Judge: Upinder S. Kalra, Case: 22STCV32532, Date: 2023-02-27 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV32532    Hearing Date: February 27, 2023    Dept: 51

Tentative Ruling

 

Judge Upinder S. Kalra, Department 51

 

HEARING DATE:   February 27, 2023                                          

 

CASE NAME:           Lewis Cohen, et al. v. Starr Indemnity & Liability Company

 

CASE NO.:                22STCV32532

 

MOTION TO STRIKE

 

MOVING PARTY: Defendant Starr Indemnity & Liability Company

 

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiffs Lewis Cohen and Alejandra Cohen

 

REQUESTED RELIEF:

 

1.      An order striking portions of the Complaint that pertain to punitive damages.

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

1.      Motion to Strike is GRANTED, as to the portions of the Complaint that pertain to punitive damages.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

On October 4, 2022, Plaintiffs Lewis Cohen and Alejandra Cohen (“Plaintiffs”) filed a complaint against Defendant Starr Indemnity & Liability Company (“Defendant.”) The complaint alleged two causes of action: (1) Breach of the Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing and (2) Breach of Contract. Plaintiffs allege that when the purchased tickets for a cruise to Antarctica, they purchased the APRIL Travel Protection – Pandemic Plus Plan. During the cruise, Plaintiffs were mandated to quarantine due to a positive Covid-19 test. Plaintiffs then submitted a Trip Interruption Claim with APRIL Travel Protection. That claim was denied by Defendant Starr Indemnity & Liability Company. 

 

On November 23, 2022, Defendant filed the current Motion to Strike. Plaintiffs’ Opposition was filed on Feburary 10, 2023. Defendant’s Reply was filed on February 17, 2023.

 

 

LEGAL STANDARD

 

Motion to Strike

 

The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436(a).) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Id., § 436(b).) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Id. § 437.) “When the defect which justifies striking a complaint is capable of cure, the court should allow leave to amend.” (Vaccaro v. Kaiman (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 761, 768.)

 

Meet and Confer:

 

Prior to filing a motion to strike, the moving party is required to satisfy their meet and confer obligations pursuant to Code of Civ. Proc. §435.5, and demonstrate that they so satisfied their meet and confer obligation by submitting a declaration pursuant to Code of Civ. Proc. §435.5(a)(2).  The Declaration of Joshua D. Mountain indicates that the parties emailed about punitive damages on November 10, 2022. Thereafter, on November 15, 2022, the parties met and conferred telephonically. The parties were unable to reach a conclusion. (Dec. Mountain ¶ 5-6.)

 

ANALYSIS:

 

Defendant moves to strike various portions of the complaint. Specifically, Defendant moves to strike requests for exemplary or punitive damages. The portions include:

 

·         Page 8, paragraph 6, lines 7-14

·         Page 8, paragraph 7, lines 15-20

·         Page 9, Prayer for Relief, paragraph 3, lines 24-25

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ claims fail to support punitive damages. The facts as alleged in Plaintiffs’’ complaint do not support the heightened standard for punitive damages and do not plead any conduct that would be oppressive, malicious, or fraudulent. Additionally, the allegations are conclusory and do not support punitive damages because under Civil Code § 3294, the allegations, including the pleading stage, must be allege specific facts. Here, Defendant argues that the claims for punitive damages are based on “conclusory statements unsupported by the remaining allegations in the complaint,” stating that Defendant’s conduct was “highly reprehensible.” (Motion 8: 12-15.) Lastly, a prayer for punitive damages applies in exceptional circumstances and Plaintiffs’ complaint does not allege specific facts, only boilerplate conclusions.

 

            Plaintiffs argue that the facts as alleged in the complaint are sufficient to support a claim for punitive damages. The complaint alleges that Defendant’s conduct was dishonest and despicable and deprived Plaintiffs of the benefit of the insurance coverage that they purchased. Plaintiffs argue that read as a whole, the complaint alleges that Defendant engaged in wrongful conduct – “depriving Plaintiffs of the benefits due to them under the Policy” and therefore support a claim for punitive damages. (Opp. 8: 12-16.)

 

To obtain punitive damages, a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts in support of punitive damages.  (See Hilliard v. A.H. Robins Co. (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 374, 391-92.)  In addition, punitive damages are allowed only where “it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.”  (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).)  Courts have viewed despicable conduct as conduct “so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people. (Scott v. Phoenix Schools, Inc., (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 702, 715.) Further, Civil Code § 3294(c) provides the definition of malice, oppression, and fraud. Malice is “conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” Oppression is “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.” Fraud is “an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.”

 

After a review of the complaint, the Court finds that the allegations do not allege specific facts supporting punitive damages, but rather state conclusions. Moreover, the allegations in the Complaint are based on the denial of coverage under an insurance policy. This is not the type of conduct that would be viewed in the abstract as malicious, fraudulent, or oppressive. Stated otherwise, even if a reasonable person viewed the denial of an insurance policy as very wrong, these facts do not rise to the type of conduct that would “so vile, base contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome.” (Scott, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p.715.)

 

Therefore, the Motion to Strike is GRANTED, as to the portions of the Complaint that relate to punitive damages.

 

 

CONCLUSION:

 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court decides the pending motion as follows:

 

            Motion to Strike is GRANTED.

 

Moving party is to give notice.

 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

Dated:             February 27, 2023                   __________________________________                                                                                                                Upinder S. Kalra

                                                                                    Judge of the Superior Court