and not just deny that they have done anything wrong.” (Vess v. Ciba–Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir.2003)
(internal quotations and citations omitted).
After a review of the Complaint, Plaintiff has failed to
allege facts that constitute fraud. AS stated above, fraud requires
specificity, the “who, what, where, when” of the alleged statements. Nowhere in
the complaint does it state when these alleged statements occurred, where they
occurred, or by what means, other than stating they “coerced and induced.” This
is insufficient for a claim for fraud.
Demurrer as to the Fifth Cause
of Action is SUSTAINED, with leave to amend.
6.
Breach
of Contract
Defendant argues that this cause of action
fails for two reasons. First, no exhibits were attached, yet this cause of
action is based on a written agreement. The complaint does not contain the
terms of the agreement or at least a copy of the agreement. Second, Defendant
argues that the complaint does not allege the essential terms of the contract.
Moreover, the complaint alleges failure to change the carpet or paint the walls
since 1994, but also acknowledges that Defendant purchased the property in
2021.
“To establish a cause of action for breach
of contract, the plaintiff must plead and prove (1) the existence of the
contract, (2) the plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) the
defendant’s breach, and (4) resulting damages to the plaintiff.
[Citation.]” (Maxwell v. Dolezal
(2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 93, 97-98.)
After a review of the complaint, Plaintiff
has failed to allege sufficient facts that constitute a breach of contract. The
complaint merely alleges that Defendant promised to honor the lease agreement.
However, it does indicate if the contract was oral or written, and fails to
provide other terms of the agreement. Moreover, the alleged breach of the
agreement in Complaint paragraph 50, the failure to maintain the property, is
also unsupported by facts. The Complaint contains conclusory allegations,
without facts.
Demurrer
as to the Sixth Cause of Action is SUSTAINED, with leave to amend.
7.
Breach
of the Warranty of Habitability
Defendant argues that
this cause of action fails because the alleged unhabitable conditions were
present prior to Defendants acquiring the property.
The elements of a cause
of action for breach of the implied warranty of habitability “are the existence
of a material defective condition affecting the premises' habitability, notice
to the landlord of the condition within a reasonable time after the tenant's
discovery of the condition, the landlord was given a reasonable time to correct
the deficiency, and resulting damages.” (Peviani
v. Arbors at California Oaks Property Owner, LLC (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 874,
891 review denied (July 14, 2021)).
After a
review of the complaint, the Court finds that the Complaint does not
sufficiently allege a cause of action for breach of the warranty of
habitability. Specifically, Plaintiff has not pleaded with sufficient facts the
second element. The Complaint does not allege when Plaintiff was aware of these
conditions and provided notice to the landlord. In the complaint, one of the
allegations that does contain a date is 1994, where Plaintiff alleges that the
carpets and paint have not been changed since Plaintiff moved in. However,
Defendants did not own this property until September 2021, and the complaint
fails to provide any facts indicating that they informed Defendants in a timely
manner after the discovery of the condition.
Demurrer
as to the Seventh Cause of Action is SUSTAINED, with leave to amend.
8.
Negligence
Defendants argue that
the complaint fails to establish breach of duty. The complaint states that
Defendant purchased the property but fails to state facts that Defendants
breached the legal duties, such as maintaining the Subject Property.
“The elements of a
cause of action for negligence are duty, breach, causation, and damages.” (Johnson v. Prasad (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th
74, 78).
After a review of the
Complaint, the Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged negligence. The
complaint states that Defendants, as landlords, had a duty to maintain the
property in habitable manner. (Comp. ¶ 60-61.) This duty was breached when
Defendants did not repair and maintain the property. (Comp. ¶ 62-63.) As a
result of this conduct, Plaintiff has suffered damages. (Comp. ¶ 64.)
Demurrer as to the
Eighth Cause of Action is OVERRULED.
9.
Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress
Defendants argue that the
complaint fails to plead facts that would support a cause of action for
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. Specifically, the Complaint
contains conclusory allegations, but does not state facts about the alleged
habitability problems.
Intentional infliction of emotional
distress requires the Plaintiff to show “(1) outrageous conduct by the
defendant; (2) the defendant's intention of causing or reckless disregard of
the probability of causing emotional distress; (3) the plaintiff's suffering
severe or extreme emotional distress; and (4) actual and proximate causation of
the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct. Conduct, to be ‘
“outrageous” ’ must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually
tolerated in a civilized society.” ’ [Citation.] In order to avoid a demurrer,
the plaintiff must allege with ‘great[ ] specificity’ the acts which he or she
believes are so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a
civilized community.” (Yau v. Santa
Margarita Ford, Inc. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 144, 160).
Generally, conduct will be found
to be actionable where the recitation of the facts to an average member of the
community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to
exclaim, “Outrageous!” (Ess v. Eskaton
Properties, Inc. (2002) 97 Cal. App. 4th 120, 130.)
Although emotional distress may
consist of any highly unpleasant mental reaction such as fright, grief, shame,
humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment or worry [citation],
to make out a claim, the plaintiff must prove that emotional distress was
severe and not trivial or transient.” (Wong
v. Tai Jing (2010) 189 Cal. App. 4th 1354, 1376.) Such distress must be “of such substantial
quality or enduring quality that no reasonable person in civilized society
should be expected to endure it.” (Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.
(1993) 6 Cal. 4th 965, 1004.)
The Court finds that while the
conduct may have been outrageous, in the sense that a reasonable person would
not tolerate such living conditions, there are insufficient allegations of
emotional distress. The allegations are conclusory, merely stating that
Plaintiff suffered and continues to suffer from “humiliation, embarrassment,
shock, sever mental and emotional distress, anguish, and indignity.” Allegations
that a defendant’s conduct caused a plaintiff to suffer a heart attack, was
sufficient for an IIED cause of action. (Kiseskey
v. Carpenters' Trust for So. California (1983) 144 Cal. App. 3d 222.)
Similarly, allegations that a plaintiff suffered depression, anxiety, and physical
illness, including vomiting, stomach cramps, and diarrhea, were adequate for an
IIED claim. (Hailey v. California
Physicians' Service (2007) 158 Cal. App. 4th 452, as modified on denial of
reh'g (Jan. 22, 2008).) In contrast,
allegations that a plaintiff lost sleep, had symptoms of anxiety, and suffered
from nervousness, but sought no medical treatment, are not adequate to state a
claim for IIED. (Girard v. Ball (1981) 125 Cal. App. 3d 772.) Here, the symptoms
described are not severe enough for an IIED cause of action.
Demurrer as to the Ninth Cause
of Action is SUSTAINED, with leave to amend.
10. Temporary Restraining Order,
Preliminary Injunction
Defendant argues that the cause of
action for temporary restraining order, preliminary and permanent injunction
fails to state sufficient facts. Plaintiff is unable to demonstrate that there
is not adequate remedy at law, because the Court will be able to compensate
Plaintiff for the rent price if deemed sufficient. Additionally, Plaintiff
cannot demonstrate irreparable harm.
For a temporary restraining order,
“the moving party must show all of the following: (1) irreparable injury to the
moving party without the TRO; (2) no harm to the public interest; (3) no
substantial harm to other interested parties; and (4) a likelihood of
prevailing on the merits.” (Sarale v.
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 225, 243.)
“A trial court may grant a
preliminary injunction upon a showing that (1) the party seeking the injunction
is likely to prevail on the merits at trial, and (2) the “interim harm” to that
party if an injunction is denied is greater than “the [interim] harm the
[opposing party] is likely to suffer if the ... injunction is issued.” (Integrated Dynamic Solutions, Inc. v.
VitaVet Labs, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1178, 1183.)
After a
review of the complaint, the Court finds that the Plaintiff has failed to
sufficiently allege that they will prevail on the merits. The complaint states
that based on the testimony and documents at the time of a hearing regarding
Defendants’ untrue statements, Plaintiff will success on the merits. However,
as stated above, there are insufficient facts to establish that there was a
misrepresentation or a new lease contract. Moreover, the Court questions why
the lease agreement was not attached to the Complaint, as it is the basis for
the entire complaint.
Demurrer
as to the Tenth Cause of Action is SUSTAINED, without leave to amend.
11. Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
Defendant argues that this cause
of action fails because it relies upon facts contained within the others.
For a declaratory judgment, a
party must demonstrate that the action is “(1) a proper subject of declaratory
relief, and (2) an actual controversy involving justiciable questions relating
to [that party’s] rights or obligations.” (Wilson
& Wilson v. City Council of Redwood City (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1559,
1581). “Declaratory relief operates prospectively to declare future rights,
rather than to redress past wrongs.” (County
of San Diego v. State of California (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 580, 607).
Here, the
Court finds that declaratory relief is insufficient as this complaint seeks to
resolve the issue of signing the alleged Lease Agreement, with an increase to
$2,000. Therefore, Plaintiff is seeking to redress past wrongs.
Demurrer
as to the Tenth Cause of Action is SUSTAINED, without leave to amend.
Leave to Amend:
Leave to amend should be liberally
granted if there is a reasonable possibility an amendment could cure the
defect. (County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 1018,1035.)
The Plaintiff has the
burden of demonstrating that leave to amend should be granted, and that the
defects can be cured by amendment. (“Plaintiff must show in what manner he can
amend his complaint and how that amendment will change the legal effect of his
pleading.” Goodman v. Kennedy (1976)
18 Cal.3d 335, 349). The Court finds that certain causes of action,
specifically the 2nd, 5th, 6th, 7th,
and 9th causes of action may be amended to plead sufficient facts.
The remaining causes of action that were sustained, the 1st, 3rd,
4th, 10th, and 11th causes of action, are
unlikely to be amended to plead factual allegations sufficient for the causes
of action. Leave to Amend is GRANTED, as to the 2nd,
5th, 6th, 7th, and 9th causes of
action, and DENIED, as to the 1st, 3rd, 4th,
10th, and 11th causes of action.
CONCLUSION:
For the foregoing reasons, the
Court decides the pending motion as follows:
1. Demurrer
as to the 1st, 10th, and 11th causes of action
is SUSTAINED, without leave to amend.
2. Demurrer
as to the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th,
7th, and 9th causes of action is SUSTAINED, with leave to
amend within 20 days notice of this order
3. Demurrer
as to the 8th cause of action is OVERRULED
Moving party is to give notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: January
19, 2023 __________________________________ Upinder
S. Kalra
Judge
of the Superior Court