Judge: Upinder S. Kalra, Case: 22STCV34213, Date: 2025-06-03 Tentative Ruling
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Case Number: 22STCV34213 Hearing Date: June 3, 2025 Dept: 51
TENTATIVE Ruling
Judge Upinder S.
Kalra, Department 51
HEARING DATE: June
3, 2025
CASE NAME: Jem
Community Center, et al. v. Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company, et al.
CASE NO.: 22STCV34213
MOTION
FOR TERMINATING SANCTION FOR PLAINTIFF’S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH JUNE 3, 2024
DISCOVERY ORDER
MOVING PARTY: Defendant
Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company
RESPONDING PARTY(S): None
REQUESTED RELIEF:
1. An
Order for a terminating sanction striking the Complaint and entering judgment
of dismissal in favor of Defendant for failing to comply with the court’s June
3, 2024 discovery order.
TENTATIVE RULING:
1. Motion
for Terminating Sanctions is GRANTED;
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:
Plaintiffs Jem Community Center and BSD Properties, LLC
(Plaintiffs) filed a complaint on October 24, 2022. Defendants Philadelphia
Insurance Indemnity Insurance Company and Tokio Marine Specialty Insurance
Company (Defendants) filed a Demurrer and Motion to Strike that the court
sustained with leave to amend on May 22, 2023 (motion to strike mooted).
Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC) on June 13, 2013 with two causes
of action for: (1) Breach of Contract; and (2) Breach of Obligation of Good
Faith.
The complaint alleges that Plaintiff and Defendants had an
insurance policy whereby Defendants would indemnify Plaintiff for fire damages.
In October 2020, Plaintiffs’ structure suffered damage from a fire. However, in
August 2022, Defendants refused to reimburse Plaintiffs for the damage.
Defendant Tokio Marine Specialty Insurance Company (Moving Defendant)
timely filed a Demurrer on July 28, 2023 which the court SUSTAINED without
leave to amend.[1]
On March 18, 2024, Defendant Philadelphia Indemnity
Insurance Company (Philadelphia) filed various motions to compel discovery from
Plaintiffs which the court GRANTED in part.
On August 27, 2024, Philadelphia filed a motion for an OSC
re: Contempt (CCP 1209) against Plaintiffs and their counsel which the court
DENIED.
On February 27, 2025, Philadelphia filed the instant motion
for terminating sanctions for Plaintiffs’ failure to comply with June 3, 2024
discovery order. Oppositions were due on or before May 20, 2025.
On June 2, 2025, Plaintiff filed an opposition.
LEGAL STANDARD:
Where a party willfully disobeys a discovery order, courts
have discretion to impose terminating, issue, evidence, or monetary sanctions.¿
(Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2023.010(d), (g), 2023.030; R.S. Creative, Inc. v.
Creative Cotton, Ltd. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 486, 495.)¿
¿
Code of Civil Procedure § 2030.040 requires that “[a]
request for a sanction shall, in the notice of motion, identify every person,
party, and attorney against whom the sanction is sought, and specify the type
of sanction sought.”¿ Furthermore, the notice of motion shall be supported by a
memorandum of points and authorities and accompanied by a declaration setting
forth facts supporting the amount of any monetary sanction sought.¿ (Code of
Civ. Proc. § 2030.040.)¿
¿
Monetary sanctions may be imposed “ordering that one
engaging in the misuse of the discovery process, or any attorney advising that
conduct, or both pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees,
incurred by anyone as a result of that conduct…unless [the Court] finds that
the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that
other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.”¿ (Code of Civ.
Proc. § 2030.030(a).)¿
¿
Issue sanctions may be imposed “ordering that designated
facts shall be taken as established in the action in accordance with the claim
of the party adversely affected by the misuse of the discovery process. The
court may also impose an issue sanction by an order prohibiting any party
engaging in the misuse of the discovery process from supporting or opposing
designated claims or defenses.”¿ (Code of Civ. Proc. § 2030.030(b).)¿
¿
Evidence sanctions may be imposed “by an order prohibiting
any party engaging in the misuse of the discovery process from introducing
designated matters in evidence.”¿ (Code of Civ. Proc. § 2030.030(c).)¿
¿
In more extreme cases, the Court may also impose terminating
sanctions by “striking out the pleadings or parts of the pleadings,” “staying
further proceedings,” “dismissing the action, or any part of the action,” or
“rending a judgment by default” against the party misusing the discovery
process.¿ (Code of Civ. Proc. § 2030.030(d).)¿ The court should look to the
totality of the circumstances in determining whether terminating sanctions are
appropriate.¿ (Lang v. Hochman (2000)
77¿Cal.App.4th 1225, 1246.)¿ Ultimate discovery sanctions are justified where
there is a willful discovery order violation, a history of abuse, and evidence
showing that less severe sanctions would not produce compliance with discovery
rules.¿ (Van Sickle v. Gilbert (2011)
196¿Cal.App.4th 1495, 1516.)¿ “[A] penalty as severe as dismissal or default is
not authorized where noncompliance with discovery is caused by an inability to
comply rather than willfulness or bad faith.”¿ (Brown v. Sup. Ct. (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 701, 707.)¿ “Although in
extreme cases a court has the authority to order a terminating sanction as a
first measure [citations], a terminating sanction should generally not be
imposed until the court has attempted less severe alternatives and found them
to be unsuccessful and/or the record clearly shows lesser sanctions would be
ineffective.”¿ (Lopez v. Watchtower Bible
and Tract Society of New York, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 566,
604-605.)¿
ANALYSIS:
Philadelphia contends that terminating sanctions are
warranted because Plaintiffs are not complying with the court’s June 3, 2024
discovery order in good faith, still owe responses to the requests for
production of documents, and have otherwise misused the discovery process such
that it prejudices Philadelphia’s ability to prepare this case for trial, let
alone resolution. Plaintiffs did not file an opposition.
The court agrees with Philadelphia that some sanctions are
warranted. First, there is a discovery order, the June 3, 2024 Order, that
ordered Plaintiffs to produce verified responses without objections within 21
days. (Greer Decl. ¶¶ 12, 13.) Second, Plaintiffs had notice of this order.[2]
(Greer Decl. ¶ 15.) Third, Plaintiffs did not comply with at least one
component of this order – Plaintiffs have not paid the previously issued
sanctions, have not provided verifications, and have not provided written
responses to the requests for production. (Greer Decl. ¶¶ 18, 19, 20, 22.) Fourth,
Plaintiffs repeatedly fail to participate in this litigation. (See, e.g.,
January 7, 2025 Minute Order on Hearing on Motion for an OSC re: Contempt
[Plaintiffs failed to appear].) Indeed, Plaintiffs’ counsel has demonstrated to
this court that monetary sanctions do not deter him. (Greer Decl., Exhibit H [“I’m
continuing to work on the remaining items today but I’m leaving town on Friday
for a week.”], Exhibit I [“Your ire is justified but let’s sort out the
threads. I left for New York for ten days (wedding) first thing on June 28. At
that time I had a trial set for July 29 and another one for August 12. . . .”];
See also, Opposition to Motion for OSC re Contempt, Sales Decl. ¶ 8 [nonpayment
of monetary sanctions ordered] and ¶ 10 [“I have not yet responded to
Defendant’s second round of discovery served in September 2024 because, at that
time, I had three trials set back to back and for which all the final filings
with the court for the trials had to be done. Although one trial settled and
the other two got continued, filing everything with the court caused me to get
backed up even to this day.”]) However, the purpose of terminating sanctions
are not to punish the non-complying parties. “The trial court cannot impose sanctions for misuse of the discovery
process as a punishment.” (Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009)
174 Cal. App. 4th 967, 992.) Rather, any given sanction must be “tailor[ed] to
the harm caused by the withheld discovery.”
(Do It Urself Moving &
Storage, Inc. v. Brown, Leifer, Slatkin & Berns (1992) 7 Cal. App. 4th
27, 36 (superseded by statute on other grounds).) This is because “the purpose
of discovery sanctions is not to provide a weapon for punishment, forfeiture
and the avoidance of a trial on the merits, but to prevent abuse of the
discovery process and correct the problem presented.” (Parker
v. Wolters Kluwer U.S., Inc. (2007) 149 Cal. App. 4th 285, 301.)
Accordingly, the court cannot to impose
issue, evidentiary or terminating sanctions until the impact of the discovery
violations can be evaluated.
Accordingly, the court GRANTS Philadelphia’s motion but
defers ruling on an appropriate sanction until the court receives additional
evidence on the prejudice.
CONCLUSION:
For
the foregoing reasons, the Court decides the pending motion as follows:
1.
Motion for Terminating Sanctions is
GRANTED;
Moving party is to give notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: June
3, 2025 __________________________________ Upinder
S. Kalra
Judge
of the Superior Court
[1]
The parties agreed to extend Moving Defendant’s responsive pleading deadline
until July 28, 2023. (Greer Decl. ¶ 3.) Defendant Philadelphia Indemnity
Insurance Company filed an Answer on July 28, 2023.