Judge: Upinder S. Kalra, Case: 22STCV39841, Date: 2023-11-08 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV39841 Hearing Date: November 8, 2023 Dept: 51
Tentative Ruling
Judge Upinder S.
Kalra, Department 51
HEARING DATE: November
8, 2023
CASE NAME: Melrose Crossing LLC v. Tahira By KB
LLC, et al.
CASE NO.: 22STCV39841
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MOTION
FOR SUMMAR JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMAR ADJUDICATION
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MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff
Melrose Crossing LLC
RESPONDING PARTY(S): None as of November 2, 2023
REQUESTED RELIEF:
1. Summary
Judgment Against All Defendants including damages of $196,518.24 plus interest,
plus reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, as allowed under the subject lease
and guaranty of lease;
2. Summary
Adjudication of the First Cause of Action for Breach of Written Lease against
Defendant Tahaira;
3. Summary
Adjudication of the Second Cause of Action for Breach of Written Guaranty of
Lease against Defendants Kali Christina Young Burns and Elvir Hukic.
TENTATIVE RULING:
1. Motion
for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:
On December 22, 2022, Plaintiff Melrose Crossing LLC
(Plaintiff) filed a Complaint against Defendants Tahira By KB LLC, Kali
Christina Young Burns, and Elvir Hukic with two causes of action for: (1)
Breach of Written Lease, and (2) Breach of Written Guaranty of Lease.
According to the Complaint, the property at issue is
commercial property located at 7024 Melrose Ave., Suite 200 (Unit 4-5), Los
Angeles, California 90038 (the Property) that Plaintiff owns. Plaintiff alleges
to have entered into a written lease agreement for the Property with Defendant
Tahira on May 25, 2021 for a term of five years from June 1, 2021 to May 31,
2026. On the same date, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Burns and Hukic
executed a Guaranty to promptly pay all rents under the lease. Plaintiff
alleges that Defendant Tahira entered into possession of the Property but
failed to pay certain base rent and additional rent. Plaintiff further alleges
that Defendant abandoned the Property and has stopped paying rent since May 1,
2022. Plaintiff alleges they have been unable to relet the Property.
Defendants filed an Answer on February 2, 2023.
On August 10, 2023, the court held a Post-Mediation Status
Conference where Defendants did not appear and Plaintiff represented to the
court that they have not had contact with Defendants.
On August 25, 2023, Plaintiff timely filed and served the
instant motion. Defendants’ opposition was due on or before October 25, 2023.
Defendants did not file an opposition.
LEGAL STANDARD:
Request for
Judicial Notice
The court grants Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice as
to Exhibits 2 and 3. (Evid. Code § 452(c), (h); See Kalnoki v. First American Trustee Servicing
Solutions, LLC (2017) 8
Cal.App.5th 23,37.) However, the court only takes judicial notice of the
foregoing documents only as to “the existence, content and authenticity of
public records and other specified documents”; it does not take judicial notice
of the truth of the factual matters asserted in those documents. (Dominguez v. Bonta (2022) 87 Cal. App.
5th 389, 400.)¿
Summary
Judgment/Adjudication
A party seeking summary judgment
has the burden of producing evidentiary facts sufficient to entitle him/her to
judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(c).) The
moving party must make an affirmative showing that he/she is entitled to
judgment irrespective of whether or not the opposing party files an
opposition. (Villa v. McFerren
(1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 733, 742-743.) Thus, “the initial burden is
always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no
triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf
v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519 (citing Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001)
25 Cal.4th 826, 850.)
When a plaintiff seeks summary
judgment, he/she must produce admissible evidence on each element of each cause
of action on which judgment is sought. (Code Civ. Proc., §
437c(p)(1).) When a defendant seeks summary judgment, he/she has the “burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit
if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action, even
if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete
defense to the cause of action.” (Code of Civ. Proc. §
437c(p)(2).)
The opposing party on a motion
for summary judgment is under no evidentiary burden to produce rebuttal
evidence until the moving party meets his or her initial movant’s burden.
(Binder v. Aetna Life Insurance Company (1999)
75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840.) Once the initial movant’s burden is met, then
the burden shifts to the opposing party to show, with admissible evidence, that
there is a triable issue requiring the weighing procedures of trial.
(Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(p).) The opposing party may not simply rely on
his/her allegations to show a triable issue but must present evidentiary facts
that are substantial in nature and rise beyond mere speculation. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998)
68¿Cal.App.4th 151, 162.) Summary judgment must be granted “if all
the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the
evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there
is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7¿Cal.App.4th¿1110,
1119.)
As to any alternative request for
summary adjudication of issues, such alternative relief must be clearly set
forth in the Notice of Motion and the general burden-shifting rules apply but
the issues upon which summary adjudication may be sought are limited by
statute. (Code Civ. Proc., §¿437c(f)(1).) “A motion for summary
adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of
action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of
duty.” (Ibid.)
ANALYSIS:
Breach of Written
Lease
Plaintiff contends that it met its burden to show a
contract, that Plaintiff performed under the contract, that Defendant Tahari
breached the contract, and that Plaintiff suffered damages because of the
breach. Defendants filed no opposition.
To state a claim for breach of contract, a plaintiff must
allege sufficient facts to establish (1) a contract between the parties, (2)
plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant’s breach,
and (4) damages to the plaintiff from the breach. (Wall Street Network, Ltd. v. New York Times Co. (2008) 164
Cal.App.4th 1171, 1178.) “As damages are an element of a breach of
contract cause of action [citation], a plaintiff cannot obtain judgment on a
breach of contract cause of action in an amount of damages to be determined later.” (Paramount Petroleum Corp. v. Superior Court (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th
226, 241.)
As the moving party, Plaintiff has the burden to show,
through admissible evidence, that there is no genuine dispute of material fact
as to each element of a cause of action for breach of contract.
Plaintiff submitted the declaration of Daniel Farasat,
manager of Tiger West Capital, LLC, which is the managing member of Plaintiff
in support of its motion. Farasat states that he personally negotiated the
terms of the May 25, 2021 lease between Plaintiff and Defendant Tahira.
(Farasat Decl. ¶ 3.) Additionally, Farasat details the terms of the lease,
including the agreed-upon base pay rate, the term, the security deposit,
provisions for late charges. (Ibid.)
Plaintiff also attached a copy of the lease. (Ibid., Exhibit 6.)
Plaintiff performed under the lease because Defendant Tahira
took possession of the Property on June 1, 2021. (Farasat Decl. ¶ 5.)
Defendant Tahira breached the lease by failing to pay rent
since April 2022. (Farasat Decl. ¶¶ 5, 6.)
Plaintiff demonstrated damages from Defendant Tahira’s
breach. First, Plaintiff was unable to relet the Property until March 15, 2023.
(Farasat Dec. ¶ 6.) However, this new lease ends on March 31, 2025, leaving
fourteen (14) months on Defendant Tahira’s original lease. (Ibid.) Additionally, the new lease is
for less rent than Defendant Tahira’s lease. (Id. at ¶ 7; see also Exhibit
9.) Plaintiff also incurred broker commission fees from South Park Group related
to locating the new tenant. (Id. at ¶
8; Exhibit 10.) In sum, Plaintiff calculates rental damages of $196,518.24 for
the period of May 1, 2022 through May 31, 2026.[1] (Id. at ¶ 9.)
Defendant Tahira has not filed an Opposition or any
objections to the instant Motion to argue that there is a genuine dispute of
material fact.
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s evidence is sufficient
to establish the existence of the lease agreement and Defendant Tahira’s breach
by failing to abide by the terms of the agreement, including failing to pay
rent. As a result, Plaintiff has suffered damages in the amount of $196,518.24
for the months Defendant Tahira has not paid rent.
Accordingly, Plaintiff has met its burden and is entitled to
summary judgment on its cause of action for breach of written lease agreement.
Breach of Written
Guaranty of Lease
Plaintiff contends that it established the existence of a
guaranty, Defendants’ default, and failure of Defendants to make payment under
the guaranty.[2]
Defendants did not file an opposition.
“A lender is entitled to judgment on a breach of guaranty
claim based upon undisputed evidence that (1) there is a valid guaranty, (2)
the borrower has defaulted, and (3) the guarantor failed to perform under the
guaranty.” (Gray1 CPB, LLC v.
Kolokotronis (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 480, 486).
Alternatively, Plaintiff’s claim can also be interpreted as a
breach of contract claim.[3] To state a
claim for breach of contract, a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to
establish (1) a contract between the parties, (2) plaintiff’s performance or
excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant’s breach, and (4) damages to the
plaintiff from the breach. (Wall Street
Network, Ltd. v. New York Times Co. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1171, 1178.) “As damages are
an element of a breach of contract cause of action [citation], a plaintiff
cannot obtain judgment on a breach of contract cause of action in an amount of damages to be determined later.” (Paramount Petroleum Corp. v. Superior Court (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th
226, 241.)
Here, under either analysis, the court agrees with Plaintiff
that there is no genuine dispute of material facts. First, Plaintiff provided
the Declaration of Farasat, who as discussed above negotiated the underlying
Lease and Guaranty, attached a copy of the Guaranty. (Farasat Decl. ¶ 4;
Exhibit 7.) Second, Plaintiff performed because Defendant Tahira took
possession of the property and Defendant Tahira defaulted because they stopped
making rent payments after April 1, 2022. (Farasat Decl. ¶ 6.) Third, Defendants
Burns and Hukic have not paid Plaintiff after Defendant Tahira’s default. (See Farasat
Decl. ¶¶ 4, 5, 6.) Fourth, Plaintiff suffered damages in the amount of
$196,518.24 for the months Defendant Tahira has not paid rent. (Farasat Decl.
¶¶ 6, 7, 8, 9,10.)
Accordingly, Plaintiff has met its burden and is entitled to
summary judgment on its cause of action for breach of guaranty.
CONCLUSION:
For
the foregoing reasons, the Court decides the pending motion as follows:
1. Motion
for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
Moving party is to give notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: November
8, 2023 __________________________________ Upinder
S. Kalra
Judge
of the Superior Court
[1]
Plaintiff
also claims attorney’s fees, pursuant to paragraph 31 of the lease, but has not
included the amount. (Farasat Decl. ¶ 10.)
[2]
Plaintiff cites a case that includes a demand for payment as an element for
this claim. However, upon reviewing the Guaranty Agreement, the parties agreed
to waive this requirement. Therefore, the court will deem it met (or
inapplicable).
[3]
The court is not bound by the captions or labels of a
cause of action in a pleading and the nature and character of a pleading is to
be determined from the facts alleged, not the name given by the pleader to the
cause of action. Thus, regardless of whether the complaint gives the
causes of action a label imbued with personal property law meaning, it is the
facts behind the label which govern the nature and character of the primary
right sued upon. (Ananda Church of
Self-Realization v. Massachusetts Bay Insurance (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1273,
1281.)