Judge: Upinder S. Kalra, Case: 23STCV10736, Date: 2023-10-23 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 23STCV10736    Hearing Date: October 23, 2023    Dept: 51

Tentative Ruling

Judge Upinder S. Kalra, Department 51

HEARING DATE:   October 23, 2023                                           

CASE NAME:           Daisy Gomez v. The Illumination Foundation

CASE NO.:                23STCV10736

MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

MOVING PARTY:  Defendant The Illumination Foundation

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiff Daisy Gomez

REQUESTED RELIEF:

1.      An Order striking various portions of the Complaint pertaining to punitive damages.

TENTATIVE RULING:

1.     Motion to Strike is GRANTED.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

Plaintiff Daisy Gomez (Plaintiff) filed a Complaint against Defendant The Illumination Foundation (Defendant) on May 12, 2023 with nine causes of action for:

1.      Discrimination in Violation of Gov’t Code §§ 12940 et seq.;

2.      Retaliation in Violation of Gov't Code §§ 12940 et seq.;

3.      Failure to Prevent Discrimination and Retaliation in Violation of Gov’t Code § 12940(k);

4.      Failure to Provide Reasonable Accommodation in Violation of Gov't Code §§ 12940 et seq.;

5.      Failure to Engage in Good Faith Interactive Process in Violation of Gov’t Code §§ 12940 et seq.;

6.      Violation of the Pregnancy Disability Leave Law (Gov’t Code § 12945(a));

7.      For Declaratory Judgment;

8.      Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy; and

9.      Failure to Permit Inspection of Personnel and Payroll Records (Cal. Labor Code § 1198.5).

According to the Complaint, Defendant hired Plaintiff on January 11, 2022 as a full-time non-exempt employee to clean rooms, wash sheets, and serve food. Plaintiff alleges she notified Defendant that she was pregnant in April 2022 and requested accommodations for pregnancy related medical visits and time off as requested by her doctor. Plaintiff alleges Defendant wrongfully terminated her on May 13, 2022.

Defendant timely filed the instant motion on August 8, 2023. Plaintiff timely filed an opposition on October 10, 2023. Defendant timely filed a reply on October 16, 2023.

LEGAL STANDARD:

Motion to Strike

The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436(a).) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Id., § 436(b).) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Id.¿§¿437.)¿“When the defect which justifies striking a complaint is capable of cure, the court should allow leave to amend.” (Vaccaro v. Kaiman¿(1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 761, 768.) 

Meet and Confer

A moving party is required to meet and confer prior to filing a motion to strike and to submit a declaration demonstrated they satisfied this requirement. (CCP § 435.5.) Upon reviewing the Declaration of Yolanda E. Lopez submitted with the motion to strike, the meet and confer requirement is met. (Lopez Decl. ¶¶ 5, 6.)

ANALYSIS:

Defendant moves to strike various portions of the Complaint which call for punitive damages.

1.      “Because the acts taken toward Plaintiff were carried out by officers, directors and/or managing agents acting in a deliberate, cold, callous, cruel and intentional manner, in conscious disregard of Plaintiff’s rights and in order to injure and damage Plaintiff, Plaintiff requests that punitive damages be levied against Defendants and each of them, in sums in excess of the jurisdictional minimum of this Court.” (Compl. ¶ 31.)

2.      “The foregoing conduct of Defendants individually, or by and through their officers, directors and/or managing agents, was intended by the Defendants to cause injury to the Plaintiff or was despicable conduct carried on by the Defendants with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights of Plaintiff or subjected Plaintiff to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of Plaintiff’s rights such as to constitute malice, oppression, or fraud under Civil Code §3294, thereby entitling Plaintiff to punitive damages in an amount appropriate to punish or make an example of Defendants.” (Compl. ¶¶ 42, 54, 60, 68, 76, 88, 109.)

3.      “punitive damages, pursuant to Civil Code §§3294 in amounts sufficient to punish Defendants for the wrongful conduct alleged herein and to deter such conduct in the future.” (Prayer for Relief No. 6.)

Punitive Damages – Oppression, Fraud, Malice

Defendant contends that Plaintiff stated a conclusory entitlement to punitive damages of which she is not entitled under Civ. Code § 3294.[1] Plaintiff argues that, when read as a whole, the Complaint facially satisfies the pleading requirement regarding entitlement to punitive damages.

Plaintiff also argues that intentional discrimination and wrongful termination related to her pregnancy falls under the umbrella to warrant a punitive damages award.

To obtain punitive damages, a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts in support of punitive damages.¿ (See¿Hilliard v. A.H. Robins Co.¿(1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 374, 391-92.)¿ In addition,¿punitive damages are allowed only where “it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.”¿ (Civ. Code, § 3294,¿subd. (a).)¿ Courts have viewed despicable conduct as conduct “so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people. (Scott v. Phoenix Schools, Inc., (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 702, 715.)  

Further, Civil Code § 3294(c) provides the definition of malice, oppression, and fraud. Malice is “conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” Oppression is “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.” Fraud is “an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” 

After reviewing the Complaint, the court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to support a claim for punitive damages. Unlike in Sasco Electric v. Fair Employment and Housing Com. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 532, 546 (where the evidence established that the employer concocted a layoff to hide that it terminated the plaintiff due to her pregnancy), here, Plaintiff alleges that she learned she was pregnant in April 2022, she informed Defendant of her pregnancy shortly thereafter, she requested accommodations for pregnancy related medical visits and time off as requested by her doctor, and Defendant terminated her employment on May 13, 2022. (Compl. ¶¶ 20, 21, and 22.) Reading the Complaint in its entirety, the only factual allegation that the court can identify is terminating Plaintiff because she was pregnant. (Compl. ¶¶ 20, 21, and 22.) While terminating a person due to their pregnancy is unlawful, that alone does not rise to the level of “oppression, fraud, or malice” required to award punitive damages.

Accordingly, Plaintiff did not sufficiently plead facts warranting an award for punitive damages.[2]

Punitive Damages – Entity Employer

Defendant contends that Plaintiff has not pleaded facts showing that its employee(s), who exercise substantial independent authority and judgment over decisions that ultimately determine policy, engaged in conduct set forth in CCP § 3294. Plaintiff argues she alleged sufficient facts for punitive damages against the entity employer.

Subsection (b) of Civil Code § 3294 states: 

An employer shall not be liable for damages pursuant to subdivision (a), based upon acts of an employee of the employer, unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation. 

Plaintiff identifies “Charles Lorenzo” and DOES 1 through 20 as persons “authorized and empowered to make decisions that reflect and/or create policy for Defendants.”[3] (Compl. ¶ 27.) However, Plaintiff concludes, rather than allege facts, that Defendant had “advanced knowledge” of the “aforementioned conduct of said managing agents” and that Defendant “ratified, authorized, and approved” said conduct. (Ibid.) Reading the Complaint in its entirety, the only factual allegation that the court can identify is terminating Plaintiff because she was pregnant. (Compl. ¶¶ 20, 21, and 22.) The court did not see any other factual allegations supporting Defendant’s “authorization, ratification, or act of oppression, fraud, or malice . . . [by] an officer, director, or managing agent.” (Civ. Code § 3294(b).) Additionally, the court did not read any factual allegations of “substantial discretionary authority over decisions that ultimately determine corporate policy” by any alleged unfit employee in the Complaint. (White v. Ultramar, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 563, 576.)

Accordingly, Plaintiff did not sufficiently plead facts to warrant punitive damages against Defendant as a corporate employer.[4]

CONCLUSION:

            For the foregoing reasons, the Court decides the pending motion as follows:

1.      Motion to Strike is GRANTED in its entirety.

Moving party is to give notice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:             October 23, 2023                    __________________________________                                                                                                                Upinder S. Kalra

                                                                                    Judge of the Superior Court