Judge: Upinder S. Kalra, Case: 23STCP01194, Date: 2023-08-23 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCP01194 Hearing Date: August 23, 2023 Dept: 51
Tentative Ruling
Judge Upinder
S. Kalra, Department 51
HEARING DATE: August 23, 2023
CASE NAME: Hallock Design Hospitality, LLC v. Sheila Vance
CASE NO.: 23STCP01194
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DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT BASED ON SISTER
STATE JUDGMENT
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MOVING PARTY: Defendant
Sheila Vance
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Hallock Design Hospitality, LLC
TENTATIVE RULING:
Motion to
Vacate Judgment is DENIED.
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL
FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:
On October 1, 2018, Hallock Design Hospitality,
LLC (“HDH”) filed a First Amended Complaint in the Circuit Court of the 11th
Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County, Florida in Case No.
2018-000477-CA-01, captioned Hallock Design Hospitality, LLC v. Sam Vaziri
Vance et al. (the "Florida Action"). The Florida Action alleged
breach of contract against Sam Vaziri Vance, Inc. dba Sama Eyewear
("SVVI") and civil theft and fraud against SVVl's principal, Sheila
Vance ("Vance").
On December 6, 2018, Sheila filed an
Answer to the First Amended Complaint, asserting the affirmative defense that
the Florida court "lacks personal jurisdiction over her, as she is not a
Florida resident and took no actions on [sic.] her individual capacity in
Florida.” Nevertheless, the Florida Court entered a final Judgment on July 20,
2022, and made the following findings:
“As for the Court's
personal jurisdiction, [HDH] established at trial that Mrs. Vance committed a
tortious act within Florida by initiating the AMEX chargeback disputes which
ultimately resulted in the funds in question being wrongfully withdrawn from
HDH’s account in Miami. As per John Hall Elec. Contracting, Inc. v. Allstate
Const., Inc., 917 So. 2d 310, 311-12 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) and En vases Venezolanos, S.A. v. Coloazo, 559 So. 2d 651,
652-53 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990), ... , this is sufficient to establish the commission
of a tortious act within Florida since the funds at issue were wrongfully
withdrawn from a Florida bank account. Thus, the Court possess personal
jurisdiction over Mrs. Vance, irrespective of her physical presence (or lack
thereof) within the state, pursuant to Florida Statutes §48.193(2) (committing
a tortious act within Florida). See also, Wendt
v. Horowitz,
822 So. 2d 1252, 1260 (Fla. 2002); State, Office of Atty. Gen., Dept. of
Legal Affairs v. Wyndham International, Inc. 869 So. 2d 592, 595-96 (Fla.
1st DCA 2004) (physical presence within Florida unnecessary for personal
jurisdictional purposes; electronic communications into the state, from which
the cause of action arises, sufficient to bestow jurisdiction).”
The Florida Court then entered a final
judgment against Vance for civil theft in the sum of $227,538.96 and fraud in
the amount of $20,879.88, for a total judgment of $248,418.84. It also entered
an order granting HDH’s attorneys fees and costs against Vance in the sum of
$232,230. The total amount remaining unpaid on the Florida Judgment against
Vance is $480,648.94.
On August 18, 2022, Vance appealed the
Florida Judgment. However, she did not file an opening brief and thus abandoned
her appeal. On February 28, 2023, the appeal was dismissed.
On April
12, 2023, HDH filed an application for entry of judgment on sister-state
judgment in the amount of $486,708.05, the amount remaining unpaid
on the sister-state judgment plus the filing fee for the application and
$15,624.11 in interest.
On April
17, 2023, the Clerk entered the judgment in favor of HDH in the full amount
requested.
On June 2,
2023, Vance filed the instant motion to vacate the April 17, 2023 judgment.
On August
10, 2023, HDH filed an opposition, a request for judicial notice, a notice of
lodging, and the Declaration of Kevin Dicker in support of the opposition. No
reply brief was filed.
REQUEST FOR
JUDICIAL NOTICE
The Court
grants Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice as to Exhibits 1-11, pursuant to
Evidence Code § 452(a) and (d).
LEGAL
STANDARD
Code of Civil Procedure
section 1710.40 provides, in pertinent part:
“(a) A judgment entered pursuant to this chapter may be vacated
on any ground which would be a defense to an action in this state on the sister
state judgment, including the ground that the amount of interest accrued on the
sister state judgment and included in the judgment entered pursuant to this
chapter is incorrect.
(b)
Not later than 30 days after service of notice of entry of judgment pursuant to¿Section 1710.30, proof of which has been made in the manner provided by
Article 5 (commencing with¿Section 417.10) of Chapter 4 of Title 5 of Part
2, the judgment debtor, on written notice to the judgment creditor, may make a
motion to vacate the judgment under this section.”
“The statute does
not identify the available defenses, but the Law Revision’s comment to section 1710.40 states that ‘[c]ommon
defenses to enforcement of a sister state judgment include the following: the
judgment is not final and unconditional . . .; the judgment was obtained by
extrinsic fraud; the judgment was rendered in excess of jurisdiction; the
judgment is not enforceable in the state of rendition; the plaintiff is guilty
of misconduct; the judgment has already been paid; [and] suit on the judgment
is barred by the statute of limitations in the state where enforcement is
sought.’” (Blizzard Energy, Inc. v. Schaefers
(2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 295, 298 (Blizzard Energy).)
California’s Sister State Money Judgments Act is “part of a procedural enactment that implements
the Full Faith and Credit Clause [citations], which is an ‘exacting’ constitutional
mandate [citation].” (Casey v. Hill (2022) 79
Cal.App.5th 937, 962 (Casey).) “[U]pon a claim that a foreign judgment is not
entitled to full faith and credit, the permissible scope of inquiry is limited
to a determination of whether the court of forum had fundamental jurisdiction
in the case. Accordingly, a judgment entered by one state must be recognized by
another state if the state of rendition had jurisdiction over the parties and
the subject matter and all interested parties were given reasonable notice and
opportunity to be heard.” (World Wide Imports, Inc. v. Bartel (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 1006, 1010 (World Wide Imports).) “As long as the sister state court had jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties, a sister state judgment is entitled to full faith and
credit ‘even as to matters of law or fact erroneously
decided.’” (Bank of America v. Jennett
(1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 104, 118 (Bank of America).)
“[While]
it is established that a court in one State, when asked to give effect to the
judgment of a court in another State, may constitutionally inquire into the
foreign court’s jurisdiction to render that judgment, the
modern decisions of [the Supreme] Court have carefully delineated the
permissible scope of such an inquiry. From these decisions there emerges the general
rule that a judgment is entitled to full faith and credit—even as to questions
of jurisdiction—when the second court’s inquiry
discloses that those questions have been fully and fairly litigated and finally
decided in the court which rendered the original judgment.”
(Bank of America, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 113, quotation
marks omitted.)
“A California
court, in ruling on a motion to vacate entry of a sister state judgment, may
not retry the case.” (Blizzard, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 298.) “The party moving to vacate entry of judgment has the burden to show by a
preponderance of the evidence that she is entitled to relief.” (Casey, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 961.)
ANALYSIS:
Here,
Plaintiff’s proof of service of the notice of entry of judgment, dated April
17, 2023, is unsigned and therefore improper. Thus, Vance’s motion to vacate is
timely.
On
the merits, Vance contends that the sister state judgment should be vacated
because the Florida Court did not have jurisdiction over her in the Florida
Action. Vance states that Wade Hallock, the principal of HDH, admitted at trial
that Vance was and is a resident of California and did not travel to Florida in
connection with the events that led to this lawsuit. (Michel
Decl., Ex. C.) Vance also states that there was no evidence
shown at trial demonstrating she had “continuous” and “substantial” activity in Florida, or “substantial and not isolated activities in
Florida.” Further,
Vance states that there was no evidence that she had any contacts in Florida
that were related or unrelated to the litigation. Vance contends that her
liability derives from disputing charges to American Express on behalf of SVVI,
for which she is a principal. Vance admits disputing the charges to American Express; and states
that American Express reviewed evidence presented by HDH and made the decision
that the reversal of charges was appropriate. (Michel
Decl., Ex. C.)
Despite
these arguments, the Court finds that Vance does not meet its burden to show
Florida lacked jurisdiction. Vance already litigated this issue in the Florida
Action. [RJN, Ex. 4, pp.
18-19]. There, the Florida Court
found that it possessed personal jurisdiction over Vance, irrespective of her lack of
physical presence within the state, because she committed a tortious act within
Florida by initiating the AMEX chargeback disputes which ultimately resulted in
the funds in question being wrongfully withdrawn from HDH' s account in Miami.
(Ibid.) Florida’s long-arm statute provides that any person, whether or
not a citizen of the state, submits herself to jurisdiction of the courts of
the state by committing a tortious act within the state. (Florida Statutes (2001) §48.193(i)(b).) Therefore, Florida’s Court properly
determined that it had jurisdiction over Vance. Vance’s moving papers do not
show that the Florida Court reached an improper conclusion. Accordingly, her
motion is denied.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court decides the pending motion as
follows:
Motion to Vacate Judgment is DENIED.
Moving
party to give notice.
IT IS
SO ORDERED.
Dated: August 23,
2023 ___________________________________
Upinder
S. Kalra
Judge
of the Superior Court