Judge Upinder S. Kalra, Case Number: 22STCV37790, Date: 2025-04-10 Tentative Ruling

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1. An Order awarding Plaintiffs $82,780.00 in attorneys’ fees and $11,614.61 in costs and expenses.

On December 2, 2022, Plaintiffs Bonnie Van Holt and Mark Van Holt (Plaintiffs) filed a Complaint against Defendant FCA US, LLC (Defendant) with three causes of action for: (1) Breach of Express Warranty, (2) Failure to Complete Repairs within 30 Days, Civil Code § 1793.2(b), and (3) Failure to Promptly Repurchase Product, Civil Code § 1793.2(d).

According to the Complaint, Plaintiffs purchased a new 2016 Jeep Grand Cherokee (the Vehicle) from Defendant. Plaintiffs experienced problems with the Vehicle that could not be repaired despite numerous repair appointments. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant refused to repair pursuant to the warranty and other breaches.

On July 16, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce settlement agreement which the court DENIED.

On November 25, 2024, Plaintiffs filed the instant motion for attorney’s fees and costs. On February 21, 2025, Defendant filed an opposition. On February 27, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a reply.

On March 6, 2025, the court heard oral arguments and continued the hearing to April 10, 2025. The court further ordered the parties to file a joint status report concerning meet and confer efforts on these fees and costs by March 21, 2025.

A prevailing buyer in an action under Song-Beverly “shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the Court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Civ. Code, § 1794(d).) By permitting buyers who prevail under Song-Beverly to recover their attorneys’ fees, “our Legislature has provided injured consumers strong encouragement to seek legal redress in a situation in which a lawsuit might not otherwise have been economically feasible.” (Murillo v. Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 985, 994.)

The prevailing party has the burden of showing that the requested attorney fees are reasonable. (Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 817.) The party seeking attorney fees “is not necessarily entitled to the compensation of the value of attorney services according to [his or her] own notion or to the full extent claimed . . . .” (Levy v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 807, 816.) If the “time expended or the monetary charge being made for the time expended are not reasonable under all circumstances, then the court must take this into account and award fees in a lesser amount.” (Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 104.) “ ‘A trial court may not rubber stamp a request for attorney fees, but must determine the number of hours reasonably expended.’ ” (Morris v. Hyundai Motor America (2019) 41 Cal.App.5^th 24, 38 (Morris).)

A calculation of attorneys’ fees for a Song-Beverly action begins with the “lodestar” approach, under which the Court fixes the lodestar at “the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (Margolin v. Regional Planning Com. (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 999, 1004-1005.) “California courts have consistently held that a computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys’ fee award.” (Ibid.)

“It is appropriate for a trial court to reduce a fee award based on its reasonable determination that a routine, non-complex case was overstaffed to a degree that significant inefficiencies and inflated fees resulted.” (Morris v. Hyundai Motor America (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 39.) It is also appropriate to reduce a fee award based on “inefficient or duplicative efforts” in the billing record. (Id. at p. 38.) However, the analysis must be “reasonably specific” and cannot rely on general notions about the fairness of the fee award. (Kerkeles v. City of San Jose (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 88, 102.) Moreover, in conducting the analysis, courts are not permitted to tie any reductions in the fee award to some proportion of the buyer’s damages recovery. (Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 24, 39.)

The lodestar figure may also be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided. (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49; PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1095.) The factors considered in determining the modification of the lodestar include the nature and difficulty of the litigation, the amount of money involved, the skill required and employed to handle the case, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case. (EnPalm, LLC v. Teitler Family Trust (2008) 162 Cal. App. 4th 770, 774 (emphasis in original).) A negative modifier was appropriate when duplicative work had been performed. (Thayer v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 819.)

Plaintiffs move for attorneys’ fees totaling $94,394.61 consisting of $82,780.00 (including anticipated time pertaining to this motion) in fees and $11,614.61 in costs.

Defendant submitted a CCP § 998 offer to Plaintiff for $99,000.00. (Compendium of Exhibits (COE), Exhibit 2.) Under the SBA, Plaintiffs are the prevailing party, and thus, fees and costs are mandatory.

Plaintiffs contend the lodestar fees are reasonable. Defendant argues the court should reduce both the hourly rate for the attorneys and staff on this matter as well as significantly reduce the total hours billed due to excessive time.

The lodestar method looks at the time spent on a matter multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. (Serrano, supra 20 Cal.3d at 49). The two-step process begins with the lodestar method, which is the time spent on the matter multiple by the hourly rate. After the lodestar method, the second step is determining whether a multiplier should be applied. The factors that Courts look at to determine if a multiplier is reasonable are: 1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132).

Plaintiffs contend the hourly rates are reasonable. These rates range from $155-$195 for paralegal/clerical staff and $350-$695 for attorneys. They contend that these rates are appropriate based on the qualifications of the attorneys and have been previously approved by the Superior Court, District Court, and other courts throughout California.

Defendants argue the hourly rates are unreasonable and should be reduced to $250-$350 per hour for the attorneys and $150 per hour for paralegal/clerical staff.[1]

“In determining hourly rates, the court must look to the “prevailing market rates in the relevant community.” (Bell v. Clackamas County (9th Cir.2003) 341 F.3d 858, 868.) The rates of comparable attorneys in the forum district are usually used. (See Gates v. Deukmejian (9th Cir.1992) 987 F.2d 1392, 1405.) In making its calculation, the court should also consider the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees.” (Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1009.)

Here, Plaintiffs’ counsel’s rates are reasonable. Plaintiffs provided multiple attorney declarations stating the experience of each of the attorneys and staff, their schooling background, year admitted into the bar, as well as previous rates that have been approved by other courts. (Rodriguez Decl. ¶¶ 2-5 (paralegal); Cook Decl. ¶¶ 3-8 (attorney); Babbit Decl. ¶¶ 2-8 (attorney); Barry Decl. ¶¶ 8-18 (attorneys and paralegal).)

However, billing at a high rate comes with the expectation that the attorney also works in an efficient manner that reflects the premium paid for his or her services. The court considers this fact in addressing the reasonableness of the hours expended, below.

Plaintiffs contend that 204.1 hours is reasonable. (Barry Decl. ¶ 7.) Defendant argues that Plaintiffs billed duplicative and unreasonably excessive hours on a straightforward Lemon Law case. Defendant draws the court’s attention to 16 items and/or item groups in the fee bill totaling 56.8 hours.

Although a verified fee bill is “prima facie evidence the costs, expenses and services listed were necessarily incurred,” (Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 682), ultimately, Plaintiff still has the burden to demonstrate the reasonableness of charges.

The trial court may reduce a fee award to a car buyer who prevailed on Song-Beverley Act claims if it finds that it was unreasonable to have numerous lawyers on a matter that did not present unique or complex issues, did not involve discovery motions, did not go to trial, and the attorneys' hourly rates were unreasonably high. (Morris, supra, at p. 37.) Here, the Court has reviewed the detailed fee bill with an eye for excessive, duplicative or unreasonable charges as contended by Defendant. Generally, the items identified by Defendant are reasonable.[2] . Other than some excessive charges for charges related to discovery[3], clerical[4], mediation[5], and fee motion, the court would agree that the total time billed to prepare initial discovery requests is high.[6]

As such, the Court reduces the requested lodestar by $9,130 . In all other respects, the billings are proper and reasonable. To be clear, the Court finds the reasonable amount of fees, based upon its experience and knowledge of this type of litigation, the lack of novelty and complexity of this case, and the professed specialization of Plaintiff’s counsel is $73,650.

Plaintiffs seek costs of $11,614.61. Defendant does not contest Plaintiff’s costs and expenses. (Opp. 2:9.)

Accordingly, the court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion requesting costs for $11,614.61.

[1] Defendant relies on the 2018 Real Rate Report: The Industry’s Leading Analysis of Law Firm Rates, Trends, and Practices identified in the matter Arias v. Ford Motor Co., No. (2020) WL 1940843. The court is not persuaded by this argument and declines to develop it further.

[2] For example, this court has awarded 1.1 hours for preparing a similar Song-Beverly Complaint.

[3] Preparing request and deposition preparation.

[4]Notices.

[5]Preparation and brief.

[6]The court declines to award any fees for the meet and confer to attempt to resolve the fee dispute.