Judge: Upinder S. Kalra, Case: 23STCV10724, Date: 2023-10-18 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV10724 Hearing Date: October 18, 2023 Dept: 51
Tentative Ruling
Judge Upinder S.
Kalra, Department 51
HEARING DATE: October
18, 2023
CASE NAME: Rhayeka C. Stewart v. Eric Robbins
CASE NO.: 23STCV10724
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MOTION
TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION
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MOVING PARTY: Defendant
Eric Robbins
RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiff Rhayeka C. Stewart
REQUESTED RELIEF:
1. An
order dismissing this action.
TENTATIVE RULING:
1. Motion
to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction is DENIED. The action is STAYED.
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:
Plaintiff Rhayeka C. Stewart (Plaintiff) filed a Complaint
on July 21, 2023 against Defendant Eric Robbins, an individual and Successor
Trustee of the Barbara Jean Powell Trust, Dated March 22, 2007 (Defendant). The
Complaint has seven causes of action for: (1) Order Invalidating Purported
Amendment to Trust Based on Lack of Capacity, Undue Influence, and Fraud; (2)
Elder Abuse; (3) Conversion; (4) Unjust Enrichment; (5) Recovery of Personal Property;
(6) Declaratory Relief and Constructive Trust; and (7) Cancellation of
Instrument.[1]
According to the Complaint, Plaintiff is the niece of
decedent Barbara J. Powell (Decedent) and a rightful beneficiary of the Barbara
J. Powell Trust dated March 22, 2007. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant used undue
influence over Decedent to prepare and execute an amendment to the Trust that
benefited him.
Defendant timely filed the instant motion on July 21, 2023.
Plaintiff filed timely an opposition on October 3, 2023.
Defendant timely filed a reply on October 6, 2023.
ANALYSIS:
Procedural Issues –
Failure to File a Demurrer
Under California Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) § 430.10(c),
a defendant may seek the abatement of an action by demurrer when “there is
another action pending between the same parties on the same cause of
action.” (See People ex rel. Garamendi v. Am. Autoplan (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 760,
770 (Garamendi) [“Under the statutory
plea in abatement the pendency of another earlier action growing out of the
same transaction and between the same parties is a ground for abatement of the
second action”]; Bistawros v. Greenberg
(1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 189, 192 [“an objection to a complaint on the basis that
a substantially similar lawsuit is pending is properly raised by demurrer
provided the defect appears on the face of the pleading or from judicially
noticed facts”].)
A demurrer is also the proper method of seeking dismissal or
stay of a subsequently filed action based on the rule of exclusive concurrent
jurisdiction. (See Garamendi, supra, at p. 771 [“Since the rule of exclusive
concurrent jurisdiction and the statutory plea in abatement are mandatory and
not discretionary judicial actions, these issues should be raised by demurrer
where the issue appears on the face of the complaint and by answer where
factual issues must be resolved”].)
Mandatory actions of the trial court should be raised by demurrer or
answer; discretionary actions should be raised by appropriate motion. (Leadford
v. Leadford (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 571, 574.)
Because the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction is a mandatory and
not discretionary judicial action, these issues should be raised by demurrer
where the issue appears on the face of the complaint and by answer where
factual issues must be resolved. (Ibid.)
If not raised by demurrer (or answer), objection on the
grounds of another action pending is deemed waived. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.80(a).)
Here, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Jurisdiction but relies exclusively on case authority that refers to abatement
actions. (See, e.g., California Union
Ins. Co. v. Trinity River Land Co. (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 104; Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Superior Court
(1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 455; Plant
Insulation Co. v. Fireboard Corp. (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 781; Wulfjen v. Dolton (1944) 24 Cal.2d 891.)[2]
Without directly citing statutory
authority to support his position, the court can only infer from the cited case
law that Defendant intended to file a demurrer under CCP § 430.10(c).[3]
Plaintiff did file an Opposition to this motion and
apparently sought to challenge the merits.
Accordingly, the court will consider the merits of
Defendant’s motion.
Exclusive
Concurrent Jurisdiction
“It is clearly established that a party may not split up a
single cause of action and make it the basis of separate suis, and in such case
the first action may be pleaded in abatement of any subsequent suit on the same
claim.” (Wulfjen v. Dolton (1944) 24
Cal.2d 891, 894. (Wulfjen).)[4]
“The rule against splitting a cause of action is based upon two reasons: (1)
That the defendant should be protected against vexatious litigation; and (2)
that it is against public policy to permit litigants to consume the time of the
courts by relitigating matters already judicially determined, or by asserting
claims which properly should have been settled in some prior action.” (Id. at pp. 894-95.)
“The violation of one primary right constitutes a single
cause of action, though it may entitled the injured party to many forms of
relief, and the relief is not to be confounded with the cause of action, one
not being determinative of the other.” (Id.
at pp. 895-96.) The primary right theory is “invoked most often when a
plaintiff attempts to divide a primary right and enforce it in two suits.” (Crowley v. Katleman (1994) 8 Cal.4th
666, 682.)[5]
“[I]f the first suit is still pending when the second is filed, the defendant
in the second suit may plead that fact in abatement.” (Ibid.) (citing to CCP § 430.10(c).)
Here, the court agrees with Defendant that the instant
action concerns the same single cause of action alleged in the suit filed in
Orange County Superior Court. For instance, the first, second, and seventh
cause of action seek the same relief as the Petition Plaintiff field in Orange
County Superior Court. (Defendant’s Exhibit A.) Upon reviewing the Complaint, the
remaining causes of action that topically appear to be torts still concern the
underlying Trust Amendment’s validity.[6]
The third cause of action for conversion pertains to Decedent’s property that
was allegedly converted due to the Trust Amendment. (Compl. ¶¶ 36, 37)
Similarly, the fourth cause of action for unjust enrichment and the fifth cause
of action for recovery of personal property also concerns trust assets. (Compl.
¶¶ 40, 41, 44.) Finally, the sixth cause of action for declaratory relief and
constructive trust asks this court to determine the validity of the Trust
Amendment. (Compl. ¶¶ 49, 50.) Taken together, and without any authority
indicating otherwise, these causes of action can, and should be, properly be
resolved by the Court in Orange County.
CONCLUSION:
For
the foregoing reasons, the Court decides the pending motion as follows:
The action is STAYED.
Moving party is to give notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: October
17, 2023 __________________________________ Upinder
S. Kalra
Judge
of the Superior Court
[1]
The Complaint cites to Probate Code § 850 and Welf. & Inst. Code §§
15610.30, 15657.3.
[2]
Defendant also cites In re Marriage of
Torres (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1367, but reliance on this authority is
misplaced. There, the action exclusively concerned child custody under the
family law code and two competing actions for child custody filed in California
and in Pennsylvania. There was no discussion about abatement under CCP §
430.10(c).
[3]
Defendant does provide a separate notice of the motion that purports to
identify the grounds for dismissing the Complaint. However, the notice appears
to reiterate the entirety of the legal argument within the memorandum of points
and authorities. Moreover, Defendant’s motion does not comply with the
requirements set forth in California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1320
[4]
Wulfjen contained an Answer with
special affirmative defenses pursuant to CCP § 537.
[5]
Crowley contained a Demurrer under
CCP § 430.10(c).
[6]
Plaintiff has provided no authority supporting her contention that the Probate
Court in Orange County cannot resolve the alleged tort claims she raises here.