Judge Upinder S. Kalra, Case Number: 23STCV07579, Date: 2025-01-14 Tentative Ruling

1. If you wish to submit on the tentative ruling, please email the clerk at SMCdept51@lacourt.org (and “cc” all other parties in the same email) and notify all other parties in advance that you will not be appearing at the hearing. Include the word "SUBMISSION" in all caps in the subject line and include your name, contact information, the case number, and the party you represent in the body of the email. If you do not have access to the internet, you may call the clerk at (213) 633-0351.

If you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear and argue the motion, and the Court may decide not to adopt the tentative ruling. Please note that the tentative ruling is not an invitation, nor an opportunity, to file any further documents relative to the hearing in question which are not authorized by statute or Rule of Court.

2. For any motion where no parties submit to the tentative ruling in advance, and no parties appear at the motion hearing, the Court may elect to either adopt the tentative ruling or take the motion off calendar, in its discretion.

3. DO NOT USE THE ABOVE EMAIL FOR ANY PURPOSE OTHER THAN TO SUBMIT TO A TENTATIVE RULING. The Court will not read or respond to emails sent to this address for any other purpose.

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiffs Jonathan Alvarez and Maria Concepcion Alvarez

1. Summary Judgment on all Causes of Action in the Complaint in favor of Defendant General Motors LLC.

On April 6, 2023, Plaintiff Jonathan Alvarez and Maria Concepcion Alvarez (Plaintiffs) filed a Song-Beverly Complaint against Defendant General Motors LLC with causes of action for: (1) Violation of Civil Code Sec. 1793.2(d); (2) Violation of Civil Code Sec. 1793.2(b); (3) Violation of Civil Code Sec. 1793.2(a)(3); (4) Breach of the Implied Warranty of Merchantability; and (5) Violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.

According to the Complaint, Plaintiffs purchased a 2019 Chevrolet Silverado VIN 2GCRCPEC0K1122214 (the Vehicle) that was manufactured by Defendant. Plaintiffs further allege they entered a warranty contract with Defendant, that the Vehicle was defective, and that Defendant failed to replace or reimburse Plaintiffs.

On April 26, 2024, Defendant filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment (MSJ). On November 20, 2024, Plaintiffs filed an opposition. On November 25, 2024, Defendant filed a reply.

A motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(c).)

A party may also bring a noticed motion for summary adjudication that one or more causes of action has no merit. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(f)(1).) A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty. (Ibid.) A motion for summary adjudication proceeds in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment. (Id. at (f)(2).)

A defendant moving for summary judgment must show either (1) one or more elements of the cause of actions cannot be established, or (2) a complete affirmative defense to the cause of action exists. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(o), (p)(2).) A defendant may demonstrate that an element of a cause of action cannot be established by showing that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.¿(2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 854,¿as modified (July 11, 2001).)

Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.¿(2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 849,¿as modified (July 11, 2001).) The plaintiff may not rely upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists but, instead, must “set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.) A triable issue of material fact exists if the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof. (Id. at 850.)

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment or adjudication, the court considers all the evidence and all the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom and must view such evidence in the light most favorable to the opposing party. (See Id. at 843; All of US or None - Riverside Chapter v. Hamrick¿(2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 751, 783,¿reh'g denied (June 17, 2021), review denied (Sept. 1, 2021).)

The court OVERRULES Plaintiffs’ evidentiary objections to the extent they challenge the authentication of the exhibits. The court SUSTAINS the objections as they relate to the additional commentary offered by Jensen. The documents speak for themselves.

Defendant contends that summary judgment in their favor is warranted because it is undisputed that Plaintiffs purchased a used vehicle without new or additional warranty coverage by Defendant. As such, Plaintiffs cannot establish an essential element for their first through third causes of action which also impacts Plaintiffs’ fifth cause of action. Defendant further contends that Plaintiffs cannot establish that Defendant was a distributor or retail seller rather than just the manufacturer so their fourth cause of action fails, too.

Plaintiffs argue that Rodriguez v. FCA US, LLC (2024) 17 Cal.5th 189 (Rodriguez) does not affect their Second, Third, and Fourth Causes of Action. Additionally, Plaintiffs argue there are triable issues of fact as to whether Defendant partnered with the dealership that sold the Vehicle to Plaintiffs. Finally, Plaintiffs argue there is a triable issue of fact for their First Cause of Action whether they were the first individual consumers of the Vehicle.

Defendant replies that Plaintiff did not actually dispute the material facts presented in the Separate Statement and their legal argument to reclassify themselves as the first buyer is unsupported by the law.

As a procedural issue, Plaintiffs’ responsive separate statement does not comply with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(f)(2). While Plaintiffs have disputed many of Defendant’s material facts, Plaintiffs’ responses fail to actually provide the nature of the dispute. Instead, Plaintiffs’ responses either amount to legal conclusion or legal argument. Thus, because these responses insufficiently prove the nature of the dispute, the court finds that the following material facts are undisputed:

2. “Rydell Chevrolet delivered the Silverado to its original owner on September 7, 2018, with 9 miles on its odometer.” (UMF No. 5.)

3. “In connection with that delivery to the Silverado’s original owner, GM issued a New Vehicle Limited Warranty with bumper-to-bumper coverage for the earlier of 48 months or 50,000 miles and powertrain coverage for the earlier of 72 months or 70,000 miles.” (UMF No. 6.)

4. “The Warranty’s coverage began when Rydell Chevroleet delivered the Silverado to its original owner on September 7, 2018.” (UMF No. 7.)[1]

5. “Importantly, GM did not issue or provide any new or additional warranty coverage to Plaintiffs or the vehicle when Maria Concepcion Alvarez bought the Silverado used in July 2019; Plaintiffs received only the balance of coverage under the Warranty that GM issued back in September 7, 2018.” (UMF No. 8.)

“The Song–Beverly Act is a remedial statute designed to protect consumers who have purchased products covered by an express warranty.” (Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 798.) The Song-Beverly Act requires that “[e]very manufacturer of consumer goods sold in this state and for which the manufacturer has made an express warranty shall: [¶] (1)(A) Maintain in this state sufficient service and repair facilities reasonably close to all areas where its consumer goods are sold to carry out the terms of those warranties or designate and authorize in this state as service and repair facilities independent repair or service facilities reasonably close to all areas where its consumer goods are sold to carry out the terms of the warranties.” (Civ. Code, § 1793.2(a).)

For motor vehicles specifically, “[i]f the manufacturer or its representative in this state is unable to service or repair a new motor vehicle, as that term is defined in paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of Section 1793.22, to conform to the applicable express warranties after a reasonable number of attempts, the manufacturer shall either promptly replace the new motor vehicle in accordance with subparagraph (A) or promptly make restitution to the buyer in accordance with subparagraph (B).” (Civ. Code, § 1793.2(d)(2) [bolding added].)

“For new products, liability extends to the manufacturer; for used products, liability extends to the distributor or retail seller and not to the manufacturer, at least where the manufacturer has not issued a new warranty or played a substantial role in the sale of a used good.” (Rodriguez, supra, at p. 202.) For purposes of Civil Code section 1793.2(d), the term “‘[n]ew motor vehicle’ means a new motor vehicle that is bought or used primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. ‘New motor vehicle’ also means a new motor vehicle with a gross vehicle weight under 10,000 pounds that is bought or used primarily for business purposes by a person, including a partnership, limited liability company, corporation, association, or any other legal entity, to which not more than five motor vehicles are registered in this state.” (Civ. Code, § 1793.22(e)(2).) “[O]ther motor vehicle sold with a manufacturer’s new car warranty” means “a vehicle for which a manufacturer’s new car warranty is issued with the sale.” (Rodriguez, supra, at p. 206.) Under Song-Beverly, a manufacturer is “generally off the hook” for used vehicles. (Kiluk v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 334, 339.)

Here, Defendant met their burden that there is no triable issue of fact that Plaintiffs are not entitled to Song-Beverly protections. First, it is undisputed that the Vehicle is used. (UMF No. 2.) Second, it is undisputed that Defendant did not issue a new or additional warranty to Plaintiffs. (UMF No. 8.) Therefore, Defendant met its burden. Plaintiffs, in turn, did not meet theirs. In fact, UMF No. 2 is unequivocally undisputed and, as discussed above, Plaintiffs provided argument – not facts – concerning UMF No. 8. The court declines to analyze Plaintiffs’ additional argument challenging the verbiage of buyer.

What is more, Rodriguez supports Defendant’s position – not Plaintiffs’. There, the plaintiff purchased a “two-year-old car with over 55,000 miles on it” with an “unexpired manufacturer’s new car warranty” that could not be repaired despite numerous repair attempts. (Rodriguez, supra at p. 195-196.) The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff’s car was not a new motor vehicle. (Id. at p. 196.) Here, like the plaintiffs in Rodriguez, Plaintiffs bought the Vehicle used with 9,204 miles on it and Defendant did not issue a new or additional warranty to Plaintiffs. (UMF Nos. 2, 8.) The Vehicle is therefore not a new vehicle.

Accordingly, the court GRANTS Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to the First Cause of Action.

Civil Code section 1793(b) requires an authorized repair facility to repair the goods to conform to the express warranties within 30 days. (Civ. Code, § 1793.2(b).) However, this applies for vehicles with an express warranty from the manufacturer. (Civ. Code § 1793.2(a).)

Here, Defendant met their burden. Notably, there is no express warranty from Defendant to Plaintiff. (UMF No. 8.) As above, Plaintiff did not meet their burden because they provided no facts.

Accordingly, the court GRANTS Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to the Second Cause of Action.

Under Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (a)(3) (third cause of action), the manufacturer must “[m]ake available to authorized service and repair facilities sufficient service literature and replacement parts to effect repairs during the express warranty period.”

For the same reasons articulated above, the court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the Third Cause of Action.

Fourth Cause of Action – Breach of the Implied Warranty of Merchantability

“[E]very sale of consumer goods that are sold at retail in this state shall be accompanied by the manufacturer's and the retail seller's implied warranty that the goods are merchantable.” (Civ. Code, § 1792; see also Civ. Code, § 1791.1.) “ ‘“Consumer goods” means any new product or part thereof that is used, bought, or leased for use primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, except for clothing and consumables.’ (§ 1791, italics added.)” (Kiluk, supra, at p. 339.)

“The Song-Beverly Act provides similar remedies in the context of the sale of used goods, except that the manufacturer is generally off the hook: ‘Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision (a) of Section 1791 defining consumer goods to mean “new” goods, the obligation of a distributor or retail seller of used consumer goods in a sale in which an express warranty is given shall be the same as that imposed on manufacturers under this chapter except: [¶] (a) It shall be the obligation of the distributor or retail seller making express warranties with respect to used consumer goods (and not the original manufacturer, distributor, or retail seller making express warranties with respect to such goods when new) to maintain sufficient service and repair facilities within this state to carry out the terms of such express warranties.’ (§ 1795.5, subd. (a).)” (Kiluk, supra, at p.339.) “[T]he assumption baked into section 1795.5 is that the manufacturer and the distributor/retailer are distinct entities. Where the manufacturer sells directly to the public, however, it takes on the role of a retailer.” (Kiluk, supra, at p.340.) Thus, “in the sale of used consumer goods, liability for breach of implied warranty lies with distributors and retailers, not the manufacturer, where there is no evidence the manufacturer played any role in the sale of the used car to plaintiff.” (Nunez v. FCA US LLC (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 385, 398.)

Here, Defendant met their burden that there are no triable issues of material fact. First, as above, the Vehicle is used. (UMF No. 2.) Second, Plaintiffs purchased the Vehicle from Panda Motors Direct which is not a GM-authorized dealership. (UMF No. 3.) The burden shifts. Plaintiffs did not meet their burden. Indeed, Plaintiffs provided no additional facts that GM was a retailer. Since the Vehicle was purchased by Plaintiffs as a used vehicle, only the distributor/retailer can be liable for a breach of express warranty. (Nunez, supra, at p. 398.) As such, summary judgment is proper.

Accordingly, the court GRANTS Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to the Fourth Cause of Action.

The failure to sate a state warranty claim under state law constitutes a failure to state a claim under the MMA. (Daugherty v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 824, 832–33.)

As discussed above, Plaintiffs’ causes of action forming the basis for their Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act claim fail. As such, they cannot maintain this claim as a matter of law.[2]

Accordingly, the court GRANTS Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to the Fifth Cause of Action.

[1] The court notes the typo identified by both parties in the exhibit.

[2] Plaintiffs’ argument that this claim can survive without the underlying Song-Beverly claims relying on non-binding federal authority is unpersuasive. The court declines to develop it further.